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In medical care resources are scarce and choices have to be made about how
these resources are to be distributed. For example, should we vaccinate all Dutch
students against mumps1 or should we introduce cartilage transplant for patients
with rheumatoid arthritis,2 or maybe both? To judge the optimal allocation of
medical resources, systematic economic evaluations are needed, comparing costs with
the benefits of health services.3 For these economic evaluations different techniques
can be used, among which cost-utility analysis. Cost-utility analysis compares the
costs of treatment to the outcomes obtained.
In cost-utility analysis preferences for a certain set of outcomes are measured
using health state utilities. Health state utilities are strongly related to health
related quality of life (HRQL) but they differ in that health state utilities measure
both quality of life and the valuation of this quality of life compared to perfect
health and death.4 Health state utilities are values between 0 and 1 that represent
individuals’ preferences for health states. Preferences are elicited using different
methods such as the Standard Gamble (SG), the Time-Trade-Off (TTO), and the
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS).5
In the SG participants are asked to choose between a certain outcome, the
health state to be valued, or a gamble with a probability (p) of receiving the best
possible outcome, perfect health, and a probability (1 − p) of receiving the worst
possible outcome, usually death. By varying p, the indifference point is searched,
the probability at which the participant is not able to choose between the gamble
and the sure outcome. The value obtained is the utility for the health state under
valuation (µ = ((p · 1) + ((1 − p) · 0) = p)). In the TTO participants are asked to
choose between a number of years living in the health state to be valued or living
a shorter period of time in perfect health. The time in perfect health is varied
to obtain an indifference point, the number of years in perfect health equal to a
higher number of years in the health state to be valued. The health state utility is
calculated by ] years in perfect health] years in health state to be valued a. In the VAS, participants are asked
to give a valuation for the health state to be valued by placing a mark on a 100 mm.
horizontal line ranging from perfect health to the worst possible outcome, usually
death. The health state utility is the number of mm. from the death anchor divided
by 100.
Which method should be used when eliciting health state utilities has been
aFor states worse than death slightly different procedure is used. But in this thesis only the
described procedure is used.
3
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
topic of debate.4 Initially the SG had a reputation of being the gold standard since
it meets the axioms, as described by Neumann and Morgenstern, of expected utility
theory.6 Nowadays the feasibility and validity of the SG is questioned. Participants
experience the SG as a complex method,7 and answers elicited by the SG are vulner-
able to probability weighting.8,9 The TTO on the other hand, is simpler to elicit, is
not vulnerable to probability weighting, and appears to have good face validity.4,7
Nevertheless the TTO is vulnerable to other biases, but these biases probably cancel
one another out. The bias of the utility curvature which is downwards makes up for
the upward bias cause by loss aversion and scale compatibility.9 Furthermore, the
time-line used in the TTO gives a good representation of decisions made in clinical
settings.10 The VAS is often used because of its feasibility, it is easy to elicit but its
construct validity has been questioned.7 Given the above reasons the TTO is now
the most often used method to elicit health state utilities.
Health state utilities can be elicited directly, by asking patients or members of
the public to give valuations to health states, or with indirect instruments. In studies
using indirect utility instruments, health state utilities of members of the general
public are based on patients’ answers to a short descriptive questionnaire. These
answers are fed into a model estimated from an earlier study,11 which generates the
utility values of the general public. The EQ-5D-tariff is such an indirect instrument
that is widely used. The EQ–5D consists of five dimensions: mobility, self-care, usual
activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. Each dimension is described
according to one of three levels of severity: no problems(1), some problems (2) and
extreme problems (3). In total the EQ-5D can thus create 243(35) theoretically
possible health state descriptions. A selection of these health state descriptions
has been valued by a large sample of members of the public, and based on these
valuations a model has been estimated from which utilities for each of the 243
descriptions can be generated.11
Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALY) can be computed based on these elicited
health state utilities. QALYs define the overall utility for a certain time path or life
expectancy. To explain the concept of QALY, I revert to the cartilage transplant as
illustration. When patients with RA receive cartilage transplant their utility might
deteriorate initially (due to surgery) but will reestablish over time (assuming that
this treatment will give no long term side effects). For example, a patient with a
life expectancy of 30 years might initially have a health state utility of 0.6. Due
to surgery this utility will deteriorate to 0.5 for a year, however after this year it
will increase to a health state utility of 0.8 which will remain for the next 29 years.
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The QALY is then (1 · 0.5) + (29 · 0.8) = 23.7. The utility of patients who do not
receive the transplant will not deteriorate initially (they do not have to recover from
surgery), but over a longer period of time these patients will continue having pain
complaints affecting their utility. For example a patient with a life expectancy of 30
years will continue to have a health state utility of 0.6 for 30 years long; leading to a
QALY of (30 · 0.6) = 18. Gain in QALYs from transplant is computed by comparing
the QALYs of patients with transplant compared to the QALYs of patients without
transplant. In cost-utility analyses this gain in QALYs will be compared with the
costs that have to be made, resulting in cost per QALY gained.
1.2 Public or patients’ preferences
Cost-utility analyses for allocation decisions are recommended to be made
from the societal perspective. This implies that health state utilities should be
elicited from members of the public. Since cost-utility analyses should lead to a just
allocation of resources these analyses should not only be based on the opinion of those
who gain health but also on that of those who pay for it.12 Organizations involved in
developing guidelines on the use of new and existing treatments, such as the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), the panel of the U.S. Public
Health Service, and the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (CvZ), advise the use of
the societal perspective, in which health state utilities elicited from a fully informed
representative sample of members of the public are preferred.12–14 However it might
be challenging to fully inform members of the public. Instead, health state utilities of
patients might be informative given that certainly patients experiencing an illness are
well-informed.12,15 The panel of the U.S. Public Health Service already suggested
that in cost-utility analyses in which alternative interventions are compared patient
preferences might be the better choice.12
Whose’ preferences are used in cost-utility analyses does matter. Preferences of
members of the public are often found to be lower than patients’ preferences.16 Sev-
eral explanations for this gap in health state valuations between patients and public
have been provided by research from different fields.17–19 To make more evidence-
justified suggestions about whose preferences to use, the mechanisms underlying this
gap in health state utilities have to be understood.15 Whose valuations are most
valid depends on the explanations for this gap. Is this gap caused by errors in the
method used, or rather due to cognitive mechanisms?18
5
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1.3 Mechanisms underlying the gap between
patients and public
Stiggelbout and de Vogel-Voogt15 systematically described mechanisms that
might cause the gap between utilities given by patients and members of the public,
by using stimulus response models (Figure 1.1). This resulted in a framework in
Figure 1.1 Framework of mechanisms underlying the gap by Stiggelbout & Vogel-
Voogt15
which the different valuation processes of patients and members of the public are
presented simultaneously. A short description of the mechanisms provided in their
framework, and of mechanisms mentioned by other researchers is provided below.
The outline of the mechanisms described here is not intended to be conclusive. By
combining information from different research fields one can always come up with
additional mechanisms that are more or less related to the ones described below.
Lack of Scope When eliciting health state utilities patients are generally asked
to value their own health of the previous week, whereas members of the public have
6
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to value a health state based on a description. Health state descriptions can be
developed by researches based on experience of physicians or patients,20 or they can
be based on classification systems, such as the Health Utility Index (HUI)21 or the
EQ-5D.22 A lack of correspondence between health state descriptions and the actual
experience of a health state might cause the gap in health state valuations between
patients and public.23 Insinga and Fryback23 found that participants gave different
health state valuations for their own experienced health than for an EQ-5D health
state description of their own health. Possibly the EQ-5D health state description is
too sparse. Jansen et al.20 found similar results in a sample of patients undergoing
radiation therapy. The own experienced health, while being treated with radiation
therapy, was valued higher than the health state description of this radiation therapy.
Framing Framing of the health state description influences how a health state
is interpreted. Most health state descriptions tend to include only limitations and
handicaps caused by the health state. Due to this negative framing, members of the
public focus on the limitations of a health state whereas patients might also think
about positive aspects in their lives.24
Focusing illusion The fact that members of the public focuses on limitations
is probably not only caused by the negative framing of health state descriptions.
People have a natural tendency to focus on the difference between their current
situation and an imaginary situation; they will overestimate the differences and
overlook the similarities.25 This focusing illusion has e.g. been demonstrated among
assistant professors who were asked to imagine that they would not achieve tenure26
and among football fans.27 However, among members of the public imagining a
disability no evidence was found for this focusing illusion.24
Status Quo Bias Status quo bias indicates that people value goods more highly
when they own them. Evidence for status quo bias has been shown previously. Par-
ticipants who were randomly assigned to a car would not part with this car, even if
they were given the opportunity to choose a different car without penalty.28 In med-
ical decision making evidence for this status quo bias has also been found. Salkeld
et al.29 studied preferences for a bowel cancer prevention test. On average patients
were willing to pay more for a test that they had used before (status quo) instead
of starting to use a new test. Both tests were equal on all attributes. Regarding the
gap in health state valuations status quo bias might cause patients to give higher
valuations. Patients valuing their own life are probably less willing to trade-off own
life years than members of the public valuing a hypothetical health state.15
Loss Aversion Related to status quo bias is loss aversion. People evaluate
7
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outcomes as gains and losses and are more sensitive to losses than to gains. For
instance people value the loss of €10,- worse than the gain of the same amount of
money. The difference between losses and gains in health state valuations depends
on the reference point.30 In patients whose reference point is their own health, the
loss of life years that a patient has to trade will get more weight than the health that
is gained leading to an upward bias.9,15 Further, for patients trading of life years or
increasing risk of dying, it might feel as tempting fate. Members of the public are
probably less concerned about trading life years or increasing risk of dying since the
situation remains hypothetical.
Adaptation Adaptation can be defined as a response that diminishes or remains
constant over time despite and increase in the stimulus.31 When confronted with
adverse circumstances such as an illness people tend to adapt peculiarly well.31
Therefore adaptation is often suggested to explain the patients’ relative high reported
quality of life.32–36 Adaptation takes place on physical and psychological level.31
Physically patients learn to handle handicaps and mentally they learn to deal with
the illness. Different processes are suggested to initiate psychological adaptation,
among which coping strategies and benefit finding. When providing health state
valuations patients will include their ability to adapt whereas members of the public
may fail to anticipate on this ability to adapt.37 Members of the public have the
tendency to overpredict the duration of emotional reactions to future events27 and
underestimate their cognitive mechanisms which alleviate this reaction.26 Tentative
support has been found for this failure to anticipate on adaptation. Members of the
public who were made aware of their ability to adapt gave higher valuations on a
person trade-off (PTO) and on a VAS measuring quality of life,24,38 but not on the
TTO and SG.39
Valuation shift Dolan40 suggested that experiencing poor health might result in
higher valuations of other hypothetical health states, a process they called valuation
shift. Dolan showed that participants in poor health assigned higher valuations to
various EQ-5D scenarios than did participants in good health. Scale recalibration
To measure health state utilities, subjective scales are used, which are susceptible
to different interpretations between people, but more importantly within people.37
When people experience illness they might change their internal standards, leading
to a change in interpretation of these scales.41 For instance a patient with RA who
first valued her joint pains as 8 on a VAS scale ranging from 0 (no pain) to 10 (major
pain), recalibrated her pain to a 5 after experiencing kidney stones. The pain she
experienced due to kidney stones was significantly more intense than any pain she
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had ever experienced before, resulting in a recalibration of her valuation of major
pain.
Implicit theories of stability and change Implicit theories of stability and change
are heuristics that people use to recall emotions. To recall emotions, people first
note their present status and then decide if their status has changed over time.
This reconstruction of emotions is guided by theories that include specific beliefs
regarding the inherent stability of an attribute.42 For instance people have the
implicit belief that they will become happier over time. When people are asked to
give an estimation of their previous happiness, they assume that they had been less
happy than they are now.43 Depending on the method used to investigate health
state utilities, implicit theories might cause bias. Such may be the case in the
increasingly popular method of asking patients to recall how their health state has
changed over time.37
1.4 Objective and outline of the thesis
Several mechanisms have been suggested to cause the gap between valuations
given by patients and members of the public, of which a number have been examined
empirically. However still no conclusive suggestions can be made, and more research
is necessary to enhance our knowledge. Although adaptation is often mentioned it
has never been tested empirically. Other mechanisms have only been studied among
members of the public and not among patients, such as focusing illusion, or the
reverse, lack of scope. The overall objective of this thesis is to further examine some
of the mechanisms proposed to cause the gap between health state valuations, in
order to gain insight in the relative validity of health state utilities of patients and
of members of the public.
In Chapter 2 first a meta-analytical comparison of health state valuations of
patients and members of the public is presented. Previously, studies described con-
trasting findings16,44 about the difference in health state valuations between patients
and members of the public. The aim of our study was to investigate the influence
of respondent group on health state valuations. Post hoc, other design-effects were
tentatively studied using moderator analyses.
In Chapters 3 through 8 mechanisms potentially underlying the difference be-
tween patients and members of the public were studied. Chapter 3 starts with the
influence of lack of scope and framing of a health state description. Patients with RA
valued their own experienced health, an EQ-5D description of their own health, and
9
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an enriched EQ-5D description of their own health. These valuations were compared
to investigate the influence of differences in health state descriptions. Next, in Chap-
ter 4 the effects of focusing illusion and adaptation were examined, as well as the
sparseness of the EQ-5D description (lack of scope). In this study open-ended ques-
tions were used to assess aspects important to patients with RA and to members of
the public imagining having RA. In Chapter 5 the effect of lack of scope and framing
was investigated further. Here the effect of a health state description was not only in-
vestigated among patients, but also among partners of patients and among members
of the public. All participants valued their own imagined/experienced health state, a
standard EQ-5D description of this health state, and an enriched EQ-5D description
of this health state. By comparing the valuations given by partners of patients to
the valuations of patients and of members of the public the effect of vicarious expe-
rience could also be examined. Chapter 6 describes a cross-sectional study among
patients with RA in which the effect of adaptive abilities on health state valuations
is examined. Adaptive abilities were based on Cognitive Adaptation Theory (CAT)
as suggested by Taylor.32,45 Chapter 7 further describes adaptation and valuation
shift, investigated in a longitudinal study among patients with Spinal Cord Injury
(SCI). Health state valuations of patients with recent onset acute SCI were assessed
at three points in time. In Chapter 8 the effect of adaptation was also examined.
Here the ability to anticipate on adaptation by patients experiencing new adversities
as well as the effect of implicit theories of stability and change were studied.
While examining the mechanisms suggested to cause the difference in health
state valuations between patients and members of the public we were challenged by
often ambiguous descriptions of these mechanisms. Among others we felt that the
language used by “response shift” gathers together different terms already existing
in the scientific literature. In Chapter 9 the conceptual confusions related to the
language of response shift is described.
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CHAPTER 2. HEALTH STATE VALUATIONS COMPARED
Abstract Objectives: To obtain quality-adjusted life-years, different
respondent groups, such as patients or the general public, may be asked
to value health states. Until now, it remains unclear if the respondent
group has an influence on the values obtained. We assessed this issue
through metaanalysis. Methods: A literature search was performed for
studies reporting valuations given by patients and nonpatients. Stud-
ies using indirect utility instruments were excluded. Results: From 30
eligible studies, 40 estimators were retrieved revealing a difference be-
tween respondent group (Cohen’s d = 0.20, p < 0.01). When elicitation
methods were analyzed separately, patients gave higher valuations than
nonpatients using the time trade-off (TTO) (N = 25, unstandardized
d = 0.05, p < 0.05) and the visual analog scale (VAS) (N = 22, unstan-
dardized d = 0.04, p < 0.05). When the standard gamble was used, no
difference was seen (N = 24, unstandardized d = 0.01, p = 0.70). Con-
clusion: In contrast with Dolders et al., our results show that patients
give higher valuations than members of the general public. For future
cost-utility analyses, researchers should be aware of the differential ef-




Valuations used in decision analyses and cost-utility analyses can be given by
different groups, such as patients or the general public. Three studies have investi-
gated the effect of response group by summing results of empirical studies,16,4446.
Two of these studies, a review, and a meta-analysis of prostate cancer utilities, found
higher valuations given by patients. The third, a meta-analysis on varying patient
groups, did not find any difference. The latter two included indirect utility instru-
ments like the European Quality of Life Five Dimensions EQ-5D-tariff11 or Health
Utilities Index Mark (HUI)47 and included multiple health state valuations from the
same study sample.
In studies using indirect utility instruments, only patients are approached to
participate, members of the public are not included as a separate sample. Such stud-
ies calculate health state utilities of members of the general public from patients’
answers to a short questionnaire. These answers are put in a model captured from
an earlier study11 which generates the utility values of the general public. Therefore,
including more than one study using indirect utility instruments leads to multiple
health state valuations from the same subject sample, which is a violation of the
assumption of independent data points. This may have led to a distortion of the
standard error, an inflated sample size, and an overrepresentation of certain stud-
ies.48 The aim of our study was to investigate through meta-analysis the influence
of the respondent group on valuations avoiding this bias.
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Search and retrieval of studies
Studies reporting valuations given by patients and by members of the general
public, professionals, or proxies (which we from now on refer to as “nonpatients”)
were retrieved through the computerized databases PsychInfo and PubMed. Studies
published between 1970 and October 2008 were searched using preferences, utility,
patient, public and, respectively, time trade-off (TTO), standard gamble (SG), or
visual analog scale (VAS) as key words. With the so-called snowball method, the
bibliographic information of De Wit et al.,16 Dolders et al.,44 Bremner et al.,46 and
other retrieved studies were searched for additional studies. With the database Web
of Science, we retrieved studies for the citations of the already retrieved studies.
Abstracts were examined regarding the inclusion criteria. Studies were included
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if they reported valuations of both patients and nonpatients, used a standard utility
method (TTO, SG, or VAS), included participants 18 years, and were written in
English. Studies that used indirect instruments (classification systems), that inves-
tigated mental health states, or in which nonpatients answered what they thought
the patient would have answered, were excluded.
2.2.2 Data extraction
A detailed coding system was used to extract data. From each study, the mean
valuations and SDs for each evaluated health state were coded for every group. If
these data were not reported, authors were contacted. We excluded studies when the
authors did not respond after three attempts or could not reveal the mean valuations.
If only the SDs were missing, we estimated these by the weighted sum of the SDs
reported in the included studies. We further coded: elicitation method, nature of
the nonpatient respondent group, and various types of information about the health
state description used. With the elicitation method it was coded if the TTO, VAS,
or SG was used. Non-patient respondent groups were coded as professionals/proxies
or members of the general public. Information about the health state description
included three aspects. First, it was recoded if the patients valued a description
or if they valued their own experienced health state. Second, it was denoted what
kind of health state description was used; a standard EQ-5D health state descrip-
tion, a standard HUI health state description, or a specifically developed health
state description. Thirdly, it was coded if the health state description provided an
illness label. Information of the retrieved studies was independently rated by two
judges (A.M.S. and Y.P. ) with satisfactory agreement for most variables (Cohen’s
κ between 1 and 0.77). Agreement on the variable “own health state or hypothetical
health state” was low, (Cohen’s κ = 0.61) in three of 30 ratings the judges disagreed.
All dissimilar ratings were compared and discussed until agreement was found.
2.2.3 Statistical analyses
Before all meta-analyses, the standard mean differences and sample sizes were
checked for outliers. One outlier for the sample size of nonpatients was found.
Specifically, Smith et al.49 included 567 nonpatients. Studies with larger sample size
are given more weight as these are assumed to be more precise. In such weighted
estimation, studies with extremely large sample size can define the entire meta-
analysis if these are given according weights.50 Therefore, we recoded this study
sample into the highest nonextreme sample size of nonpatients (N = 246). Next,
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we compared the results obtained with the original sample size to those obtained
with the recoded sample size. Because the results remained almost unchanged, we
present the data including the original sample size.
One overall meta-analysis and three subanalyses by elicitation method were
performed. Before any of the analyses, data within each of the retrieved studies
were combined. If more than one health state was valued in one single study, a
meta-analysis on the level of this primary study was performed. The differences
between patients and nonpatients were estimated for each health state and were then
combined into one estimator through metaanalysis. This estimated mean difference
was then used as estimator for this study in the overall meta-analysis. In studies
that included more than one respondent group in either the patient or the nonpatient
group, estimations of both subsamples were included. The sample size of the other
group was divided by two, and used twice to compare each of the subsamples. In
studies using more than one elicitation method, a meta-analysis on the level of the
primary study was performed.
Using the software Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (version 2.2.046),51 the stan-
dard mean difference, Cohen’s d, and 95% confidence interval were estimated.We
used Cohen’s d to control for the difference in the numerical scales of TTO, SG, and
VAS. For each analysis by elicitation method, the unstandardized difference was
estimated, instead of Cohen’s d.
The homogeneity of the sample was checked with the Q-statistic.52 If the
sample of reports appeared to be heterogeneous, random effect models were used
and moderator variables were analyzed to investigate if these could explain this
heterogeneity. The significance of the six moderating effects was checked using the
Q-statistic. A significant contrast means that the moderator variable explains some
of the heterogeneity between the groups, but it does not necessarily imply that one
of the subsamples is homogeneous. For each subsample, we again investigated the Q-
statistic and Cohen’s d. The Duval and Tweedie’s trim and fill procedure53 gave no
indication for publication bias in the overall meta-analysis, nor in the subanalyses.
2.3 Results
The search yielded 36 studies of which 30 could be included in the analyses.
Two studies were excluded due to differences in elicitation method used for patients
and non-patients54,55 and two studies were excluded since the reported data was
already included in another study.56,57 In another two studies the same group of
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non-patients was used.58,59 We decided to divide the sample size of this group of
non-patients by two and keep the estimations of both studies in the analyses.
Of the remaining 31 studies, five studies reported other data than mean val-
uations. The authors of these studies were contacted. From three of these studies
the authors sent the mean valuations and standard deviations by mail.60–63 Of one
study additional not-reported data was sent.63 No mean valuations and standard
deviations could be retrieved from the other two studies.64,65 In Appendix A data of
the included studies is shown.16,49,58–63,66–85 In 23 studies, participants rated more
than one health state, and in 13 studies, more than one elicitation method was used.
In these studies, meta-analyses on the level of the primary study were performed.
2.3.1 Overall meta-analysis
From the included 30 studies, 40 mean differences in health state valuations
between patients and nonpatients, from now on referred to as “estimators,” were
extracted. The total set of estimators was heterogeneous [Q(39) = 398.25, p < 0.01].
Using the random effects model, the overall combined effect size for the total set was
significant (Cohen’s d = 0.20, SD = 0.06, p < 0.01). Patients gave higher valuations
compared to nonpatients. Figure 2.1presents the standardized mean differences for
each study. Two moderators showed a significant contrast (Table 2.1).
Patients’ and nonpatients’ valuations were more distinct when no label was
provided than when it was. Furthermore, valuations were more similar between
groups when they both valued a health state description than when patients valued
their own health. In terms of heterogeneity, the Q-statistic reveals that all subsam-
ples remain heterogeneous, except for the subsample of studies without illness label.
We want to emphasize that this sample consisted of only three studies. Because
this subsample was homogeneous, the fixed effect model was used to test the group
difference. For each subsample, the group difference is reported as Cohen’s d.
2.3.2 Meta-analysis of studies by estimation method
The set of 25 TTO estimators was heterogeneous [Q(24) = 263.85, p < 0.01].
The overall combined effect size revealed a difference between the response groups
unstandardized d = 0.05, SD = 0.02, p < 0.05). Moderator analyses showed a sig-
nificant contrast between studies with own health and studies with a health state
description [Q(1) = 5.93, p < 0.01]. When patients valued their own health (N =
3), their valuations were different from those of nonpatients (unstandardized d =
0.24, p < 0.01). When both groups valued a health state description (N = 22), the
16
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Figure 2.1 The 40 mean differences from the 30 included studies
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valuations of the two groups were similar (unstandardized d = 0.02, p < 0.05). The
set of 24 SG estimators was heterogeneous [Q(23) = 116.36, p < 0.01]. There was
no significant difference between response groups (unstandardized d = 0.01, SD =
0.01, p < 0.05); therefore, search for moderator factors was not performed. The set
of 22 VAS estimators was heterogeneous [Q(21) = 189.47, p < 0.01]. A difference was
seen between respondent groups (unstandardized d = 0.04, SD = 0.02, p < 0.01).
Patients valued health states higher compared with nonpatients. A significant con-
trast was found between professionals/proxies and members of the general public
[Q(1) = 9.53, p < 0.01]. Professionals/proxies (N = 6) did not value health states
different from patients (unstandardized d = −0.04, p < 0.05), whereas members of
the general public (N = 16) gave lower valuations compared with patients (unstan-
dardized d = 0.07, p < 0.01).
2.4 Discussion
In this meta-analysis using 40 estimators from 30 studies, we found a small to
moderate difference in valuations between patients and nonpatients. This finding
contrasts with the findings of Dolders et al.44 The exclusion of studies that used indi-
rect instruments is unlikely to have caused this, as Dolders et al. did find a difference
in valuations between respondent groups in studies using indirect instruments. A
smaller number of included studies is not an explanation either, because we included
29 studies compared with only 11 by Dolders et al. From these 11 studies, seven
studies were selected for the current meta-analyses; of the remaining four studies
included in Dolders et al., three were based on indirect health state valuations, (the
EQ-5D) and one study valued health states worse than death and reported that the
majority of patients were unable to complete or understand the measurement tasks.
Newly published studies (N = 10) included in our study may partly explain the
difference. Finally, the difference might be explained by the inclusion of multiple
effect sizes by Dolders et al.44 which might have led to errors.
The results of the current study showed that states providing an illness label
were rated more similar by patients and nonpatients than states not providing an
illness label. Possibly, healthy subjects, like patients, will not use the whole utility
continuum for labelled health states.86 Another contrast was shown between studies
in which patients valued their own health and studies in which patients valued a
health state description. Valuations were more similar between groups when they
both valued a description. This might be explained by a so-called loss aversion,
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patients giving higher valuations when they “own” a health state.15 Initially, in
three studies, the judges disagreed on this moderator variable, but after reading
through the studies again, agreement was easily found. The disagreement was in
two studies due to poor reporting and in one study due to a poor definition.
Only in the meta-analysis including studies for the VAS was an effect for the
type of nonpatient group found. Valuations of professionals/proxies were more sim-
ilar to those of patients than valuations of the general public, probably because of
their experience with patients. In future meta-analyses, it may be worthwhile to
start off by stratifying by both disease label and type of health state valued by
patients (own health vs. scenarios), as these had moderating effects.
Despite the use of several moderator factors, all samples remained heteroge-
neous, except for three studies without illness label. Different explanations may be
given for this heterogeneity. First, a great diversity was seen between the type and
severity of the health states. As shown by Insinga and Fryback,23 the difference
between valuations given by different respondent groups may depend on the severity
of the health state. Second, patients as well as members of the general public differ
in the extent of their experience with different health states, which creates hetero-
geneous groups.17 Unfortunately, we were not able to control for the differences in
experience and the choice of the particular health states.
In this study, multiple significance tests were carried out, which might have
led to multiplicity. Using Bonferroni correction, the main results of the elicitation
subsamples remained the same. Correcting the moderator variables in the overall
metaanalysis and in the meta-analysis of studies by elicitation method, nonsignifi-
cant contrasts for all samples were found. However, it has been argued that tests
performed to investigate heterogeneity should not be adjusted for multiple testing.87
Given our results, future studies should take the impact of respondent group into
account. Which respondent group should assign health state valuations depends on
the research question of the study. For cost-utility analysis, the implications of our
findings can be best illustrated using the unstandardized differences. Mean unstan-
dardized difference in studies using the TTO or the VAS was 0.05 and 0.04 with a
95% confidence interval of 0.01-0.08 for the TTO and 0.01-0.07 for the VAS. The
influence of such a difference on a cost-utility ratio depends on other characteristics
included in the analysis, for example the period for which the effect of treatment
lasts. In studies using the SG, no effect of respondent group was seen, probably due
to ceiling effects caused by risk aversion.15 Given the small sample sizes and differ-
ent findings between the meta-analyses, we feel that we cannot claim implications
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for the findings of the moderator analyses. These results should be corroborated in
future research.





Valuing Health: Does Enriching a
Scenario Lead to Higher Utilities?
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CHAPTER 3. VALUING HEALTH
Abstract Objectives: Patients have been found to value their own ex-
perienced health state higher than an investigator constructed scenario
of that health state. The aim of this study was to investigate if pa-
tients value their own experienced health state higher than a standard
EQ-5D scenario of their health state and if “enriching” this scenario by
adding individualized attributes reduces the differences between experi-
enced health and the scenario. Methods: Face-to-face interviews were
held with 129 patients with rheumatoid arthritis. Patients were asked
to value in a time tradeoff their own experienced health; 6 standard
EQ-5D scenarios, of which the 5th (untold to them) represented their
own health state; and a standard EQ-5D scenario of their health state
(identified as such) enriched with individual attributes. Results: The
own experienced health state was not valued differently from the own
standard EQ-5D state and was lower compared to the own enriched EQ-
5D state of that same health state. An interaction effect was found for
health status. Patients with better health did not report different values
for their own experienced health compared with their own standard EQ-
5D description; their own experienced state was rated lower than their
own enriched EQ-5D description. Patients with poor health valued all 3
health states similarly. Surprisingly, utilities for scenarios enriched with
exclusively negative individual attributes were not lower than those for
the own standard EQ-5D description. Conclusion: The hypothesis that
disparities in valuation can be attributed to EQ-5D description being too




Utilities of health states are important in health decisions. Health state utilities
are used to compare investments in cost of a therapy with the benefits in health.
Utilities can be elicited in members of the general public but also in patients. Which
group should be used is still a matter of discussion.16,44 Many studies16,88 but not
all81 have found valuations of patients to be different from valuations of members of
the general public.
Patients are often asked to value their own experienced health state, whereas
members of the general public are asked to value descriptions of these health states.
Jansen and others20 found that patients’ ratings of their own experienced health
state were higher than their valuation of a description of that same health state.
The authors explained this difference in rating by hypothesizing that the description
of the health state may not have matched the own experienced health state despite
an evidence-based development process. Similar results were revealed in a meta-
analysis of utilities assigned to prostate cancer.46 Patients with prostate cancer
rated a description of their health lower than their experienced health state.
Valuing a description of a health state instead of valuing an experienced health
state might cause differences in the interpretation and integration of the information.
These differences in interpretation and integration could result in different utilities.15
In particular, patients interpret information in light of their experience, whereas
healthy participants are limited to the information that is provided in the health
state description.
Moreover, descriptions of health states are developed in several ways. Jansen
and others20 developed health state descriptions based on the literature and expe-
riences of physicians and patients. However, others have developed descriptions on
the basis of health state classification systems, such as the Health Utilities Index
(HUI)21 and the EuroQol EQ-5D.89 Dissimilarities in the construction of health
state descriptions might lead to different interpretations and valuations as well. In
addition, health state descriptions are often framed in negative terms. This leads
to a focus on the negative impact of the health state, which might cause healthy
participants to overestimate the negative impact of a disease.
Insinga and Fryback23 asked members of the general public to value a selec-
tion of all possible EQ-5D health state descriptions as well as their own experienced
health. By chance, several participants’ experienced health matched one of the EQ-
5D descriptions they had valued. It turned out that ratings of the own experienced
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health differed from the ratings of the matching EQ-5D description. Specifically, par-
ticipants with mild health problems valued their own experienced health lower than
the corresponding EQ-5D health state description, whereas patients with moderate
health problems estimated their own experienced health higher than the correspond-
ing EQ-5D health state description. The authors concluded that an EQ-5D profile of
a health state does not resemble the own experienced health state because it is too
sparse and lacks positive aspects.23 Possibly, EQ-5D descriptions should be enriched
to create more resemblance between self-ratings and self-identified EQ-5D ratings.
In cost-utility research, enriched EQ-5D descriptions have already been used
to explore preferences for different medication types. Medication-related attributes
added to the EQ-5D description induced differences in preferences between treat-
ments.90 Smith and others49 suggested that formerly treated patients should rate
their past health state more similar to patients than to members of the general
public, assuming that differing valuations result from descriptions being sparse and
lacking scope. In contrast to their expectations, ratings of formerly treated pa-
tients were more similar to the ratings of members of the general public than to the
ratings of patients currently undergoing treatment.49 This finding indicates that
providing more detailed information about a health state might still not eliminate
patient-public differences.49 Nevertheless, information that makes the health state
description more personal might improve health state descriptions. For instance,
Llewellyn-Thomas and others91 found that with objective health outcomes, individ-
ual health state descriptions were better explained than standardized health state
descriptions.
The aim of this study was to investigate if patients value their own experienced
health state higher than their own standard EQ-5D scenario and if “enriching” this
scenario by adding individualized attributes leads to smaller differences between
the valuations of the own experienced health and the scenario. To this purpose,
patients had to value their own health state in 3 different ways. They valued their
own experienced health, a standard EQ-5D description of this health state, and an
enriched EQ-5D description of this health state. Based on the findings of Smith and
others49 and Llewelyn-Thomas and others91 we chose to enrich the own standard
EQ-5D description with individual patient attributes instead of giving more detailed
but standard information. Considering the results of Insinga and Fryback23 we
expected the valuation of the own standard EQ-5D description in relation to the




3.2.1 Participants and procedures
The sample consisted of patients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA) aged 18 to 76
years old who had visited their treating rheumatologist in the past 6 months. From
the database of the Leiden University Medical Center, 300 patients who visited their
rheumatologist in the last year were randomly selected. In the selection method,
we oversampled men to get an equal male/female distribution because RA is more
prevalent in women.
Medical records of the selected patients were assessed for comorbid conditions
and true diagnosis of RA. From the 300 selected patients, 50 patients had not been
diagnosed with RA, and 7 had comorbid conditions. The remaining 243 eligible pa-
tients received information about the survey by mail, including an informed consent
form. If patients did not return the informed consent form within 3 weeks, they
were called as a reminder. Data were collected using self-report questionnaires and
a semistructured interview. The medical ethics committee of the Leiden University
Medical Center approved the study protocol.
3.2.2 The interview
Face-to-face interviews were performed by 3 trained interviewers following a
strict interview protocol. The interviews took place at the patients’ preferred lo-
cation: at home, in the hospital, or at work. Patients who were interviewed in
the hospital came to the hospital; they were not hospitalized at the time of the
interview. The interview started with the valuation of each participant’s own expe-
rienced health of the previous week. This was followed by the EQ-5D questionnaire,
a 5-item health-related quality-of-life questionnaire with the dimensions mobility,
selfcare, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression.89 Patients an-
swered this questionnaire on a 3-point scale: no problems, some problems, and no
function at all or, in the case of pain, extreme pain. After this EQ-5D questionnaire,
2 filler questionnaires followed -that is, the Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire92 and
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale93- to distract patients’ attention from the answers
they gave on the EQ-5D questionnaire. In the next part, participants were asked
to value46 standard EQ-5D states. Five of these EQ-5D states were retrieved from
previous research with patients with RA, covering the full utility range from 0 to 1
according to the UK tariff.11 A description of these health states can be found in
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appendix B. Unknown to the patients, the sixth health state was their own standard
EQ-5D state of the previous week, as indicated in the EQ-5D questionnaire. The
computer retrieved the answers of the patient earlier in the interview and created
the own standard EQ-5D state for this patient. All standard EQ-5D states were
randomly presented except for the patient’s own standard EQ-5D state, which was
always presented as the 5th state. The description of the patient’s own standard
EQ-5D state was similar to that of the other standard EQ-5D health states. Patients
were not informed that it was their own standard EQ-5D health state. If 1 of the
5 preselected EQ-5D states happened to be the same as the own standard EQ-5D
state, this state was replaced automatically with the EQ-5D state that should have
been presented in the 6th place.
After valuing their own experienced health and the 6 EQ-5D descriptions, pa-
tients answered an open-ended question asking them to indicate attributes important
to the own experienced health state. The interviewer entered these attributes in the
computer. It was impossible to add a full description of each attribute; consequently,
a key word was used. The interviewer and the patient together created suitable key
words for each of the individual attributes. Only key words on which the patient
agreed were used. These individual attributes were then combined with the patient’s
own standard EQ-5D state of the previous week to create an own enriched EQ-5D
state. On the computer screen, the description of the own enriched EQ-5D state was
shown with the individual attributes represented beneath the 5 standard attributes.
It was made clear to the patients that the order in which the attributes were pre-
sented was arbitrary and that it was up to the patients how important the attributes
were to them. Furthermore, patients were told that the description as stated on the
computer fit their own health state.
If this were not clear, the interviewer explained how this description was created
and made sure that the patient understood that it was his or her own health state.
After the valuation of this own enriched EQ-5D state, patients indicated their level
of functioning on the individual attributes that they had named before as important
to their quality of life of the previous week. To rate this functioning, we used the
same scale as was used in the EQ-5D questionnaire. Patients stated if they had
no problems, some problems, or were not able to perform an individual attribute.
At the end of the interview, all patients were asked whether they had recognized
among the 6 EQ-5D states their own standard EQ-5D state that described their own




Figure 3.1 The interview process.
All health states were valued using a time tradeoff (TTO). Patients rated how
many years (x) of their remaining life expectancy (y), derived from Dutch life ex-
pectancy tables [17], they were willing to trade to obtain perfect health. Utility
was calculated as y−xy . The computer program Ci394 was used to elicit the utilities
based on a pingpong search procedure. On the computer screen, a short description
of perfect health and the health state to be valued were presented. Perfect health
was described as full well-being, physically, psychologically, and regarding social
activities. While completing the TTOs, patients were asked to think aloud.
After the interview, patients were asked to complete the Health Assessment
Questionnaire (HAQ)95 at home and to return it by mail. The HAQ is a 24-item
29
CHAPTER 3. VALUING HEALTH
disease-specific health questionnaire. Patients reported the number of problems they
perceived in performing several daily activities and whether they had to use devices
for these activities. The total HAQ score was used in this study as an indicator of
the patients’ health status, with higher scores indicating worse functioning.
3.2.3 Data analysis
Prior to the main analyses, all variables were examined for uni- and multivari-
ate outliers, linearity, and normality. Missing data were excluded listwise. Differ-
ences between valuations were analyzed using within-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Using the Bonferroni pairwise comparison, post hoc contrasts were per-
formed to investigate the valuations of the own experienced health, own standard
EQ-5D, and own enriched EQ-5D pairwise. On the basis of statements made during
the think-aloud procedure and the open-ended question, patients were divided into 2
groups depending on whether they had recognized their own standard EQ-5D state.
To investigate if recognizing the own standard EQ-5D influenced the valuation of
this health state, we performed a t− test.
Two interviewers judged independently whether the individual attributes named
in the open question used to enrich the own standard EQ-5D states were positive,
negative, or neutral. The agreement between the ratings of the interviewers was
good (Cohen’s κ = 0.90). Divergent evaluations were compared, and agreement was
found through listening to the taped interview and by discussion. We expected the
valuation of patients’ own enriched EQ-5D to be higher when this description was
made more positive compared to their own standard EQ-5D.
Inversely, we expected the valuation of the own enriched EQ-5D to be lower
compared to the own standard EQ-5D when adding the individual attributes made
this description more negative. Examples of negative attributes were pain, fatigue,
and mobility; examples of positive attributes were grandchildren, good emotional
functioning, and leisure activities. Naturally, the positive effect of the positive at-
tributes would only hold if patients stated to have no problems on this attribute.
Similarly, the negative effect would only hold if patients stated to have some prob-
lems or were not able to perform the attribute. To determine this valence of the
attributes, we analyzed each attribute for the number of problems that patients
stated to have with that particular attribute: no problems, some problems, or un-
able to perform. Only positively evaluated attributes with no problems were judged
to add positive information, and negatively evaluated attributes with some prob-
lems or unable to perform were judged as negative added information. For example,
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when patients named their partner as an additional attribute, this was expected to
increase the valuation of the enriched EQ-5D health state only if the patient stated
that he or she had no problems with his or her partner. If the patient reported
having some or severe problems with his or her partner, we could not be sure if the
enriched EQ-5D would become more positive by adding the partner as an additional
attribute. The effect of added attributes on the valuation of the health state was
assessed with descriptive statistics and a paired sample t−test. Finally, ANOVA
was used to assess if current health influenced the relative valuations of the 3 health
states, with current health based on the dichotomized total HAQ score.
3.3 Results
A total of 132 patients of 243 patients approved the interview, a response rate
of 54%. Of these responders, 1 patient with emotional problems and 2 patients who
were not able to speak and understand Dutch were excluded. No differences in age
and time since diagnosis between responders and nonresponders were found. Data
of 2 participants created multivariate outliers and were excluded from further anal-
yses; Mahalanobis distance, F (3) = 31.07 and F (3) = 18.05. All variables met the
assumptions for linearity and normality, except for the variables “own experienced
health,” “own standard EQ-5D,” and “own enriched EQ-5D.” Because we found sim-
ilar results with nonparametric tests as with parametric tests, we decided to present
the results of the parametric tests. These tests give more information and made it
possible to test an interaction effect.
The interviews took place at the patients’ preferred location: at the hospital
(N = 82), at the respondent’s home (N = 44), or at work (N = 1). Patients were
not hospitalized at the time of the interview. The interview took 1.5 to 2 hours.
Patients interviewed at home had on average more health problems based on the
HAQ total score than patients interviewed in the hospital. Table 3.1 presents the
demographic information of the 127 respondents who were included.
3.3.1 Valuations of own experienced health state
Table 3.2 shows the means and standard deviations of the 3 health state
valuations. We found small differences among the ratings of the 3 health states:
own experienced health state, the own standard EQ-5D, and the own enriched EQ-
5D, F (2, 242) = 3.83, p = 0.03. Post hoc analyses showed that this effect resulted
principally from the patient’s own experienced health state scoring somewhat lower
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Table 3.1 Patient Characteristics (N = 127)





Nine years or less 38 (30%)
Between 10 and 12 years 62 (49%)







aNumbers do not add up to 127 due to missing data.
than the patient’s own enriched EQ-5D state (p = 0.03). No significant differences
were found between the ratings of the patient’s own experienced health state and
the patient’s own standard EQ-5D state description or between the standard and
the own enriched EQ-5D state descriptions.
Table 3.2 Means and SD of the valuations the different health states
(N = 122) Mean SD
Own experienced health state 0.79 0.23
Own standard EQ-5D statea 0.81 0.25
Own enriched EQ-5D state 0.83 0.22
aNo differences in the valuations of the own standard EQ-5D state were found between
patients who had versus who had not recognized their own standard EQ-5D state,
t(123) = 0.651, p = 0.51.
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Table 3.3 Means and SD of the valuation of the different health state descriptions
according to the severity of the patients’ current health.
Patients HAQ ≥ 0.94b Patients HAQ < 0.94b
(N = 59) (N = 62)
Mean SD Mean SD
Own experienced health state 0.75 0.26 0.83 0.20
Own standard EQ-5D state 0.74 0.29 0.88 0.18
Own enriched EQ-5D state 0.76 0.27 0.90 0.14
bHigher HAQ scores indicate worse functioning.
3.3.2 Differences in ratings between patients based on the
severity of their current health state
To investigate the effect of the patients’ current health, we performed a median
split based on the HAQ total score (0.00 − 0.94 vs. 0.95 − 3.00). There were no
differences in gender or age between the 2 groups. When the dichotomous HAQ
score was added to the ANOVA for the different valuations, a trend was found for
an interaction, F (2, 238) = 2.5, p = 0.09. Table 3.3 shows the means and standard
deviations of the 3 health state valuations for the 2 groups.
The effect seen in the total group turned out to occur only in patients in
better health. There was a small difference between the ratings of the 3 health
states, F (3, 183) = 7.94, p < 0.01. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that
this difference resulted principally from the lower valuation of the own experienced
health state than the valuation of the own enriched EQ-5D state description (p =
0.01). Patients in poorer health rated the 3 health state descriptions as similar,
F (2, 116) = 0.55, p = 0.55.
3.3.3 Own enriched EQ-5D state description
To the open-ended question, most patients named both positive as well as
negative attributes (N = 96; 76%). Fourteen (11%) patients named exclusively
positive attributes, and 16(13%) named exclusively negative attributes. Patients
who named exclusively positive attributes indeed gave slightly higher valuations
to their own enriched EQ-5D state (mean = 0.92, SD = 0.13) compared to their
own standard EQ-5D state (mean = 0.90, SD = 0.15); however, this difference was
not statistically significant, t(13) = 0.03, p = 0.11. Contrary to our expectations,
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patients who named exclusively negative attributes similarly did not rate their own
enriched EQ-5D state lower than the standard EQ-5D state description (mean =
0.79, SD = 0.23 vs. mean = 0.76, SD = 0.26).
3.4 Discussion
In this study, we investigated if patients valued their own experienced health
state higher than an EQ-5D scenario describing their health state and if enriching
this scenario by adding individualized attributes led to smaller differences between
the valuations of the own experienced health and the scenario. Contrary to our
hypotheses, the own experienced health state was not valued differently from the
own standard EQ-5D state and was found to be lower when compared to the own
enriched EQ-5D state of that same health state. We found an indication of an
interaction between one’s current health and valuations. Patients in relatively good
health rated the own standard EQ-5D state description somewhat higher than their
own experienced health but not statistically significantly, whereas we did not see
differences for patients with poorer health. These findings are in line with the results
of Insinga and Fryback.23 These authors suggested that when individuals rate their
own experienced health, they might consider minor decrements in 1 or more of the
5 EQ-5D dimensions that fall between “no problems” and “some problems” or that
patients consider health decrements within attributes not specified by the EQ-5D
dimensions. Likewise, in our study, patients with better health might have thought
about minor problems when they valued their own experienced health.
By enriching the own standard EQ-5D state, we expected to make the descrip-
tion and, as a result, also the valuation more similar to the own experienced health
state. However, the own standard EQ-5D states were also valued higher than the
own experienced health by patients with better health. We can only speculate about
this unexpected finding. Perhaps framing of the question about the own experienced
health caused the difference between the valuations. Specifically, in the introduction
of the own experienced health state at the beginning of the interview, patients were
asked to think about their previous week, particularly about their physical, social,
and emotional health in that week. In this introduction, the last week was empha-
sized, and as a result, patients with better health might have been provoked to think
about minor problems of the previous week. In the open-ended question, following
the 6 standard EQ-5D valuations, patients were asked to name the most important
attributes relating to their own health state of the previous week. First, thinking
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about the ”most important aspects” might have overshadowed the minor problems
patients thought about earlier. Second, patients might have become more aware of
the positive aspects of their lives. The latter question was asked after patients had
valued 5 health states that were for patients in relatively good health who were most
often worse than their own health. Lacey and others96 showed that health states
are valued differently when context information is added. Their participants rated
a severe health state more severe in a context of other less severe health states and
rated a mild health state more mildly in a context of other more severe health states.
In our study, patients valued their own standard EQ-5D state and the own
enriched EQ-5D after they had valued 4 other health states. We did so to create a
situation where patients would not easily recognize their own standard EQ-5D state.
To reduce a context effect of the other health states on the valuation of the EQ-5D
states, however, we varied the sequence in which the health states were presented
randomly, whereas in the study of Lacey and others,43 patients viewed the health
states in order from most severe to least severe, and patients were asked to view all
health states first before they rated them. We believe that a context effect, if any
were present in our study, would not have strongly influenced patients’ valuations
because preselected EQ-5D states showed no order effect. That is, a health state
presented first was not valued differently from a health state presented last a , even
though the valuation of the enriched EQ-5D health state might have been influenced
by the earlier 5 states for patients with better health. They might have recognized
that their health state was not as bad as the other 5 health states, which could have
led to a higher valuation of their own enriched EQ-5D health state. The finding
that this effect was only seen in patients in better health may point toward such a
contrast effect. For this group of patients, the states were more likely to be worse
than the own health state. The fact that their own experienced health was always
presented at the beginning of the interview might have had a negative effect on
the valuation of this health state. We felt this to be inevitable because we wished
to avoid having EQ-5D information to influence patients’ valuations of their own
experienced health state.
Another finding in this study was that even when exclusively negative attributes
were added, the own enriched EQ-5D state was not valued lower than the own
aThe mean (0.69[0.28]) of the first presented health state did not differ from the mean (0.69[0.28])
presented last. Because of the randomization, all health states appeared an approximately equal
number of times in each place. This made it possible to calculate the mean valuation of all health
states presented in the first place and to compare this with the mean valuation of a health state
presented in the last place.
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standard EQ-5D. Because this result was based on valuations of only 16 patients,
this finding has to be viewed with caution. However, if there is some ground for
this finding, it might have been caused by a so-called status quo bias; people tend to
value health states higher when they ”own” that health state.15 In economic decision
making, studies have revealed that people value goods more highly when they own
these goods.28,29 People thus seem to prefer what they know, which may result in
a preference for own health above an unknown health state. In our study, when
patients were valuing the own enriched EQ-5D health state, they were told that it
was their own health, in contrast to when they were valuing the own standard EQ-5D
description of their own health. Although we found significant differences, they are
small compared to the minimal importance difference (MID) for the EQ-5D. Walters
and Brazier97 revealed a mean MID of 0.074(−0.011 to 0.140) for the EQ-5D with
secondary analyses on 11 studies. However, the aim of this study was to understand
why health states are valued differently. In future studies, it would be interesting to
investigate the consequences of such differences for cost utility analyses.
3.5 Conclusion
Only limited support was found for the contention that the EQ-5D state de-
scription might be too sparse. It remains uncertain if including personal information
with a health state description will make hypothetical health states valued more sim-
ilarly to experienced health state ratings.
36
4
Focusing illusion, adaptation and
EQ-5D Health State Descriptions:
The difference between patients
and the general public.
Peeters Y., Vliet Vlieland T.P.M., & Stiggelbout A.M. Focusing illusion, adaptation and EQ-5D Health
State descriptions: The difference between patients and the general public. Health Expectations 2011
Mar 3, Epub ahead of print.
CHAPTER 4. FOCUSING ILLUSION, ADAPTATION AND EQ-5D
Abstract Objectives:Patients tend to assign higher utilities to health
states compared to the general public. Several explanations have been
given for this difference including focusing illusion -, caused in part by
the We investigated whether patients and the public differ in which di-
mensions they find important. Furthermore, we compared whether the
dimensions named by patients and the public obtained higher rankings
of importance compared to the predefined EQ-5D dimensions. Within
each nominated dimension we investigated whether the public used a
more negative frame compared to patients. In addition, adaptation was
investigated by comparing patients with high levels of adaptation and
patients with low levels of adaptation. Method: Data were collected
using semistructured interviews among 124 patients with rheumatoid
arthritis and 64 members of the public. Participants indicated which
aspects are important to them when they think about their life having
rheumatoid arthritis and rated the importance of these aspects and of
the EQ-5D dimensions. Results: In contrast to patients, the public
named more often aspects related to sports & mobility, leisure activities,
and work, and framed these aspects negatively. Compared to self-rated
dimensions, the public ranked the EQ-5D dimensions as more important
whereas patients found both groups of aspects equally important. Pa-
tients who showed higher levels of adaptation did not differ significantly
from patients with lower levels. Conclusion: The public is focussed on
life domains that are negatively influenced by the described health state





In cost-utility analysis, utilities are used to estimate how much better the
quality of life is in one health situation or ’state’ compared with another. Utilities
can be elicited from the public or from patients. For analysis from a societal per-
spective, it is recommended to use utilities assessed from a representative sample of
the general public.98 In contrast, utilities of patients who have experience with a
health state might be more appropriate in clinical decision making and in certain
policy decisions.99 Whose utilities should be used is only relevant if patients and
public differ. Literature dealing with this difference is somewhat controversial3 and
generally supports the supposition that patients assign higher utilities compared to
members of the public.16,46,100
Several explanations have been given for the difference between patients and
the public. Patients typically assign utilities in light of their experiences, whereas
members of the public are limited to a description of the health state. Even among
patients, it has been shown that utilities for patients’ own health are higher than
utilities they assign to a description of their own health.20,46 When patients give
utilities for their own health, a broad range of information can be used, whereas
utilities based on health state descriptions are supposedly limited to the information
provided.
The EQ-5D is widely used to provide health state descriptions. The EQ-5D
consists of five dimensions:, mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and
anxiety/depression. Each dimension is described according to one of three levels
of severity: no problems (1), some problems (2) and extreme problems (3). In
total the EQ-5D can thus create 243(35)theoretically possible health state descrip-
tions.89 EQ-5D health state descriptions thus consist of five sentences stating the
level of problems on the dimensions. Several publications have pointed out that the
sparseness of these EQ-5D health state descriptions23,90,101–104 limits their ability
to comprehensively describe health states. The sparseness of EQ-5D descriptions
is a result of the original purpose of the EQ-5D. The EQ-5D was developed as a
non-comprehensive measurement alongside other more detailed measures of Health
Related Quality of Life (HRQoL).105 The five EQ-5D dimensions were selected from
a review of existing instruments and tested against the results of a survey on the con-
cepts of health of lay persons.22 Given the current use of the EQ-5D as a full health
state description it has been suggested that the comprehensiveness of the EQ-5D
health states should be improved by adding new health state dimensions.23 Studies
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investigating the effects of extra dimensions have based the selection of extra dimen-
sions on expert groups and the general public’s concepts of health.102,104 However,
by selecting EQ-5D dimensions from lay persons’ health concepts, the sparseness of
the EQ-5D health state descriptions might inadvertently prompt a focusing illusion
in this group.
Focusing illusion is suggested as an important explanation for the difference
between health state utilities assigned by patients and the public. When members
of the general public are asked to imagine life in a certain health state they will con-
centrate on the differences between their current health state and the health state
to be valued.26 Life domains influenced by the health state receive disproportional
attention, whereas domains that will not be affected are ignored. The public con-
centrates on the negative aspects of an illness while patients give utilities in light of
their experiences in general.
Another explanation suggested for the differences in ratings between patients
and the public is the adaptation of patients. When patients experience an illness
they will adapt to it by changing their interests and goals and by lowering their
expectations for specific dimensions in the future.18 In contrast, it seems almost
impossible for the public to anticipate such adaptation.38,39 This study investigated
focusing illusion and adaptation as explanations for the differences in utilities be-
tween patients and the public. We investigated whether patients with rheumatoid
arthritis (RA) and members of the general public who were asked to imagine having
RA differed in which dimensions they rated as important in their lives. We hy-
pothesize that compared to patients, members of the public are more focussed on
dimensions influenced by the illness. Furthermore, we asked participants to name
important aspects in their lives and examined whether the dimensions named by
patients and the public were given higher rankings of importance compared to the
predefined EQ-5D dimensions. Given that the EQ-5D dimensions were based on
concepts of lay persons we hypothesize that the EQ-5D will accurately reflect the
opinion of the public but not that of patients. Within each named dimension we in-
vestigated whether the public used a more negative frame compared to patients. The
public may focus on those dimensions for which they would experience limitations
after developing an illness, thus leading to negative framing.
Similarly, adaptation was investigated by comparing patients with high levels
of adaptation and patients with low levels of adaptation. We investigated if patients
with high levels of adaptation named different dimensions compared to patients
with low levels of adaptation, if within each subgroup the dimensions named ob-
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tained higher importance rankings compared to the predefined EQ-5D dimensions
and within each of the dimensions we investigated whether these two groups differed
in their framing.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Patient subject recruitment
From the patient database of the Leiden University Medical Center, 300 pa-
tients aged 18 to 76 years old who had visited their rheumatologist in the past 6
months were identified. Men were oversampled to get an equal distribution of males
and females. Medical records of the selected patients were reviewed to confirm the
diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) and to identify comorbid conditions. Of the
300 identified patients, 50 had not been diagnosed with RA, and 7 had severe comor-
bid conditions. The remaining 243 eligible potential patient subjects were mailed
information about the interview and an informed consent form and asked to return
the signed consent form if they were willing to participate. Those who did not return
the form within 3 weeks were telephoned once and asked if they were interested, and
whether they needed a copy of the survey and consent form mailed to them.
4.2.2 Recruitment of members of the public
Members of the public were recruited through advertisements in local newspa-
pers distributed in Leiden and the surrounding mid-west region of the Netherlands.
To meet inclusion criteria, participants had to be between 35 and 76 years old. Those
who had RA or whose partner had RA were excluded. Of the 69 people who re-
sponded, two were excluded; one of the excluded participants had RA and the other
one had a partner who had RA. The 67 individuals who were invited to participate
were mailed information about the survey including an informed consent form.
4.2.3 Data collection
Data were collected using semistructured interviews and self administered ques-
tionnaires. Face-to-face interviews were performed by three trained interviewers.
The interview took place at the patient subjects’ preferred location: at home, at our
department (an office area of the LUMC), or at work. Members of the general public
were requested to visit our department. Patient participants who were interviewed
at our hospital office were not hospitalized at the time of the interview. In this
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paper only the part of the interview used to gather the information for this study is
described. A full description of the interview can be found elsewhere.100
The semistructured interview was slightly different for patients and members
of the public. Both groups received the same questions but answered them from a
different point of view. Patients were asked to answer questions about their own
health during the last week. Members of the public read a health state description
of RA (see Appendix C) and were asked to imagine that they had the RA state
described, and to thus imagine their previous week with this health state. At any
time point during the interview the RA health state description could be reread by
the participant.
During the interview, patients and members of the public answered the EQ-5D
questionnaire by filling out the level of problems on each of the EQ-5D dimensions for
their own health or the health state description, respectively. Next, after some filler
questions, patients were asked to name aspects important to their health during the
last week, and members of the public were asked the same questions imagining that
they had the RA state as described. An open-ended question was asked to elicit up
to a maximum of five dimensions. Each of the dimensions named by the participant
was summarized to one keyword after consultation with the participant. These
keywords were then written down on separate sheets of paper. Subsequently, the
five EQ-5D dimensions were also written down on separate sheets. All dimensions
were ordered by importance to the participant’s life with rheumatoid arthritis (actual
or imagined). If aspects were ranked equally important they were put next to each
other. The most important dimension was rated as 1, the next one 2, and so on.. If
aspects were equally important they received the same importance rating.
After the interview, participants received a questionnaire which they completed
at home and returned by mail. For patients this questionnaire included the Illness
Cognition Questionnaire (ICQ) to assess adaptation. This questionnaire consists of
three scales: hopelessness, benefit finding, and acceptance. Patients rated how much
they agreed with 18 statements on a four point Likert scale ranging from ’not at
all’ to ’completely’. The medical ethics committee of the Leiden University Medical
Center approved the study protocol.
4.2.4 Coding
The aspects named by the patients were initially consolidated into 10 dimen-
sions based on often recurring themes in the interviews. Each interviewer indepen-
dently coded the aspects based on these dimensions. Based on a comparison of the
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coding, a final coding system was developed. All aspects were recoded by each of the
two interviewers, differences were compared, and discrepancies were resolved through
discussion and reviewing the audio tapes of the interviews. A full description of the
coding system can be found in Appendix D.
The dimensions named by members of the public were coded using the same
coding system. Both interviewers coded all aspects. Agreement between the inter-
viewers was substantial, with a Cohen’s κ = 0.79.106 Divergent evaluations were
compared, and discrepancies were again resolved through discussion and reviewing
the audio tapes of the taped interviews. All aspects named fitted in one of the di-
mensions of the coding system. The interviewers also judged independently whether
the aspects were framed as positive, negative or neutral, based on the descriptions in
the interview schemes. The agreement between these ratings was almost perfect for
the dimensions named by patients (Cohen’s κ = 0.90) and moderate for the public
(Cohen’s κ = 0.51).106 Divergent evaluations were compared. By listening to the
taped interviews agreement was found.
4.2.5 Analysis of data
1. Do patients and the public differ in which dimensions they find im-
portant, in their ranking, or in the framing of the aspects named?
To answer this research question, the number of patients was compared to the
number of members of the public that named at least one aspect within a dimension.
For each dimension the frequencies were compared by using a χ2-test. Furthermore
the overall importance of all EQ-5D dimensions was compared to the overall impor-
tance of all self-named aspects using the Wilcoxon signed rank test. A lower number
indicated a higher importance. For this analysis we calculated for each participant
the mean rank-order of all EQ-5D dimensions and that of the self-named dimen-
sions. Next, for each of the EQ-5D and self-named dimensions the mean importance
was calculated. The mean ranks of the coded dimensions based on the own named
aspects were based only on the rank-order of participants who actually named an
aspect in this dimension.
To investigate framing, we first compared the overall framing between patients
and the public. For each participant we summed the positive, negative and neu-
tral codings and divided these by the number of aspects. That is, a participant
who named 3 aspects of which two positive and one neutral obtained the value
0.67( (1+1+0)(3) ). The overall framing value between patients and the public was com-
pared using the median test. Next we calculated for each dimension the number of
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participants who framed the aspect as positive, negative, or neutral. If participants
named more than one aspect with unequal codings in the same dimension this par-
ticipant was judged as “mixed”. For example, if a participant named “I often swim”
and “I am not able to walk long distances” both aspects were coded into the dimen-
sion sports & mobility with one as positive and one negative. For each dimension
the positive and negative frequencies of patients were compared to the frequencies
of the public using a χ2-test. Neutral and mixed were excluded.
2. Do patients with low acceptance of their illness differ from patients
with high acceptance in which dimensions they find important, their rank-
ing, or in the framing of the aspects named?
All analyses described above to compare patients and the public were also
performed to compare patients with high acceptance of their illness and patients
with low acceptance of their illness. Low and high acceptance of the illness was
based on a median split of the acceptance scale of the ICQ. Bonferroni correction
was used to correct for multiple comparisons where necessary.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Participants
Of the 243 patients identified, 132 patients agreed to participate in the study
(54%). No differences in age or time since diagnosis between responders and non-
responders were found. Of the responders, one patient with emotional problems and
two patients who were not able to speak and understand Dutch were excluded. Five
patients who could not finish the interview due to time or cognitive and concentration
problems were excluded from further analyses. In total 124 patients were included
in the analyses. The interviews took place at the hospital (N = 82), at the patients’
home (N = 41), or at work (N = 1). In total 67 members of the public originally
agreed to be interviewed. Two participants canceled the interviews, both due to
tight time schedules. All interviews took place at the hospital (N = 65).
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present the demographic information of the partici-
pants. As can be seen from Table 4.2, the health state of patients was less severe
than the health state description imagined by members of the public both based on
the UK-tariff estimated from the ratings participants gave on the EQ-5D question-
naire. No differences were found on the aspects named and rankings given between
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Table 4.2 Participant characteristics; continuous
Patients (N = 124) Public (N = 65)
Mean (Range) SD Mean (Range) SD
Age 58(29-75) 10.88 56(38-75) 10.86
Time since diagnose 13(2-47) 9.26
RA (years)
EQ-5D UK-tariffa 0.63 (−0.43 − 1.00) 0.27 0.53(−0.20 − 0.69) 0.27
aEQ-5D UK-tariff of the health state to be valued
Table 4.3 Members of the public who currently have or previously had significant
health problems:
Type of health problem: N (%)
Stroke 2 (3%)
Cardiac disease 4 (6%)
Cancer 7 (11%)
Migraine / severe headache 8 (12%)
High blood pressure 11 (17%)
Asthma/ bronchitis etc. 1 (2%)
Severe back problems/ herniated disc 3 (5%)
Parkinson 1 (2%)
Severe problems in joints 4 (6%)
Other 19 (29%)
problems experienced by participants from the general public are depicted in Ta-
ble 4.3.
4.3.2 Patients vs. Public
1. Do patients and the public differ in which dimensions they find im-
portant, their ranking, or in the framing of the aspects named?
Table 4.4 shows the frequencies and percentages of participants who named at
least one aspect in a dimension. Patients named significantly more often aspects in
the dimension illnesses not RA-related (χ2(1) = 15.25; p < 0.005), and less often in
sports and mobility (χ2(1) = 9.67; p < 0.005), and work (χ2(1) = 8.01; p < 0.005)
compared to the public. The significance level was corrected for the number of tests,
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Table 4.4 Number of aspects named in each dimension by patients and public
Frequency and percentage dimension named:
Patient % (N) General public % (N)
Physical inconvenience RA-related 77 (96) 66 (43)
Illness/inconvenience not RA-related 23 (29) 2 (1)]
Family 38 (47) 20 (13)∗
Other social contacts 23 (28) 19 (12)
Emotions/Worries 40 (50) 31 (20)
Sports/Mobility 27 (33) 49 (32)]
Leisure activities 23 (28) 37 (24)∗
Work 26 (32) 46 (30)]
Broad every day life 30 (37) 26 (17)
Other 20 (25) 19 (12)
∗p < 0.05,] p < 0.005
resulting in a corrected level of p < 0.005.
The mean rank-order of EQ-5D dimensions was not different from the rank-
order of self-named dimensions in patients (mean = 3.47(1.24) vs. mean = 3.26(1.19);
z = −1.64, p = 0.101). By contrast, members of the public rated the EQ-5D dimen-
sions as more important compared to the self-named dimensions (mean = 3.30(0.99)
vs. mean = 4.01(1.42); z = −3.32, p = 0.001). Table 4.5 shows the importance of
each of the EQ-5D dimensions and self-named dimensions for patients and public;
a lower number indicates greater importance. The mean reported is based on the
rank-order of participants who named a dimension in this category. Consequently
this mean is supported by only a sub-sample of participants (Table 4.4) making it
impossible to statistically test the difference between the two respondent groups.
Overall, the public framed the aspects more negatively compared to the patients
(median framing value of the public = -0.75 vs. median of the patients = 0.00;
χ2(1) = 23.92, p < 0.005).
Figure 4.1 shows the negatively and positively framed aspects for each of the
dimensions separately; neutral aspects were excluded. The χ2 tests shows that
for almost all dimensions patients framed their aspects more positively, except for
the dimensions family, emotions & worries, and other. Again we used a corrected
significance level of p < 0.005.
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Figure 4.1 Percentage dimensions named by patients and public divided in positive
and negative
The negatively and positively framed aspects for each of the dimensions separately;
neutral aspects were excluded.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.005
1 Physical inconvenience RA-related
2 Illness/inconvenience not RA-related
3 Family













EuroQol Mobility 2.92(1.70) 3.62(1.99)
EuroQol Self-Care 3.56(2.16) 3.29(2.16)
EuroQol Usual activities 3.12(1.88) 3.19(1.77)
EuroQol Pain/Discomfort 3.98(2.27) 3.21(1.67)
EuroQol Anxiety/Depression 3.81(2.42) 3.19(2.19)
Physical inconvenience RA-related 3.44(1.72) 3.13(1.68)
Illness/inconvenience not RA-related 4.02(2.21) 4.00(NA)
Family 2.51(1.52) 3.31(1.70)
Other social contacts 3.79(1.85) 3.82(2.14)
Emotions/Worries 3.23(1.87) 3.63(2.42)
Sports/Mobility 3.32(1.77) 4.32(2.20)
Leisure activities 3.52(1.69) 5.20(2.05)
Work 3.97(2.24) 4.67(2.22)
Broad every day life 3.00(1.90) 5.06(1.95)
Other 3.64(1.98) 3.33(1.87)
alower number indicates greater importance
2. Do patients with low acceptance of their illness differ from patients
with high acceptance in which dimensions they find important or in the
framing of the aspects named?
No differences were found between these patient groups in the frequency of dimen-
sions named. For patients with low acceptance the mean rank-order of EQ-5D
dimensions (3.47 (1.27)) was similar to the mean rank-order of own named dimen-
sions (3.35(1.12)), (z = −0.51; p = 0.61). However, patients with high acceptance
tended to rank the self-named dimensions slightly more important compared to the
EQ-5D dimensions (mean = 3.22(1.27) vs. mean = 3.48(1.23); z = −1.82, p = 0.07).
Aspects named by the patients with high acceptance were framed more positively
(median = 0.27) than those named by the patients with low acceptance (median
=−0.20), (χ2(1) = 6.57, p < 0.01). However the framing within each dimension did
not differ.
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4.4 Discussion
Most studies show that patients assign higher health state utilities compared
to members of the public.16 We studied explanations for this difference. Support
was found for the focusing illusion of the public. The findings underpin the hy-
pothesis that the public is focused on life domains influenced by a health state: the
public concentrated on not being able to perform work, leisure activities, and sports
anymore. Alternatively, these findings could also be explained by adaptation of pa-
tients. Patients in this study were less concerned about not being able to work or
play sports. A possible explanation is that they have learned to live without these
activities and have found new life goals.
The overall framing of aspects important to patients was neutral, whereas a
positive frame might have been expected. In the discussion about whose utilities
should be used it is argued that patients overestimate their well-being, leading to a
positive bias.107 Patients might be unrealistically optimistic about their situation108
and avoid complaining about their situation.107 However, our results tentatively
show that patients do not positively exaggerate their life domains. This is in line
with Riis et al107 who found no evidence that patients overestimate their mood.
Possibly patients have a better picture about life in a certain health state, resulting
in more accurate estimations. However, we have to take into account that the results
are limited to patients with rheumatoid arthritis. It could be that these patients
are less able to adapt to their illness. Rheumatoid arthritis is a disabling and often
progressive disease, with varying symptoms and which is characterized by pain and
deformity of the joints. There is evidence that pain is a symptom to which people
only adapt to in a limited way.109,110
To compare the effect of acceptance, patients with high acceptance were com-
pared to patients with low acceptance. For all research questions a difference was
seen between patients with high and low acceptance, but the effect was not strong.
Patients who had better accepted their illness framed their aspects slightly more
positively than patients who had a lower acceptance.
In contrast to the hypothesis that patients think more about their life in general
we found that 77% of the patients still named one or more aspects of physical
(in)convenience related to RA. This can be explained by the context of the study.
Patients were invited to participate in a study investigating quality of life of patients
with RA and answered several questions related to RA and their health before
answering the open ended question about their most important aspects. It may be
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that the context of the study, the introduction, and the previous questions made
information about RA easily accessible in the minds of the patients.111,112 Along
the same line, the answers given by members of the public may have been guided
by the domains provided in the health state description.
Another explanation for the difference between patients and members of the
public was the sparseness of the health state descriptions, such as in the EQ-5D.
When compared to the self-named dimensions we found that according to the pub-
lic the EQ-5D dimensions were ranked as more important. This suggests that the
EQ-5D dimensions indeed give a good reflection of the most important dimensions
to be included in a health state description according to the public. In contrast,
patients found their self-named dimensions equally important as the EQ-5D dimen-
sions. For patients the EQ-5D dimensions might not be complete, other dimensions
are also important in creating comprehensive health state descriptions. A tentative
suggestion can be made for adding information about family. As illustrated in Table
4, this dimension might be expected to be more important than the EQ-5D dimen-
sions. Our findings suggest that patients find an EQ-5D health state description
too sparse and information about family should be added. More research among
patients is necessary to further investigate this finding.
Our findings were based on an open-ended question asking participants to name
the most important aspects without referring to the predefined EQ-5D dimensions.
Naturally, had we asked patients and the public which dimensions they found im-
portant in addition to the five EQ-5D dimensions, we might have obtained different
results. We were afraid that if we referred to the EQ-5D dimensions, participants
would have focussed on naming similar dimensions. Further, it was decided not to
code the aspects into the predefined EQ-5D dimensions but to use a new coding
system. EQ-5D dimensions can be interpreted in a very broad as well as in a narrow
way. For instance, one can suggest that aspects related to family and friends are
mentioned by the dimension “daily activities” whereas someone else might think that
family and friends are not per se part of an activity. To determine if the self-named
aspects correspond to the EQ-5D dimensions, more information would be necessary
about how the participants interpreted the EQ-5D dimensions. For instance, broad
everyday life might be expected to come under EQ-5D self-care or usual activities,
but most often aspects named in this dimension were hard to distinguish. Often par-
ticipants mentioned aspects such as “Generally I am able to do what other people
would do on a typical day.” This can come under the EQ-5D dimension self-care but
also under the dimension usual activities. When asked, participants did not make a
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clear distinction.
In our sample 62% of members of the public had experience with an illness.
Experience with an illness may have influenced our findings.17 Yet from a societal
perspective it is suggested that a representative sample of the general public should
be assessed for cost-utility analyses. This does not exclude people with current
or previous health problems. When we compared the number of participants with
significant health problems with the number of the Dutch population113 we did not
find major differences. Our sample seems to be a good representation of the Dutch
population.
Patients and members of the public differed on some demographic characteris-
tics. A major difference between the patients and the public was that in the sample
of patients more participants were married. However, both members of the pub-
lic and patients named family an equal number of times as an important domain.
Another difference was seen in that more patients were unable to work, compared
to members of the public. Post hoc analyses on work status showed that people
who were able to work more often named aspects related to this dimension. This
suggests that activities that have taken up most time in one’s previous week come
to mind more easily. However, participants unable to work, mostly patients, seem
to have changed their focus. Participants able to work mentioned not being able to
work as an important limitation, whereas participants who actually were not able
to work did not mention work at all. Finally patients had fewer years of education
than members of the public, but no effect was found on aspects named by education
level.
In this study patients were asked to think about their own health whereas
members of the public were asked to imagine a health state description. Although
this is in line with research in cost-utility analysis, it leads to differences in perception
of health state severity and to variance between patients and public. In this study
the average health state of patients was less severe than the health state description
imagined by members of the public based on UK- EQ-5D tariff scores. However,
given that the majority of patients were not able to work or had problems with
sports/mobility but did not focus on these dimensions of life, we expect the influence
of the severity of the health state to be minor.
In conclusion, regarding the EQ-5D health state descriptions, our findings in-
dicate that patients find an EQ-5D health state description sparse. More research
among patients is necessary. Regarding focusing illusion we found that the public is
focused on life domains that are negatively influenced by the health state whereas
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patients are focused both on the negative and the positive aspects of their lives.
Consequently, patients’ picture of life in a health state might give a better reflection
of reality. To what extent patients had accepted their illness did not have a strong
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CHAPTER 5. UTILITIES - PATIENTS, PARTNERS AND PUBLIC
Abstract Objectives:Many studies have found health state valuations
of patients to be higher than valuations of members of the general pub-
lic, and valuations of professionals to be intermediate. This difference
has generally been ascribed to experience with the state, whereby vi-
carious experience of professionals leads to the intermediate values. No
studies have compared utilities of patients with those of their partners,
who have a similar but more “insider” vicarious experience. The aim of
this study was to compare values of patients, their partners, and mem-
bers of the public. Since the studies that have found higher values for
patients have generally asked patients to value their own experienced
health state rather than a scenario, we also wished to assess whether the
difference maybe due to a scenario-effect, and whether ’enriching’ a sce-
nario by adding individualized attributes reduces the differences between
the groups. Methods: Data were collected using semi-structured inter-
views among 127 patients with rheumatoid arthritis, 71 partners of these
patients, and 64 members of the public. Participants indicated which as-
pects (attributes) were important to them when thinking about their
life having (or imagining having) rheumatoid arthritis. These aspects
were used to “enrich” the EQ-5D scenarios. Participants were asked to
value in a Time TradeOff 1) their own experienced/imagined health; 2)
a standard EQ-5D scenario, which (untold to them) represented their
own health state; and 3) a standard EQ-5D scenario of their own health
state (identified as such), enriched with individual attributes. Results:
For all three states ratings were significantly higher for patients than for
the general public. Ratings for partners were in between (and not all
significantly different). No differences were seen between the three types
of health states to be values. Conclusion: Differences between patients
and the public are not likely to be due to sparseness of the scenarios,
but may be due to a focusing illusion, enhanced by the negative framing
of scenarios. It could be argued that for societal level decision making
utilities from partners are more well-informed than those of the public,




Health state utilities play an important role in health care decision-making and
health economics. The most important applications of utilities are in expected utility
decision analysis and in cost-utility analysis. In such analyses, the expected utility
for each possible strategy is calculated by combining the utilities for all possible
health states with the probabilities of these states occurring. Utilities can be used
at various levels of health-care decision-making, and the level determines whether
they should be assessed from the general public or from patients. Gold et al.12 have
recommended the use of society’s preferences in cost-utility analyses from a societal
perspective, for macro-level decision-making, and utilities thus should be assessed
from a representative sample of fully informed members of the general public. For
guideline development, the meso-level, and for individual patient decision-making,
the micro-level, they have recommended the use of utilities obtained from actual
patients, assuming that the latter have a better understanding of the impact a health
state can have. They have qualified their recommendations, however, basing their
reasoning and their recommendations on the assumption that health state utilities in
general differ between patients and the general public. In many instances, members
of the public who are asked to imagine experiencing health states assign lower utilities
to those states than do patients who are actually experiencing these states. The
observation of the differences in utilities between respondent groups has therefore
led to the question of whose utilities are most ’well-informed’, and thereby most valid
for use at the different levels of decision-making.15 The answer to this question will
depend on the reason for the differences. Are they due to better understanding
by the patients of what the health states are really like? Or are differences due
to cognitive mechanisms operating in patients during or after treatment, such as
justification processes? Or, worse, are they simply artifacts of the method, caused by,
for example, different objects of valuation? In most studies, patients are instructed
to value “their health in the past week” or “their current health”. “Health” may
be specified further, referring to physical, psychological, and social well-being.114
Members of the general public will mostly not be experiencing the health states to be
valued. The respondents are therefore requested to value a health state description,
or scenario, of the state. Generally, health state classification systems such as the
EQ-5D,89 or the Health Utilities Index, are used for this purpose. They give a
limited description of the health state, usually in terms of functioning on some
salient dimensions. The EQ-5D scenarios describe specific levels of impairment in
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mobility, self-care, and daily activities, and specific levels of pain/discomfort and
anxiety/depression. Respondents are asked to imagine spending the rest of their life
in the health state described in that scenario.
Relatively little research has been devoted to the development of these health
state scenarios, despite early research in the field of utility assessment that showed
the impact of framing of the scenarios on the elicited utilities.91 Jansen et al.20found
that patients undergoing radiotherapy assigned higher values to their “own health”
during radiotherapy than to a scenario that aimed to describe their actual radiother-
apy experience. The authors ascribed this difference to the scenario not matching the
patients’ experience (’non-corresponding description’). Similar results were revealed
in a meta-analysis of utilities assigned to prostate cancer.46 Patients with prostate
cancer rated a description of their health lower than their experienced health state.
In a study using the EQ-5D health classification system, Insinga and Fryback23 also
found a difference between diseased respondents’ valuations of their current health
(“however they conceived of it”) and their valuations of the EQ-5D scenario that
by coincidence happened to describe their own health. They argued that ’non-
corresponding description’, which they termed ’lack of scope’, best explained the
different values that respondents assigned to their own health compared to the EQ-
5D description of their health. They concluded that the scenarios of the EQ-5D are
too sparse to describe certain health states. Further, the scenarios are often framed
in negative terms. This leads to a focus on the negative impact of the health state,
which might cause healthy subjects to overestimate the negative impact of a disease.
Indeed focusing illusion has been suggested by many as an important explanation
for the difference between health state utilities assigned by patients and public.25
When the public imagines life in a certain health state they will concentrate on the
difference between their current health state and the health state to be valued. Life
domains influenced by the health state receive disproportional attention, whereas
domains that will not be affected are ignored. The public concentrates on the neg-
ative aspects of an illness while patients give utilities in light of their experience in
general.
Possibly EQ-5D descriptions should be enriched to create more resemblance be-
tween ratings of “own health” (self-ratings) and ratings of scenarios describing “own
health” (self-identified EQ-5D ratings). In cost-utility research enriched EQ-5D de-
scriptions have already been used to explore preferences for different medication
types. Medication-related attributes added to the EQ-5D description induced dif-
ferences in preferences between treatments.90 In an earlier study we assessed the
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impact of enriching an EQ-5D scenario of patients’ own health, but found it did not
make it more similar to the patients’ valuation of their own health.115 Given the
above it may be expected however, that the effect should particularly be seen in
members of the general public. The inconclusive findings in patients therefore led
us to the question whether enriching a scenario would make valuations of members
of the general public more similar to those of patients. Furthermore, to obtain more
in-depth insight into the problems of a possible better understanding that patients
have20 and of focusing illusion25 we decided to include an additional population:
partners of patients. To our knowledge no studies have assessed the valuations of
this group. This is surprising since professionals have repeatedly been found to as-
sign values that are intermediate between those of patients and of the public,116 and
partners can be expected to assign such intermediate values too, since they have
vicarious experience, like professionals, and probably have a better understanding of
the day to day adaptation to poor health than professionals. The aim of this study
was to assess the difference in utilities between patients, their partners, and the gen-
eral public, and to further investigate to what extent this may be due to an effect of
using a scenario. We aimed to disentangle the effect of scenario vs. own health by
eliciting valuations for three objects of valuation (in our case: rheumatoid arthritis
health states) from each of the three groups, two groups who had to imagine living
with a disease (members of the public and partners) and the third actually living
with the disease (patients). Respondents valued their own imagined/experienced
health state, a standard EQ-5D description of this health state, and an enriched
EQ-5D description of this health state. We hypothesized that the value patients
assigned to their own health would be highest, followed by that assigned by partners
to their life with (imagined) RA, and that the lowest value would be assigned by the
public to the standard EQ-5D state. We further hypothesized that adding individ-
ualized attributes to the EQ-5D (enriching it) would lead to higher valuations, and
thereby lead to smaller differences between the valuations of the own experienced
health and the scenario. Based on the findings of Smith et al.49 and Llewelyn-
Thomas et al.91 we chose to enrich the standard EQ-5D description with individual
patient attributes instead of giving more detailed but standard information.
59
CHAPTER 5. UTILITIES - PATIENTS, PARTNERS AND PUBLIC
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Participants and procedures
The participant sample consisted of patients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA)
aged 18 to 76 years old who had visited their treating rheumatologist in the past six
months. From the database of the Leiden University Medical Center (LUMC), three
hundred patients were randomly selected. In the selection method, we oversampled
males to get an equal distribution of males and females, since RA is more prevalent
in women. Medical records of the selected patients were reviewed to confirm the
diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) and identify co-morbid conditions. Of the
300 identified patients 50, patients had not been diagnosed with RA, and 7 had severe
co-morbid conditions. The remaining 243 eligible patients were mailed information
about the survey, including an informed consent form and asked to return the signed
consent if they were willing to participate. Those who did not return the form
within 3 weeks were telephoned as a reminder. Data were collected using self-report
questionnaires and a semi-structured interview.
The partner sample consisted of partners of patients with RA (not of the above
patients). We recruited partners by announcements at the outpatient clinic of the
Department of Rheumatology of the LUMC and in the Newsletter of the Rheuma-
tology Patient Society (In Beweging). Moreover, RA consultants and nurses at the
outpatient clinic of the LUMC approached partners of patients to participate in
the study. Partners contacted the researchers by phone or e-mail to make an ap-
pointment, preferably at the LUMC. All partners were telephoned by the research
assistant to verify that the partner had no RA, was aged between 18 and 76 years
old, that their spouse had been diagnosed with RA and did not participate as a
patient in our study.
Members of the public were recruited through announcements in local newspa-
pers distributed in Leiden and the surrounding mid-west region of the Netherlands.
To meet inclusion criteria participants had to be between 35 and 76 years old. Those
who had RA or whose partner had RA were excluded. The individuals who were in-
vited to participate were mailed information about the survey, including an informed
consent form. The medical ethics committee of the Leiden University Medical Center




Data were collected using semistructured interviews and self-administered ques-
tionnaires. Face-to-face interviews were performed by one of three trained interview-
ers. For patients and partners the interview took place at their preferred location:
at home, at our department (an office area of the LUMC), or at work. Members
of the general public were requested to visit our department. Patients who were
interviewed in the hospital were not hospitalized at the time of the interview.
The interview started with the valuation of each participant’s own experienced
health of the previous week. The subsequent part of the interview was slightly
different for patients, partners, and members of the public. All groups received
the same questions but answered them from a different point of view. Patients were
asked to answer questions about their own health during the previous week, partners
were asked to imagine that they had their partner’s (the RA patient’s) health of the
previous week, and members of the public read a detailed health state description
of RA (see appendix C) and were asked to imagine that they had the RA state
described, and to thus imagine their previous week, having this health state. At any
time point during the interview the RA health state description could be reread.
Next, participants answered the EQ-5D questionnaire, five items on mobility,
self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression, on a three point
scale: no problems, some problems, and no function at all, or in the case of pain,
extreme pain.89 They were asked to indicate the level of problems on each of the
EQ-5D dimensions for their own health, their partner’s health, or the health state
description, respectively. This state is from now on referred to as “own standard
EQ-5D” state, even though strictly speaking it was only their own state for the RA
patients.
After this EQ-5D questionnaire two filler questionnaires followed, i.e. the Pa-
tient Satisfaction Questionnaire92 and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale,93 to distract
participants’ attention from the answers they had given on the EQ-5D questionnaire.
In the next part, participants were asked to value five standard EQ-5D states. Five
of these EQ-5D states were retrieved from previous research with patients with RA,
covering the full utility range from 0 to 1 according to the UK tariff.11 A descrip-
tion of these health states can be found in appendix B. Unknown to the participants,
the sixth health state was their own standard EQ-5D state of the previous week as
indicated in the EQ-5D questionnaire. The computer retrieved the answers of the
participant earlier in the interview and created the own standard EQ-5D state for
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this participant. All standard EQ-5D states were randomly presented except for the
participant’s own standard EQ-5D state, which was always presented as the fifth
state. Participants were not informed that it was their own standard EQ-5D health
state. If one of the five pre-selected EQ-5D states happened to be the same as the
own standard EQ-5D state, this state was replaced automatically with the EQ-5D
state that should have been presented in the sixth place.
Following this valuation task respondents were asked to name aspects impor-
tant to their health during the last week, and partners and members of the public
were asked the same questions but imagining that they had the RA state of their
partner or as given in the description. An open-ended question was used to indi-
cate these dimensions, with a maximum of five dimensions. The interviewer entered
these attributes in the computer. It was impossible to add a full description of each
attribute; consequently a keyword was used. The interviewer and the participant
together created suitable keywords for each of the individual attributes. Only key-
words on which the participant agreed were used. These individual attributes were
then combined with the own standard EQ-5D state of previous week to create an
own enriched EQ-5D state. On the computer screen, the description of the own
enriched EQ-5D state was shown with the individual attributes represented beneath
the five standard attributes. It was made clear to the participants that the order in
which the attributes were presented was arbitrary and that it was up to the partic-
ipants how important the attributes were to them. Furthermore, participants were
told that the description as stated on the computer fitted their own health state. If
this was not clear, the interviewer explained how this description was created and
made sure that the participant understood that it was his or her own (experienced
or imagined) health state.
All health states were valued using a time tradeoff (TTO). Participants rated
how many years (x) of their remaining life expectancy (y), derived from Dutch life
expectancy tables,117 they were willing to trade to obtain perfect health. Utility
was calculated as y−xy . The computer program Ci394 was used to elicit the utilities
based on a ping-pong search procedure. On the computer screen a short description
of perfect health and the health state to be valued were presented. Perfect health






Of the 243 patients selected, 132 patients gave their approval to be interviewed
(54%). No differences in age and time since diagnosis between responders and non-
responders were found. Of the responders, one patient with emotional problems
and two patients who were not able to speak and understand Dutch were excluded.
Data of 2 participants created multivariate outliers and were excluded from further
analyses (Mahalanobis distance, F (3) = 31.07 and F (3) = 18.05). The interviews
took place at the hospital (N = 82), at the patients’ home (N = 44) or at work
(N = 1). Of the 74 partners of RA patients who originally gave their approval to be
interviewed 73 were actually interviewed. One participant could not be reached. The
interviews took place at the hospital (N = 45), at the participants’ home (N = 26)
or elsewhere (N = 2). Of the 69 members of the general public who responded two
were excluded: one of the excluded participants had RA and the other one had a
partner who had RA. Two participants decided to cancel the interview, both due
to a tight time schedule. All 65 interviews took place at the hospital. Table 5.1
presents the demographic information of the participants.
5.4.2 Valuations of the three health states
Table 5.2 shows the means and standard deviations of the three health state
valuations for the three groups. As expected, scores were highest for patients, lowest
for the public and in between for partners. Using MANOVA, we found statistically
significant differences between the three participant groups for all three health states.
Since the higher utilities of the patients and partners may have simply been due to
better health of the patients (better than the health state description presented to
the public), we redid the analysis, using the tariff of the EQ-5D states scored by the
respondents as covariate. Estimated marginal means are shown in Table 5.3. Using
MANCOVA, we found an overall effect for respondent group (F (6, 504) = 2.2, p =
0.04). Between-subjects analysis showed a highly statistically significant difference
between the groups for the enriched state, and a borderline effect for own (imagined)
health and the standard EQ-5D state. Post hoc pairwise comparisons, adjusted for
multiple comparisons, showed significant differences between patient and public for
the own (imagined or experienced) health (p = 0.02), the standard EQ-5D state
(p = 0.03), and the enriched EQ-5D state (p < 0.001). Differences between patient
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and partner and between partner and public were of borderline significance for the
enriched EQ-5D state only (p = 0.10and 0.08, respectively). Table 5.3 shows the
means and standard deviations of the 3 health state valuations for the 3 groups.
Contrary to our expectation, repeated measurement ANOVA showed no
effect of health state valued (own vs. standard EQ-5D vs. enriched EQ-5D), nor an
interaction between group (patients, partners, public) and state valued. Differences
were minimal and own state, if anything, was lower than the other two states, not
higher. In a comparison as commonly described in the literature, the valuation of
the standard EQ-5D state of the public from Table 5.1 would have been compared
to the patient’s own health (0.67 vs 0.79). We indeed found the expected difference.
However, we had expected to bridge this gap by enriching the scenario, which did
not occur (enriched state: 0.66).
5.5 Discussion
Aim of this study was to assess the difference in utilities between patients,
partners, and the general public, and to further investigate to what extent differences
may be due to an effect of valuing a scenario vs. valuing one’s own health. To our
knowledge this is the first study assessing utilities in partners of patients. As we had
expected, patients assigned the highest value to all states, followed by partners and
the general public. However, we did not see a difference by object of valuation, i.e.,
whether participants imagined themselves living in a state described as a ’sparse’
EQ-5D scenario, an enriched EQ-5D scenario, or their own health (patients), the
health of their partner with RA (partners), or a detailed description of an RA state
(public). Particularly for the general public we had expected that enriching an
EQ-5D scenario would increase the valuations, bringing these closer to those of the
patients. In this group, however, the three valuations were approximately the same,
and 0.12-0.15 lower than those of patients. The findings in partners and the public
are a confirmation of our findings in patients,13 that the generally found difference
between patients and the public is not due to the scenarios being too sparse, a
suggestion that had been made both by Jansen et al.20 and Insinga and Fryback.23
It may still however be the case that they lack positive aspects, as also argued by
the latter. From a qualitative analysis of the open ended question that was used to
elicit attributes to enrich the scenarios it appeared that the public was focused on life
domains that were negatively influenced by RA: they concentrated on not being able
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patients and the public are not likely to be due to sparseness of the scenarios, but
may be due to a focusing illusion, enhanced by the negative framing of scenarios.
In the discussion about the difference between patients and public it has also
been suggested that patients overestimate their well-being, leading to a positive
bias.107 Patients might be unrealistically optimistic about their situation,108 or
even suffer from self-deception: “people with disabilities . . . deceiving themselves
about how close to normal they are”. However, the mentioned qualitative analysis
did not indicate patients to positively exaggerate their life domains. Further, their
utilities for their own health were not higher than those for the EQ-5D scenario that,
unknown to them, represented their own situation, and were not close to 1. The
finding of partners’ valuations being intermediate, points to an effect of (vicarious)
experience with the disease, leading to a better ability to anticipate adaptation than
the public. An important conclusion of research in behavioral economics that will
also apply to utility assessment is that humans are poor in predicting how they
will value a situation once it is experienced, so-called “poor hedonic forecasting”.26
Processes of adaptation, e.g., appear difficult to anticipate. It has been suggested
that members of the public use a transition heuristic when valuing health, i.e., they
focus on the time of entering a poor health state and do not consider adaptation
to that state. This will result in these respondents undervaluing states. As stated
above, members of the public indeed focused on attributes that were negatively
influenced by a health state. Further, the public ranked the EQ-5D dimensions as
more important than the self-rated dimensions, whereas patients found both groups
of attributes equally important. This indeed points to a transition heuristic or a
focusing illusion.25 Patients in this study were less concerned about not being able
to work or play sports. Possibly they have learned to live without these activities
and have found new life goals. Gold et al.12 have argued that “techniques that
create a better understanding in the general public of the experience of differering
health states will be highly useful in strengthening this field” . Using adaptation
exercises as proposed by Damschroder38 may serve as such to overcome the poor
hedonic forecasting of humans. Our findings in partners indicate that there is indeed
something to gain here.
Other explanations often given for the gap between patients and members of
the public are loss aversion and status quo bias. Good health is considered a gain to
patients, and poor health a loss to healthy subjects. Losses weigh more strongly than
gains, and thereby utilities are lower for healthy subjects. Related to this is status
quo bias, or the endowment effect, which shows that people value goods more highly
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once they own them. One may expect this bias to be stronger for respondents valuing
their own health (which they ’own’) than for respondents valuing hypothetical states
(which they are asked to imagine ’owning’), leading to higher utilities in patients.
Both loss aversion and an endowment effect might also explain why patients gave
somewhat, although not significantly, higher values to the enriched than to the
standard EQ-5D scenario (0.83 vs. 0.81), since for the latter they were not made
aware that it was their own health state. If differences between groups were entirely
due to loss aversion, however, partners’ valuations should have been similar to those
of the general public, whereas they were in between those of patients and the public.
In the end it remains a matter of principle, or even a philosophical issue, which
mechanisms to allow in the process of utility elicitation for societal decision making,
and which to avoid. Even if patients have a more realistic picture of their life,
they will still suffer from loss aversion, a mechanism that one may not wish to
include in utilities used for cost-utility analysis, or from other cognitive mechanisms
operating during the tradeoff task, such as justification processes, which, we would
argue, should not be reflected either. As regards the failure to anticipate adaptation,
Gilbert has argued that this may be a Darwinian mechanism “An organism aware
of its ability to construct its own satisfaction might well loose its preferences for one
outcome over another and become happily extinct” (p. 635).26 Nevertheless one may
argue that for allocating health care resources one does not want to incorporate all
adaptation, since health care ultimately is aimed at improving health and preventing
ill health. But clearly an improvement over current practice would be to incorporate
more positive aspects in the scenarios used to elicit utilities from the public. An issue
for debate in our opinion would be the use of partners of patients, since they by their
vicarious experience they have a more realistic view of the health states than the
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CHAPTER 6. EFFECT OF ADAPTIVE ABILITIES ON UTILITIES
Abstract Objective: In cost-utility analyses gain in health can be mea-
sured using health state utilities. Health state utilities can be elicited
from members of the public or from patients. Utilities given by patients
tend to be higher than utilities given by members of the public. This
difference is often suggested to be explained by adaptation, but this has
not yet been investigated in patients. Here, we investigate if, besides
health related quality of life (HRQL), persons’ ability to adapt can ex-
plain health state utilities. Both the direct effect of persons’ adaptive
abilities on health state utilities and the indirect effect, where HRQL me-
diates the effect of ability to adapt, are examined. Methods: In total
125 patients with rheumatoid arthritis were interviewed. Participants
gave valuations of their own health on a visual analogue scale (VAS) and
time trade-off (TTO). To estimate persons’ ability to adapt, patients
filled in questionnaires measuring Self-esteem, Mastery, and Optimism.
Finally they completed the SF-36 measuring HRQL. Regression analy-
ses were used to investigate the direct and mediated effect of ability to
adapt on health state utilities. Results: Persons’ ability to adapt did
not add considerably to the explanation of health state utilities above
HRQL. In the TTO no additional variance was explained by adaptive
abilities (∆R2 = 0.00, β = 0.02), in the VAS a minor proportion of the
variance was explained by adaptive abilities (∆R2 = 0.05, β = 0.33).
The effect of adaptation on health state utilities seems to be mediated
by the mental health domain of quality of life. Conclusions: Patients
with stronger adaptive abilities, based on their optimism, mastery and
self-esteem, may more easily enhance their mental health after being di-




In health care, decisions are made about treatment at the level of individ-
ual patients, of patient groups (guideline development), and at the societal level.15
Decisions about guideline development and decisions at the societal level are often
guided by cost-utility analyses. In these analyses the gain in health obtained by
treatment is compared with the costs that have to be made in order to obtain this
gain.12 To assess the value of this gain, cost-utility analyses make use of health state
valuations, i.e. health state utilities.
A health state utility is a preference for a particular health state compared
with perfect health and immediate death. Utilities can be seen as a global valuation
of health related quality of life (HRQL)118 and can be expected to show a strong
relationship with health status. Nevertheless, only between 18% and 43% of the
variance in health state utilities can be explained by HRQL. Most of the variance
still remains unexplained.119
Health state utilities can be elicited from members of the public and from
patients. Members of the public tend to give lower health state valuations, compared
to patients.100 This discrepancy in health state valuations has, among others, been
suggested to be explained by the failure of members of the public to anticipate on
their ability to adapt. Patients adapt to the physical and psychological challenges
of their illness.120 When health state valuations are elicited from patients, some of
the variance in health state utilities might be explained by this adaptation.18,20,36
Tentative support has been found for the effect of adaptation on health state
valuations. Members of the public who were made aware of their ability to adapt
gave higher valuations on a person trade-off (PTO) and on a visual analogue scale
(VAS) measuring quality of life,24,38 but not on the time trade-off (TTO) nor on
the standard gamble (SG).39 Whether health state utilities given by patients are
actually correlated with adaptation has not been topic of study yet.
Adaptation can be defined as a response that diminishes or remains the same
despite constant or increasing stimulus levels.31 The outcome of adaptation can
be measured by change over time, such as change in well-being107 or life satisfac-
tion.121,122 If researchers aim to gain more insight in the process of adaptation itself,
adaptation can be conceptualised through certain coping-strategies.123,124 These
coping-strategies are, among others, enabled by personal resources.
By studying adaptation Taylor32 developed the Cognitive Adaptation Theory
(CAT) which is based on cognitive interviews with chronically ill persons. This the-
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ory is one of the dominant theories in health psychology and has often been used to
empirically test adaptation. Research using this theory suggests that psychological
adjustment to an illness occurs around four themes; a search for meaning in the
experience, an attempt to regain mastery over the event and over one’s life more
generally, an effort to enhance one’s self-esteem, and the ability to find positive illu-
sions, i.e. optimism. These concepts as suggested in the CAT are further described
below.
After a threatening event, people often cannot find a sense of meaning in the
experience and lose their feelings of mastery and of self-esteem. Most people manage
to re-establish these over time. According to Taylor, this re-establishment is based on
so-called positive illusions. People develop unrealistic beliefs that make it possible to
regain control over the event and over one’s life and to regain self-esteem.32 Although
positive illusions may create unrealistic and maybe ’false’ ideas, these illusions have
been found to be important resources.45
Previous studies have shown that patients who score high on indicators of CAT
have better psychological functioning,125–128 they are less anxious and depressed,
report more vitality and have a better mental functioning.126,129,130 Moreover,
patients with a higher score on indicators of CAT reported better physical function-
ing,126,127 they showed fewer new coronary events or hospital admissions125,130 and
lived longer.131 It thus appears that patients who have higher self-esteem, mastery,
and optimism, and who find a meaning in the experience have better abilities to
adapt.
No standard method is available for investigating the ability to adapt based
on CAT. Studies have used different indicators and methods for their analyses. For
instance, studies have included indicators measuring optimism, mastery and self-
esteem, but often exclude finding meaning. To our knowledge, only in two studies the
effect of finding meaning was included.131,132 The rationale to exclude benefit finding
was described by Major et al.133 and Chan et al.127 Both research groups suggest
that mastery, self-esteem, and optimism are stable personality traits representing a
persons’ resilience, whereas finding meaning might be seen as a process facilitated
by these personality traits.
Apart from this variety of indicators of CAT included to measure adaptive
abilities, studies have also used different ways to measure these indicators. Some
studies have analysed the effects of the different indicators separately,128,134 some
have created a scale taking the indicators together,130–132,135 and again others have
investigated each indicator separately as well as an aggregate scale of the indicators
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together.125–127 The latter studies revealed that besides the effect of the aggregate
scale, often only one of the indicators had an effect on the outcome measurement.
Since the overall results of these studies show different ’single’ indicators to reveal
an effect, indicators of persons’ abilities to adapt cannot be simplified to one single
indicator. Exploring the results of these studies further, it seems that significant
effects have mostly been seen in studies using an aggregate scale. Therefore, in the
present study persons’ ability to adapt is constructed with an aggregate scale based
on mastery, self-esteem and optimism.
The first aim of this study was to investigate if above HRQL, persons’ adaptive
abilities explain health state utilities. That is:
• Do adaptive abilities account for the unexplained variance in health state util-
ities above the variance explained by HRQL?
Another possibility is that adaptation, in this study measured through persons’
ability to adapt, has an indirect effect on utilities, through HRQL. As described
above, adaptive abilities does affect psychological and physical functioning.130 This
would fit the hierarchical model of Spilker and Revicki,136 in which three levels
of quality of life are distinguished that have mutual impact on each other. The
hierarchy of this model ranged from a global level such as a health state utility,
to HRQL domains, and to specific determinants of domains such as personality
characteristics,136 which may include adaptive abilities. Thus, the second aim of
this study was to investigate if adaptive abilities affect health state utilities via
HRQL domains.
• Is the relation between adaptive abilities and health state utilities mediated137
by HRQL domains?
Since we investigated psychological adaptive abilities we assume from a theoretical
point of view that only mental health can mediate this relation.
6.2 Methods
6.2.1 Participants and design
We chose to study our research questions in a sample of patients with rheuma-
toid arthritis (RA). RA concerns a chronic disease with a wide spectrum of man-
ifestations, for which adaptation is relevant, since no cure is available. From the
database of the Leiden University Medical Centre, 300 people who were between 18
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and 76 years old and had visited their treating rheumatologist in the previous six
months were randomly selected. In total 1054 patients had visited their rheuma-
tologist in the past six months. These patients were randomly numbered. First,
400 numbers had been drawn (using the software Excell) as a selection for a differ-
ent study.138 Of the remaining 654 patients 90 patients had to be excluded due to
age restrictions, and 10 were excluded because they had refused to participate in
a similar study.139 Next, to get equal male/female distribution, 150 male patients
and 150 female patients were randomly selected to participate in the current study.
Based on the medical records, 50 people who had not been diagnosed with RA, and
seven with severe co-morbid conditions were excluded. The remaining 243 eligible
people received information about the survey by mail, including an informed consent
form. Patients who did not return the informed consent form within three weeks
were called as a reminder. Data were collected using self-report questionnaires and
a semi-structured interview. The medical ethics committee of the Leiden University
Medical Centre approved the study protocol.
6.2.2 The interview
Face-to-face interviews were performed by three trained interviewers following a
strict interview protocol. The interviews took place at the persons’ preferred lo-
cation; at home, in the hospital, or at work. A full description of the interview
can be found elsewhere.115 Here, only the part of the interview used to gather the
information necessary for this study is described.
At the beginning of the interview, people valued their health of the previous
week using a visual analogue scale (VAS) and a time tradeoff (TTO). Next people
completed three questionnaires: the EQ-5D questionnaire,105 two scales of the Pa-
tient Satisfaction Questionnaire140 and, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.93 In this
study only the information retrieved by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale will be
used. After the interview, people were asked to complete a questionnaire at home
to lessen the burden. Among others this questionnaire included the Life Orienta-
tion Test,141 the Mastery scale of Pearlin and Schooler,142 and the MOS 36-item
Short-From Health Survey (SF-36).143
6.2.3 Instruments
The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) The VAS is a 100 mm horizontal line ranging
from death to perfect health. Perfect health was described as full well-being in
physical, psychological, and social functioning. Utility for the own health state of
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last week was elicited by asking respondents to place a mark between death and
perfect health. The Time tradeoff (TTO) The computer program Ci394 was used to
elicit the TTO utilities based on a ping-pong search procedure. On the computer
screen a short description of perfect health and a description of the patient’s own
health state of the previous week were presented. Perfect health was again described
as full well-being in physical, psychological and social functioning. People rated
how many years (x) of their remaining life expectancy (y), derived from Dutch
life expectancy tables,117 they were willing to trade to obtain perfect health. Life
expectancy was used as the time frame since it was shown to be more meaningful
to the participant144 and to lead to less loss aversion.145 Utility was calculated as
y−x
y .
6.2.4 Indicators for persons’ adaptive abilities
Personal Control The Mastery List of Pearlin and Schooler142 measures the
extent to which people feel they are in control of their lives. People indicated their
agreement with seven items such as “I can do about anything I really set my mind
to do”, on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ’totally disagree’ to ’totally agree’.
Total score ranged from 7 − 35, with a higher score indicating more control. Good
internal consistency (α = .58 − .70) was reported previously among patients with a
chronic illness.130 Self-Esteem With the Rosenberg self-esteem scale93 the positive
or negative valuation people have toward themselves was measured. People rated
how much they agreed with 10 statements such as “I feel I have a number of good
qualities”, on a four-point Likert scale. The total score of the scale ranges from
0-30, with a higher score indicating higher self-esteem. Among patients with a
chronic illness good internal consistency (α = 0.83 − 0.90) and test-retest reliability
(ρ = 0.71) were reported previously.130,146
Optimism The Revised Life Orientation Test (R-LOT)147 consists of three items
measuring pessimism, three items measuring optimism and four filler items. Items
such as “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best”, were scored on a five-point
scale ranging from ’strongly disagree’ to ’strongly agree’. The total score, ranging
from 0-24, was calculated after recoding items measuring pessimism. A higher score
indicates more optimism. The R-LOT previously revealed good internal consistency
(α = 0.74−0.89) and test-retest reliability (ρ = 0.67) among patients with a chronic
illness.130,146
Health related quality of life HRQL was measured with the SF-36.143 The SF-
36 comprises eight multi-item dimensions which can be summed into a physical and
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a mental component score (SF-36 PCS and SF-36 MCS). Scores in each component
range from 0-100, with higher scores indicating better HRQL.
6.2.5 Data analysis
Prior to the main analyses, all variables were examined for uni- and multi-
variate outliers, missing data, linearity and normality. Missing data were excluded
listwise. Principal component analysis was performed to check if the constructs
’personal control’, ’self-esteem’ and ’optimism’ could be combined in one scale. The
number of factors were decided upon by an eigenvalue > 1 and the scree plot. If
the constructs measured one underlying factor, the standardized total scores of the
separate constructs were summed and used as one scale measuring adaptive abilities.
To further analyze the reliability of this scale Cronbach’s alpha was calculated.
Hierarchical linear regression was conducted to assess if adaptive abilities could
explain the variance in utilities above that explained by HRQL. To control for HRQL,
the total scores on the PCS and MCS were entered first. In the next step the
adaptive abilities were added. Separate analyses were performed for the VAS and
TTO. Mediation analyses were performed as suggested by Baron & Kenny.148 First
we investigated if adaptive abilities affected mental health; second, the relation of
mental health with health state utilities was investigated; third we investigated the
direct effect of adaptive abilities on health state utilities without controlling for
mental health, and finally we checked if after controlling for mental health the direct
effect of adaptive abilities and health state utilities decreased (partial mediation) or
even became zero (full mediation).148 When partial mediation was shown, the Sobel
test statistic149 was used to test the strength of the mediation.
6.3 Results
Of the 243 people selected, 132 people gave their approval to be interviewed
(54%). No differences in age and time since diagnosis between responders and non-
responders were found. Of the responders, one person with emotional problems,
and two persons who were not able to speak and understand Dutch were not invited
for the interview. Of the interviewed patients four were excluded; three people
could not finish the interview due to cognitive or concentration problems, and one
person returned the questionnaire after more then a month. All variables met the
assumptions for linearity and normality, except for health state utility measured by
the TTO (skewness = −1.36, SE = 0.22).
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Table 6.1 Characteristics of people with RA included in this study
patients with RA (N = 125)




Nine years or less 38(31%)
Between 10 and 12 years 62(49%)





Divorced/ Widow 9 (7%)
Single 6 (5%)
Time since diagnosis (years) 13(2 - 47)±9.26
(Mean(range) ± SD)
Health state Utilities
VAS (Mean(range) ± SD) 66.14 (14 - 100)± 19.15
TTO (Mean(range) ± SD) 0.77 (0 - 1)± 0.25
Health status
SF-36 PCS (Mean(range) ± SD) 36.46 (12-58)± 10.66
SF-36 MCS (Mean(range) ± SD) 52.36 (24-67)± 9.66
aNumbers do not add up to 125 due to missing data.
The interviews were administered by three trained interviewers (following a
strict script), and took place at the LUMC (N = 83), at the respondent’s home
(N = 41) or at work (N = 1). People were not hospitalized at the time of the
interview. Persons interviewed at home had on average more health problems than
persons interviewed in the LUMC based on the SF-36 PCS score. No interviewer
effect was found on the answers patients gave. Table 6.1 presents the demographic
information of the 125 people who were included.
6.3.1 Creating a scale measuring persons’ ability to adapt
Principal component analysis of the three indicators of persons’ ability to adapt
(Personal control, Self-esteem, and Optimism) could be aggregated to one compo-
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Table 6.2 Pearson correlations of study variables
TTO VAS
Persons’ ability to adapt 0.33] 0.65]
SF-36 PCS 0.30] 0.57]
SF-36 MCS 0.33] 0.43]
]p < 0.01
nent. This component explained 73% of the variance, the component loadings for
self-esteem, personal control and optimism ranged from 0.81 − 0.88. With relia-
bility analysis the scale measuring persons’ ability to adapt showed good internal
consistency, Cronbach’s α = 0.80.
6.3.2 Predicting utilities
Before hierarchical regression analyses, the associations between the utility
measures and demographic characteristics (time since diagnosis, gender, age, having
a partner, having children, and education) and the study variables (PCS, MCS, and
persons’ ability to adapt) were checked with Pearson correlations. The demographic
characteristics showed low to no correlation with the TTO and VAS (all ρ < 0.20).
All study variables showed moderate to strong intercorrelation (Table 6.2).
6.3.3 Adaptive ability as direct predictor of TTO and the
VAS, over and above HRQL
Table 6.3 presents the relationships of HRQL and persons’ ability to adapt with
utilities measured by the TTO and VAS, using a two-step hierarchical regression
analysis. HRQL explained 19% of the TTO and 49% of the VAS. After correcting
for HRQL, persons’ ability to adapt did not predict additional variance in the TTO.
On the VAS 5% additional variance was explained by persons’ ability to adapt.
Although persons’ ability to adapt had no direct effect on health state utilities
over and above the HRQL domains, it might have had an effect on HRQL domains
that in turn affect health state utilities (mediation). Therefore this mediation effect
was examined next. Firstly, it was found that persons’ ability to adapt affected
mental health, after correction of physical health (∆R2 = 0.46, p < 0.01). Secondly,
mental health was related to health state utilities (∆R2 = 0.11, p < 0.01 for the
TTO and ∆R2 = 0.18, p < 0.01 for the VAS). Third, without correcting for mental
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Table 6.3 Hierarchical regression analyses direct influence of adaptive abilities on TTO
and the VAS above HRQL
Predictors ∆R2 B β
TTO
N = 123 Step 1 0.192 p < 0.001
SF-36 PCS 0.006 0.265 p < 0.001
SF-36 MCS 0.009 0.331 p < 0.001
Step 2 0.000 p = 0.886
SF-36 PCS 0.006 0.260 p = 0.006
SF-36 MCS 0.009 0.319 p = 0.006
Persons’ ability to adapt 0.000 0.018 p = 0.886
VAS
N = 123 Step 1 0.487 p < 0.001
SF-36 PCS 0.956 0.529 p < 0.001
SF-36 MCS 0.848 0.420 p < 0.001
Step 2 0.048 p = 0.001
SF-36 PCS 0.761 0.421 p < 0.001
SF-36 MCS 0.432 0.214 p = 0.014
Persons’ ability to adapt 0.441 0.325 p = 0.001
health, persons’ ability to adapt (∆R2 = 0.06, p < 0.01) did have a direct effect on
health state utilities measured with the TTO and with the VAS (∆R2 = 0.20, p <
0.001). Finally, we found that the effect of persons’ ability to adapt on both utility
measurements decreased after controlling for mental health. As can be seen from
Table 6.3 (explained previously) persons’ ability to adapt was completely mediated
by mental health when health state utility was measured with TTO. The explained
variance of VAS by persons’ ability to adapt on VAS decreased from 20% to 5% when
mental health was added, which was a significant change (Sobel test statistic149 =
5.45, p < 0.01), indicating partial mediation.
6.4 Discussion
In discussion sections of papers and in theoretical manuscripts, the difference
in health state utilities between people with a chronic illness and the public is often
explained by adaptation.15,107 The results of this study show that adaptive abilities
are indeed related to utilities, but that this effect is fully mediated by mental health
for the TTO, and partly mediated for the VAS. It seems that in people with a chronic
81
CHAPTER 6. EFFECT OF ADAPTIVE ABILITIES ON UTILITIES
illness a stronger ability to adapt may lead to better mental health, which in turn
leads to higher health state utilities. The suggested relation between adaptation and
health state utilities given by people with a chronic illness does not occur directly,
but appears to be mediated by mental health. Admittedly, this conclusion has to be
made with caution since not adaptation but adaptive abilities are studied here.
Adaptive abilities explained 46% of the variance in mental health, which in turn
explained between 11 − 18% of the variance in health state utilities after correction
for physical health. Arnold et al.,150 already suggested such a mediation effect.
They found that people with a chronic illness do not differ from healthy people in
global quality of life and that global quality of life is mostly explained by mental
functioning. Based on these findings they argued that people with a chronic illness
psychologically adapt, causing a recovery of their mental health, which leads to
recovery of global quality of life. The cross-sectional design of this study limits
the points described above. From this study no conclusions can be drawn about
the causal relationship between persons’ ability to adapt, HRQL, and health state
utilities. Nevertheless, causal relations between persons’ ability to adapt and HRQL
have been described previously.128,130 Future longitudinal research is necessary to
further investigate this causal relationship.
The index based on CAT to measure persons’ ability to adapt, has been used
in several studies but has not yet been validated. Given the number of studies using
such a scale based on the CAT, validation is pressingly needed. Further, this index
has been suggested to reflect stable personality traits, which might not change over
time.133 If adaptive abilities are indeed stable over time, then health state utilities of
members of the public might be influenced in a similar way. Yet since members of the
public find it difficult to anticipate on their ability to adapt24 we still would expect
a less substantial effect of adaptive abilities on HRQL and health state utilities in
this population.
HRQL predicted 20% of the variance in the TTO, and 49% of the variance
in the VAS. These results are comparable with previous findings concerning the
relationship between HRQL and health state utilities.151 The smaller amount of
variance explained in the TTO compared to the VAS might be caused by the trading
process. In this trading process, a series of information processing activities and
construction of subjective values for dimensions are developed, making the variance
in TTO-scores difficult to explain. Another explanation may lie in the cognitive
nature of the TTO. Campbell152 suggested that quality of life can be assessed with
cognitive or with affective measurements. Cognitive measurements depend on a more
82
6.5. CONCLUSION
intellectual process while affective measurements depend on subjective feelings. The
TTO might be seen as a more cognitive measurement, the VAS as a more affective
measurement. After a life event, the affective component of well-being appears to be
more impaired than the cognitive component, which means that this component is
sensitive to change and the cognitive component is more stable.153 Finally, a more
methodological explanation for the smaller amount of variance explained in the TTO
might be that the TTO was skewed. When a dependent variable is skewed a smaller
effect size might be anticipated.154
This study included patients with RA who had been diagnosed on average 13
years before. First, it can be questioned if patients still need to adapt to their ill-
ness so many years after diagnosis. It seems evident that adaptation takes place
in the initial phase of the illness. However, the disabling, often progressive and
uncontrollable characteristics of RA might result in adaptive processes, even after
so many years. The results of this study indicate that adaptive abilities indirectly
explain health state utilities, so this result might become more distinct when exam-
ining patients in the initial phase of their illness. Secondly, RA is a chronic illness
characterized by pain and deformity of the joints, leading to physical limitations.
There is evidence suggesting that people do not adapt to unpredictable stressors
such as pain.109 On the other hand, patients with RA might be able to adapt to
other aspects of their illness such as the physical limitations by learning new ways
to perform activities and they might learn to accept their pain.155 More research is
necessary to investigate the effect of adaptive abilities on health state valuations in
other patient groups.
6.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the results in this study seem to indicate that adaptive abilities in-
directly explain health state utilities. Assuming that these adaptive abilities induce
adaptation, then cost-utility analyses could partly be founded on utilities shaped
by adaptation. Such utilities will result in less room for improvement between the
patient’s own health condition and perfect health, leading to a lack of justification
to treat an illness.36 Based on this challenge, one could argue that members of
the public should provide valuations instead, but these respondents are limited in
their knowledge and experience compared to patients, and perhaps anticipate in-
sufficiently to adaptation. The results of this study call for a discussion about if
and how adaptation should be compensated for in cost-utility analyses, but first
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longitudinal research is necessary on the relation between health state utilities and
adaptation, before decisions about compensations for adaptation can be made.
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CHAPTER 7. THE INFLUENCE OF TIME AND ADAPTATION
Abstract Objective:One of the explanations for the difference between
health state utilities elicited from patients and the public is adaptation.
The influence of adaptation on utilities was investigated in patients with
spinal cord injury. Methods: Face-to-face interviews were held at three
time points (T1 after admission to the Rehabilitation Centre, T2 during
active rehabilitation, T3 at least half a year after discharge). At T1, 60
patients were interviewed, 10 patients withdrew at T2 and T3. At all
time points patients were asked to value their own health and to value
a health state description of rheumatoid arthritis, on a Time Trade-Off
(TTO) and Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), and the Barthel Index and the
Adjustment Ladder were filled out. Main analyses were performed us-
ing Mixed Linear Models taking the time-dependent covariates (Barthel
Index and Adjustment) into account. Results: Valuations given on
the TTO for the own health changed over time, even after correction
for gain in independence (F (2, 59) = 8.86, p < 0.001). This change
over time was related to adjustment. Both a main effect for adjustment
(F (1, 87) = 10.05; p = 0.002) and interaction effect between adjustment
and time (F (1, 41) = 4.10; p = 0.024) were seen for valuations elicited
with the TTO. Valuations given for the own health on the VAS did not
significantly change over time, nor did the valuations for the hypotheti-
cal health state. Conclusion: The effect of psychological adaptation on





In cost utility analyses costs of treatment are compared with benefits in health.
These benefits in health generated by treatment are measured by health state util-
ities, which can be given by members of the public or by patients who are actually
experiencing the health state. Health state utilities given by patients have generally
been found to be higher than utilities given by members of the public.100 Although
this difference is well described in the literature, the origin remains unclear. To de-
cide whose valuations are most valid it is important to understand which underlying
mechanisms causes this difference.
One of the explanations for the difference between health state utilities given by
patients and members of the public is adaptation. Patients will adapt to their illness
whereas members of the public fail to anticipate on this ability to adapt.24,38 For
example Riis et al107 studied hemodialysis patients and found that these patients
reported similar moods as healthy controls which suggests that these patients have
adapted to their illness. Moreover, the healthy controls gave significantly lower
estimations of their moods imagining living with hemodialyses than the patients
did.
Adaptation can be defined as a response that diminishes or remains the same
despite constant or increasing stimulus level.31 Adaptation is a generic term which
represents various processes that may take place simultaneously. For instance adap-
tation can refer to the process in which patients learn new skills to deal with their
handicap in activities of daily living.156 For example patients with spinal cord injury
learn how to handle their wheelchair, or how to empty their bladder, but most pa-
tients will never return to normal functioning. Nevertheless, patients with SCI report
a rather high satisfaction with life.157 This life satisfaction can partly be explained
by rehabilitation but more important predictors are social and psychological func-
tioning.158 For patients with SCI psychological adaptation thereby appears at least
as important as their physical adaptation. Members of the public might anticipate
on the ability to learn new skills, but they might fail to anticipate to the psycho-
logical adaptation processes, which often operate unconsciously. In the following
paragraphs some of these psychological adaptation processes will be discussed.
Psychological adaptation processes can occur through cognitive coping strate-
gies such as positive reframing; patients reframe their situation to see it in a more
positive light. Instead of focusing on the losses of having an illness patients might
focus on the value of dealing with it.159 Patients have described that by dealing with
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an illness they feel stronger, more self-secure, and experience improved relationships
with others.160 Besides positive reframing it is suggested that patients infuse ordi-
nary events with a positive meaning. Tentative support indicates that when patients
experience a stressful event they start searching for positive aspects in their lives
compensating the negative experience.159 Furthermore patients might change their
goals and adjust their future expectations. A patient who develops weak sight might
have previously aimed to become a pilot in an emergency helicopter. After develop-
ing the sight problems the patient discovers his ability to listen and instead becomes
a counselor at an emergency line. By changing career the patient might forget how
important flying was to him and instead learns that reassuring people gives him
more fulfillments.
Strongly related to these coping strategies is the so called “psychological im-
mune system”. The psychological immune system has been proposed to consist of
defense mechanisms that weakens strong emotions over time.26 In contrast to coping
strategies the psychological immune system is suggested to fail when operating con-
sciously. This restriction will be explained by the following example, based on one of
the defense mechanisms used by the psychological immune system. Often people ra-
tionalize about their situation in such a way that a negative event might be actually
quite positive to them. A patient diagnosed with cancer might rationalize that it is
a good thing that he developed cancer instead of his spouse since this spouse already
has diabetes. But if a friend reminds the person of his own kidney deficit, which the
person conveniently had forgotten, then the repair is undone. Similar to rationaliza-
tion people might justify previous decisions, such as occurs in preferences for medical
treatment.15,161 Besides rationalization and justification, several other mechanisms
are used by the psychological immune system, among others self-enhancement and
motivated reasoning.26
In studies investigating the gap between health state valuations of patients and
of members of the public, the psychological processes of adaptation of patients are
often provided as explanation but seldom have been the topic of study. In a study
of Jansen and colleagues26 they indirectly were. The authors assessed changes in
utilities over time in a sample of breast cancer patients who received radiotherapy.
Patients were asked to rate their own experienced health, a health state scenario
of radiotherapy, and a health state scenario of chemotherapy at two time points,
before and in the period in which they received radiotherapy. The authors expected
patients’ valuations for a radiotherapy scenario to change when patients actually
received this therapy. By experiencing radiotherapy patients might have learned
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that they are able to adapt to it. Change in the health state valuation is seen as
an indication for this adaptation process. The results of this study showed however,
that patients’ ratings for the radiotherapy scenario were similar before and while
experiencing this health state, but patients’ ratings for their own health during ra-
diotherapy were higher than those for the scenario. This could indicate that patients
infused their own situation with positive meaning, or could point to more uncon-
scious adaptation, both of which would not work for the scenario. An alternative
explanation provided by the authors was that the experienced radiotherapy was not
as severe as was described in the scenario, despite the evidence-based development
of the latter.
These authors further assessed valuation shift, a change in valuation of hypo-
thetical health states caused by a change in the own experienced health.15,162 By
adapting to poor health, patients would be able to anticipate on their ability to
adapt when they rate hypothetical health states and assign higher ratings. There-
fore, besides the radiotherapy scenario, the authors asked patients to rate a scenario
of a hypothetical health state, chemotherapy, before and during radiotherapy. No
valuation shift was seen for the chemotherapy scenario. The authors suggested that
the stability of the valuations before and after radiotherapy might have been in-
fluenced by the short term and relative minor side effects of this health state (7
weeks of radiotherapy). Patients might not have adapted sufficiently. Further, it
also can be questioned if patients adapt to temporary states162 The authors noted
that in the literature ratings for health state scenarios often remained stable over
time whereas most change was shown in studies in which patients rate their own
experienced health. It can be questioned if patients are able to project their ability
to adapt to a health state (scenario) that they do not “own”.161
In contrast to Jansen et al.161other studies did find evidence for valuation
shift.40,163 Among others, Dolan showed that patients with poor health assigned
higher valuations to various EQ-5D scenarios than did patients with good health.40
The discrepancy between Dolans’ findings and the findings of Jansen et al161 might
be explained by the duration and severity of the illness or health state. The influence
of adaptation on (hypothetical) health state valuations might only be expected after
a certain time, not for temporary states, and, may depend on the severity of the
illness. We therefore wished to study these issues in a serious condition with little
or no prospect for cure, for which adaptation is a major issue.
To understand the influence of adaptation in valuations given by patients, lon-
gitudinal research in a study sample with patients with Spinal Cord Injury (SCI)
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was performed. SCI leads to permanent long term changes in physical functioning to
which people adapt; physically as well as psychologically.164 First it is examined if
valuations for their own experienced health change over time apart from the change
expected by the rehabilitation process. Obviously patients with SCI will rehabili-
tate in the first phase after injury, i.e. they learn new skills to perform activities
of daily living independently, which can be expected to result in an improvement
in health state valuations. Therefore we will adjust the health state valuations for
the improvement in independence. Secondly we examined if the change in health
state valuations can be related to adaptation. Finally the experience with a chronic
illness on patients’ valuations of a hypothetical health state unrelated to SCI will be
studied. Does experience with a chronic illness lead to valuation shift?
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Participants and procedures
Six rehabilitation centers (RC) specialized in spinal cord injury in the Nether-
lands were involved in inclusion of patients. Patients between 18 and 75 years old
who were able to speak and understand Dutch, with acute SCI causing functional
losses and problems with daily activities were approached by their treating physician
or psychologist. Patients were approached to participate in this study in the first few
weeks of admission. Patients with minor functional losses (neither problems with
walking ability nor problems with bladder or bowel functions) and patients with
severe emotional or cognitive problems were excluded. Eligible patients who gave
consent to be interviewed were contacted by one of the interviewers. The interview
was scheduled to fit into the patients’ rehabilitation schedule.
Patients were interviewed at three times. The first interview took place as
soon as possible after admission aimed at at most within the first 4 weeks, except
for patients who had not started active rehabilitation. The second interview took
place during active rehabilitation aimed at at least two weeks before discharge. The
third interview took place at least half a year after discharge. Since the rehabilitation
period of patients with tetraplegia is generally longer, the time between interviews
differed for patients with paraplegia and patients with tetraplegia. For patients with
paraplegia the second interview was aimed at three month after the first interview
and the third interview about one year after the first. For patients with tetraplegia
the second interview was aimed at about six months after the first interview and
the third interview approximately 18 months after the first interview. The medical
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ethics committee of the LUMC and the local ethics committees approved the study
protocol.
7.2.2 The interview
Face-to-face interviews were performed by two trained interviewers following
a strict interview protocol. The first and second interview took place at the RC, the
third interview took place at home or during an out-patient clinic visit to the RC.
The interview was in outline the same at all three time points. In the introduction
of the interview, people were instructed that in questions about their health they
should not only take illness in account but also the limitations caused by their injury.
At the start of the interview, patients answered an open-ended question about their
life in the past period. In the first interview we focused on the incident causing the
injury and the period between the incident and admission to the RC. This open-
ended question was followed by several demographic questions. Next patients gave
a valuation of their own health of the previous week using a visual analogue scale
(VAS) and a time tradeoff (TTO), followed by a valuation of a rheumatoid arthritis
(RA) health state (Appendix C). When patients valued their own health they were
asked to imagine that their health would not improve due to rehabilitation and would
remain the same as it was in the previous week. In the last part of the interview
several questionnaires were interviewer-administrated including the Barthel Index165
and the adjustment ladder.166
7.2.3 Assessments
The Time Tradeoff (TTO)
TTO utilities were elicited with interviewer help using a time-line and board on
which descriptions were placed of perfect health and respectively the patients’ own
health of previous week or the RA health state. Perfect health was described as full
well-being in physical, psychological and social functioning. Patients rated how many
years (x) of their remaining life expectancy (y), derived from Dutch life expectancy
tables for their gender and age category,117 they were willing to trade to obtain
perfect health. The indifference point was searched through the bisection method.
Given the severity of SCI and the emotional status of the patients, the lowest tradeoff
was set at three months living in perfect health. Utility was calculated as y−xy .
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The Visual Analog Scale (VAS)
The VAS is a 100 mm horizontal line ranging from death to perfect health.
Perfect health was again described as full well-being in physical, psychological and
social functioning. Utility for the own health state of the previous week and for the
RA health state were elicited by placing a mark between death and perfect health.
Barthel Index
The Barthel Index (BI)165 is a measure of performance and rates the degree
of independence of help in activities of daily living. The index consists of ten items
with a total score between 0 and 20. A higher score indicates more independence.
The BI had been examined in a Dutch sample of patients with SCI and found to be
a reliable and valid measure which can be used in an interview.167
Adjustment ladder
The adjustment ladder is a horizontal ladder ranging from 1, worst possible
adjustment to 10, best possible adjustment. Patients named the number which
indicated their current overall adjustment.166 The question was translated in Dutch
using a forward and backward translation procedure. Patients were allowed to choose
between whole numbers.
7.2.4 Data Analysis
Change over time of utilities for the own health was examined with linear mixed
models taking time-dependent covariates into account. For both the TTO and the
VAS models were fitted with time included as fixed and random factor. To correct
for gain in independence the BI score was included as fixed factor. This implies
that the health state valuations given at the three time points were corrected for
the BI score at the corresponding time, before we examined the change over time.
Using the main effect of time (or the post hoc univariate test when an interaction
effect was present), the overall change over the three time points was examined. To
examine the change more precisely, the corrected health state valuations (Estimated
Marginal Means (EMM)) at T1 and T2 and at T2 and T3 were compared pairwise.
If a significant effect of time was present, the model was extended by including the
adjustment ladder, as fixed factor. From the significance level of the main effect
for adjustment we examined if the change in utilities could be related to conscious
adjustment. If conscious adjustment measured by the adjustment ladder totally
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explained the change in health state valuations over time, we expected the main
effect of time to diminish.
Next we studied if experience with SCI changed patients’ valuations of a hypo-
thetical health state, in a similar way as for the own health, but not corrected for
gain in independence. Mixed linear models for TTO and VAS were fitted with time
included as fixed and random factor. Overall change and change between the time
points was assessed through the main effect of time and post hoc pairwise compar-
isons of the utilities. If the effect of time was significant the model was extended
with adjustment.
In each model fixed factors were tested on main effect and on interaction with
time. Distributions of residuals were checked on normality. Missing values were
estimated based on answers given to the remaining questions, given at different time
points and given by other patients. In all models T1 was used as reference point.
7.3 Results
In total 74 patients met our inclusion criteria and were approached by their
physiatrist or psychologist to take part. Of these patients 13 refused due to personal
reasons and one patient was excluded since he found it impossible to answer the
TTO given his religion. In total 60 (81%) patients agreed to participate and were
interviewed at T1. Of this sample 10 patients had to be excluded at T2; four
patients withdrew for personal reasons, one patient could not be contacted, one
patient was excluded due to an infection which made active rehabilitation impossible,
and four patients were not interviewed because the time between the first interview
and discharge had been less than a month. Of the 50 patients who were interviewed
at T2 six were interviewed after discharge. For this time point the answers of these
six patients were recoded into missing since their adaptation process might have
been influenced by being at home. At T3 again 50 patients were interviewed, the
four patients who had been excluded for the second interview due to the short time
frame were added again, and another four patients had to be excluded (two withdrew
due to major pain, one had passed away, and one was not interviewed due to logistic
reasons). Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 show the demographic characteristics and mean
valuations of these patients.
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Table 7.1 Characteristics of people with RA included in this study
Time 1 (N = 60) Time 2 (N = 50)a Time 3 (N = 50)a
After admission During active At least six month
rehabilitation after discharge
Gender
Female 19(32%) 17(34%) 17(34%)
Marital status
Married 38(63%) 30(60%) 28(56%)
Divorced/ Widow 10 (17%) 10(20%) 12(24%)
Single 12(20%) 10(20%) 10 (20%)
Children
Yes 36(60%) 30(60%) 29(58%)
Education
Nine years or less 18(30%) 14(28%) 13(26%)
Between 10 - 12 years 25(42%) 20(40%) 21(42%)
13 years of more 17(28%) 16(32%) 16(32%)
Type injury
Incomplete paraplegia 19(32%)b 15(30%)b 18(36%)
Complete paraplegia 19(32%)b 19(38%)b 19(38%)
Incomplete tetraplegia 20(33%)b 14(28%)b 11(22%)
Complete tetraplegia 2(3%)b 2(4%)b 2(4%)
AIS - scorec
A 20(33%) N.A. N.A.
B 9(15%) N.A. N.A.
C 13(22%) N.A. N.A.
D 15(25%) N.A. N.A.
Cause of injury
Accident 34(57%) 27(54%) 28(56%)
Illness 14(23%) 12(24%) 12(24%)
Surgery 12(20%) 11(22%) 10(20%)
Help answering VASd
No help 41(68%)b 35(70%) 41(82%)
Help needed 18(30%) 15(30%) 9(18%)
aThe study sample time point two and three is not exact the same, see Results section;
b Numbers do not add up to the total number of participants due to missing data;c
Based on the scores at admission to the RC; d Some participants with problems in their
upper limps were helped when answering the VAS; N.A. = No information Available
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Table 7.2 Continuous characteristics
Time 1 (N = 60) Time 2 (N = 50)a Time 3 (N = 50)a
After admission During active At least six month
rehabilitation after discharge
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)













TTO own 0.47( 0.33) 0.63( 0.31) 0.68(0.28)
health state
TTO RA 0.54 (0.35) 0.58(0.29) 0.59(0.27)
health state
VAS own 61(17.9) 67(15.6) 65(19.3)
health state
VAS RA 54(23.5) 54(19.0) 53(21.9)
health state
Barthel Index 9.1(5.9) 12.3(5.4) 13.3(5.2)
Adjustment Ladder 6.2(2.0) 6.9(1.7) 7.3(1.7)
aThe study sample time point two and three is not exact the same, see Results section.
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Table 7.3 Linear mixed model of TTO including time, Barthel Index and Adjustment
β SE p
Intercept 0.18 0.105 0.09
Barthel Index 0.01 0.004 0.03
Adjustment 0.03 0.015 0.04
Time (T2 vs. T1) 0.32 0.131 0.02
Time (T3 vs. T1) −0.21 0.166 0.21
Time · Adjustment (T2 vs. T1) −0.03 0.019 0.15
Time · Adjustment (T3 vs. T1) 0.05 0.023 0.04
Valuations on T1 are used as reference point.
7.3.1 Change in health state valuations for the own health
and the impact of adaptation
TTO
Results of the mixed linear model examining the effect of time after correction
for BI showed both a main effect for BI (F (1, 120) = 9.44, β = 0.01(SE = 0.01), p =
0.003) and a main effect for time (F (2, 59) = 8.86, p < 0.001; beta(T1vsT2) =
−0.13(SE = 0.04), p = 0.001;β(T1vsT3) = 0.16(SE = 0.05), p = 0.001). Post hoc
pairwise analyses showed that the increase between T2 (EMM = 0.63, SE = 0.04)
and T3 (EMM = 0.66, SE = 0.04) was not significant. Given the significant main
effect of time the model was extended with adjustment as fixed factor. Both the
main effect for adjustment (F (1, 87) = 10.05; p = 0.002), and the interaction between
adjustment and time (F (1, 41) = 4.10; p = 0.024) were significantly related to TTO.
Table 7.3 shows the results of the linear mixed model including time, BI, and adjust-
ment. The effect of adjustment at T3 was stronger (β = 0.05(SE = 0.02), t(92) =
2.05, p = 0.044) than the effect of adjustment at T1. After inclusion of adjustment
as fixed factor the effect of time remains significant (F (2, 57) = 7.37, p = 0.001).
VAS
The linear mixed model examining the effect of time on VAS of the own health
state corrected for the BI shows only a main effect of BI (F (1, 101) = 13.80, p <
0.001). After correction for BI no main effect of time was found (F (2, 58) = 1.36(p =
0.27)). The corrected VAS valuations do not differ significantly between the three
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time points (T1 = 63, SE = 2.3;T2 = 66, SE = 2.1;T3 = 63, SE = 2.7).
7.3.2 Change in patients’ valuations of the RA health state
TTO
Using mixed linear model with time as fixed and random effect, no main effect
of time on TTO valuations for the hypothetical health state was found (F (2, 47) =
0.35, p = 0.70). The estimated marginal means were T1 = 0.54 (SE = 0.05), T2 =
0.57(SE = 0.04) and T3 = 0.58(SE = 0.04).
VAS
Mixed linear models for VAS valuations of the hypothetical health state with
time as random and fixed effect revealed no main effect of time either (F (2, 48) =
0.08, p = 0.93). At the three time points the estimated marginal means were T1 =
54(SE = 3.1), T2 = 54, (SE = 2.8) and T3 = 53(SE = 3.1).
7.4 Discussion
In studies investigating the gap between health state valuation of patients and
of members of the public psychological adaptation is often provided as explanation
but seldom has been studied. In this paper provisional support for the effect of
adaptation on health state valuations has been found. Health state valuations for
the own health given on a TTO changed over time even after correction for the gain
in independence. This increase could partly be explained by conscious adjustment.
However, even after correction for conscious adjustment the valuations on the TTO
still increased.
Strongest increase in the valuations for the own health given on the TTO (after
correction for improvement in independence) appeared during in patient rehabilita-
tion. Patients adapt to their injury most in the initial phase after they were ad-
mitted to the RC. In the period after discharge when most patients returned home,
not much improvement was reported. This is in line with previous findings. Van
Koppenhagen et al.164 found that in the first period during inpatient rehabilitation
life satisfaction of patients with SCI changed with the strongest change in the first
three months. Whereas in the second year after injury when patients are discharged
from the rehabilitation centre only minor168 or no change169 in life satisfaction is
reported. Moreover patients with injuries developed several years ago reported even
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a moderate decline over a period of nine years.170
The increase in valuations for the own health on the TTO could partly be
explained by self-reported, conscious, adjustment. After correction for conscious ad-
justment the valuations still increased over time. Adaptation measured by a single
estimation of the overall adjustment by patients themselves, as used in this study,
does not explain the increase in valuations sufficiently. Several explanations can be
suggested for this finding. First, adaptation measured by the adjustment ladder
might include physical as well as psychological adjustment. However it can be ques-
tioned if patients are able to reflect on their unconscious adaptation that is enabled
through their psychological immune system.26 Patients might be aware of their
adaptation, but not of the underlying unconscious processes creating it. Secondly,
by using a single item estimator with an open description of adjustment we can
only speculate which aspects of adjustment patients have taken in account. Third,
the change can be related to social aspects or prevalence of secondary problems.157
Although, this assumption only holds if social aspects and prevalence of secondary
problems are also related to the time since injury.
The effect of adaptation on health state valuations for the own health on the
TTO was not equal at all time points. Interestingly compared to the effect of
adaptation on the valuation at T3, the valuation for the own health at T2 was
almost not influenced by adaptation. Possibly patients found it difficult to estimate
their overall adjustment at T2 because they were thinking about their discharge. In
the period before discharge patients are occupied with the last steps before they are
going home, such as arranging devices necessary for their daily activities. Further,
they are aware that they soon have to change the relative secure surroundings of
the RC for their home where no immediate help is available. During the interview
patients therefore often made remarks that they thought they were adjusted to their
SCI while being in the RC, but they were not sure about their adjustment when
returning home.
In contrast to the findings on the TTO the valuations given on the VAS did not
change over time, whereas actually change on the VAS would have been expected.171
This finding might provide insight in the effect of adaptation on health state valua-
tions. In the TTO patients focus on time, comparing their quality of life with length
of life. Some psychological adaptation processes are time dependent and might in-
fluence on how much time a patient is willing to trade. For example if patients are
able to change their future expectations and goals they will have something “new”
to live for, resulting in fewer years they are willing to trade. Schwartz et al.171found
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such a relation between life goals and willingness to trade.
Nevertheless the finding that health state valuations of the own health on the
VAS did not increase is noteworthy. The VAS can be described as an affective mea-
sure which is suggested to be more sensitive to change than cognitive measures.172
However this suggested sensitivity of the VAS is based on patients diagnosed with
cancer or with RA, whereas in this study patients with SCI were interviewed in the
initial phase after injury. SCI is a serious condition with little or no prospect for
cure. It can be questioned if findings based on patients with cancer or RA can be
generalized to our study sample.
To examine valuation shift patients were asked to value a RA health state.
Experience with SCI did not change how patients valued this hypothetical health
state. The valuations for the RA health state on the TTO and VAS did not increase
over time. These findings are similar to those described by Jansen et al.20 In contrast
to what was expected, the long-term adjustment to SCI did not result in an increase
in valuations of a hypothetical health state. Probably patients are not able to project
their ability to adapt on a hypothetical health state. This failure to anticipate on
ability to adapt has been described before in members of the public.24,39 This finding
also gives support for previous findings which showed that health state valuations
of patients and members of the public are more similar when both groups give
valuations to hypothetical health states.100
From previous research it followed that the effect of adaptation on health state
valuations could best be examined in patients with a severe chronic illness.20,40
Therefore patients with SCI were included, since SCI is a serious condition with little
or no prospect for cure. This entailed some disadvantages, however. The inpatient
rehabilitation process of this study sample was unpredictable. Where some patients
had a rehabilitation period of several months or even a year, other patients were
allowed to go home after only a few weeks. Since this variation was only partly
related to the level of injury it was not always possible to keep track of discharge.
As a result the time point T2 was less consistent than we aimed for. To minimize
this variation in the time, T2 interviews that took place after discharge were coded
as missing. Despite this variation in time the findings described in this study seem
substantial. Including only patients who were interviewed at the aimed time points
did not change our findings.
Finally, we want to focus on an unexpected secondary finding. TTO valua-
tions were lower than VAS valuations in the first interview Table 7.2. In general,
VAS valuations have been found to be lower than TTO valuations. Only for very
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severe health states valuations on the VAS have been found to be higher than TTO
valuations.173 It is proposed that for severe health states patients find it unthink-
able to live in it for several years, whereas this focus on time is less prominent in
the VAS. This phenomenon, entitled “maximum endurable time”174 is reflected in
comments of patients related to the length of time. For example one patient said:
“not 21 years like this, sometimes I hope when I close my eyes that I will not wake
up again”. Although patients were allowed to adjust the number of expected years
in the TTO when they found the described situation unbearable, only two patients
chose to do so.
7.5 Conclusion
Valuations for the own health state given on the TTO seem to be influenced by
psychological adaptation over time, but for the VAS no such effect was found. Ex-
perience with a chronic illness did not result in a change in valuation of a hypothetical
health state. The effect of psychological adaptation on health state valuations can
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CHAPTER 8. AFTER ADVERSITY STRIKES
Abstract Numerous studies on affective forecasting have demonstrated
that people frequently underestimate their ability to adapt to adverse
circumstances. But to date, these studies have not assessed people’s af-
fective forecasts early in the experience of these new circumstances. We
present two longitudinal studies of people experiencing new adversities.
In the first study 54 patients experiencing new limb amputations were
recruited to participate in a mailed survey. Patients assessed their well-
being, functioning and general health (1) two weeks after discharge from
the hospital and (2) three months later. At the first time point patients
also predicted their well-being, functioning and general health at three
months. In the second study 55 patients experiencing new colostomies
were recruited and received mailed surveys at three time points; (1) at
baseline (within one week after leaving the hospital), (2) one month after
baseline, and (3) seven months after baseline. Again we assessed their
actual and predicted well-being, functioning and general health. In both
studies the actual change was compared to the change expected by pa-
tients. Across both studies, patients expected to significantly improve
on all three domains but reported little actual improvement. Together,
these studies demonstrated that people with new disabilities overesti-
mate hedonic adaptation-they expect their overall well-being to improve




In order to make good decisions, people need to imagine how their future well
being will or will not be affected by their choices. For example, if confronted with a
choice of whether to move across the country to accept a better paying job, a person
would need to predict how her happiness will be affected by the increased income, the
new location, leaving friends behind, etc. To a large extent, making the best choice
in this type of circumstance depends on making accurate predictions. However,
numerous studies on affective forecasting have demonstrated that people frequently
mispredict their long-term emotional responses to events.26,175,176 People typically
overestimate the duration and affective impact of negative life events, assuming
that major events will have enduring emotional consequences, while underestimating
their ability to adapt to such circumstances.26,176 For instance, people imagine that
chronic illness and disability will have a sustained impact on their wellbeing, whereas
people experiencing such problems often report high levels of wellbeing.18,177
The general thrust of research on affective forecasting implies that when peo-
ple experience new adversities, they underestimate the speed and thoroughness of
hedonic adaptation-feeling miserable because of their new circumstances, they imag-
ine that such misery will be deeper and longer lasting than it will actually be.178
However, research on affective forecasting has not, yet, investigated people’s beliefs
about adaptation when they are early in the experience of a new adversity. Instead,
many studies have been cross-sectional,26,177,179 comparing people’s naive predic-
tions to the reported experiences of people in the circumstance in question. But
this type of cross-sectional design does not allow us to determine whether people
who are newly experiencing adversity fail to properly consider hedonic adaptation
in forecasting their own happiness; they might be miserable now, but do they expect
to remain miserable?
Other studies have employed longitudinal designs, but do not capture people’s
experience and predictions early in the course of adapting to the adversity, and
then compare those to experiences after adaptation has had a chance occur. For
instance,26 assessed people’s predictions of their long-term emotional reaction to the
outcome of a political election and found that people who supported the candidate
who lost the election expected to experience stronger negative emotions than they
actually did. Similarly, patients waiting for a renal transplant expected to experience
a greater increase in well being than they actually did.180 These prospective designs
established that immune neglect and hedonic adaptation are powerful phenomena.
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But they did not provide an opportunity to see what people predict early in the
process of adapting to adversity.
The aim of this study was to investigate if “newbies”-people early in the experi-
ence of a new adversity-are prone to the same kind of forecasting errors as have been
demonstrated in previous research. Using a longitudinal design, we followed recently
disabled patients to compare their predictions (about how much they would adapt to
their condition) to their actual experience of adaptation over time. Based on previ-
ous research in affective forecasting, we examined three competing hypotheses-that
people new to disabilities would a) underestimate their ability to adapt over time,
resulting in predictions of well being that are biased low, b) accurately predict adap-
tation, and c) overestimate adaptation. We elaborate on each of these hypotheses
in the following paragraphs.
There are reasons to think that these newbies will underestimate adaptation.
First, as reviewed above, such underestimation is a wide spread phenomenon, hav-
ing been demonstrated for short-term minor events like the outcomes of football
games,27 more significant phenomenon like people’s beliefs about how long they will
be influenced by a move to a different climate,181 and serious chronic adversities,
like spinal cord injuries and divorce.37 Second, early in the experience of a new
adversity, many people experience strong negative emotions. It is plausible that it
would be difficult for them to therefore imagine themselves with weaker emotions,
due to what Loewenstein calls a hot/cold empathy gap.182
On the other hand, there are members to think that newbies may accurately
predict adaptation. First, having begun to experience the new adversity, they may
already have new insight into the speed and thoroughness of hedonic adaptation.
With their psychological immune systems already in high gear, they may be more
able to imagine the long term trajectory of their emotions. Second, under normal
circumstances people typically believe that happiness will increase in the short run-
that they will be happier several months or years from now than they are now. People
expect positive events in their own future even when there is no supportive evidence
for it.108 Similarly, people with chronic or terminal illnesses maintain positive beliefs
about their future health despite their health problems.45
Finally, there are reasons to think that newbies will actually overestimate adap-
tation. Some adversities, like new health problems, may create realistic hope for
improvement in health related domains, and people might mistakenly assume that
these improvements will be accompanied by similar improvements in well-being.180
For instance, people undergoing below-the-knee amputations must recover from ar-
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duous surgeries, and must then undergo taxing physical therapy regimes. While
these people cannot expect to get their lower legs back, they can expect to experi-
ence improvement in physical functioning in the months following their amputation.
Will they overgeneralize from their beliefs about physical functioning, and therefore
mispredict how much their overall quality of life will also improve?
8.2 Study 1: Predicting physical functioning,
general health and well-being after
amputation surgery
8.2.1 Overview
In study 1, we report on a longitudinal survey of patients undergoing limb
amputations, in which we assessed their physical function, general health and well-
being by mailing surveys to them at baseline (two weeks after discharge) and three
months later. At baseline, we also asked patients to predict what their physical
functioning, general health and well-being would be three months later. With this
design, we were able to assess the accuracy of people’s predictions across these three
domains.
8.2.2 Participants
We recruited patients at the University of Michigan Medical Center who un-
derwent a major single limb amputation. We excluded people who had had previous
limb amputations, were suffering from dementia, were terminally ill, or could not
understand written English. We contacted 69 patients while still in the hospital re-
covering from the surgery. 54 (78%) agreed to participate in our longitudinal study.
Participants were paid $40 for each completed survey.
8.2.3 Study measurements
Well-being: We assessed life satisfaction by asking patients how much they agreed
with the statement “I am satisfied with my life,” on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).183 We also asked patients how often they felt “calm
and peaceful”, “energetic” and “depressed”, on a scale ranging from 1 (none of the
time) to 5 (all of the time).143 We then created a composite measure of well-being
by averaging scores across these four measures (Cronbach’s α = 0.75). Physical
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Table 8.1 Patient Characteristics of patients who had amputation surgery
Three month survey (N = 37)







Divorced/ Widow 14 (40%)
Single 5 (14%)
Cause amputation
Something sudden 10 (29%)
functioning: We assessed three aspects of physical functioning: (1) “satisfaction with
current level of physical functioning” on a scale ranging from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5
(very satisfied); (2) “engagement in social activities outside the home such as visiting
friends, neighbors and relatives”, on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7
(very frequently); and (3) “social activities inside the house such as talking on the
phone, having someone over for a visit”, on the same seven point scale. Cronbach’s α
for a composite of these three measures was 0.53. General health: To assess general
health, we utilized the first item of the MOS 36-item short form health survey which
assesses self-reported general health on a scale ranging from 1 (poor health) to 5
(excellent health).143
8.2.4 Results
41 (76%) patients returned the first written survey and the three month survey.
The most common reasons for non response were moving, death, and voluntary
withdrawal. Four patients had additional amputations during the survey period and
were excluded. The demographic characteristics of the 37 patients included in this
study are shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.2 shows patients’ baseline ratings for well-being, physical func-
tioning, and general health, their predictions for how these three domains would
change at three months, and their actual outcomes at the three month time point.
Students’ t-tests were conducted to compare these ratings. As can be seen, patients’
self-reported well-being did not increase over time (t(31) = 0.05, p = 0.96, effect size
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= 0.01) whereas they expected a significant improvement of approximately seven
points (t(31) = 3.64, p = 0.001, effect size = 0.64). Also, on functioning and on gen-
eral health they reported no significant improvement (functioning: t(34) = 0.42, p =
68, effect size = 0.07; general health: t(34) = −1.72, p = 0.10, effect size = 0.29)
even though they had expected to improve (functioning: t(34) = 4.17, p < 0.001,
effect size = 0.70; general health: t(34) = 2.97, p = 0.005, effect size= 0.50).
In general, patients anticipated significant improvement across all three
domains, but did not experience any significant improvements (and in fact experi-
enced a decline in self-reported health of borderline statistical significance). Rather
than underestimate adaptation, then, these patients overestimated it-they antici-
pated an improvement in well-being that did not arise.
8.2.5 Discussion
Rather than underestimate adaptation, the patients in study 1 overestimated
how much their well-being, physical functioning, and general health would improve
in the months following their amputation. In the introduction, we discussed several
factors that could cause people to overestimate adaptation to adversity. We sug-
gested that people might overgeneralize when making predictions: anticipating that
they would experience improvements in physical functioning they might, therefore,
overestimate how much their sense of well-being would also improve. In Study 1,
however, such an overgeneralization does not account for such mispredictions, be-
cause these patients did not, by patient self-report, experience significant improve-
ments in general health or physical functioning over this time period. Instead, they
overestimated how much these domains would improve too.
Why did people with new amputations overestimate improvement across all
three domains? One possibility is that the baseline measure, completed several
weeks after the amputation, took place after significant adaptation had already oc-
curred. They might have experienced several weeks of significant improvement, and
mistakenly assumed that they would continue to experience similar improvements.
To further complicate matters, patients with amputations are often plagued by many
other chronic, even progressive, illnesses, like vascular disease and diabetes. Having
begun to recover from their amputations, they may mistakenly imagine their health
improving over the next three months, while overlooking the likelihood that they
will experience new medical problems. Indeed, four patients were removed from
our analyses because they required additional amputations during the three month
follow-up period. Patients focused too narrowly on the likelihood that their recently
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amputated limb would improve, they might have underestimated the chance that
other problems would arise.
We address some of these complicating issues in our second study including peo-
ple with a different health problem: patients undergoing surgery to have a colostomy.
First, we not only asked these patients to predict how their lives would change af-
ter the surgery, but also asked them to reflect back on how their lives had in fact
changed at later time points. Using this method, of both assessing predictions and
recollections, we can more thoroughly test whether people have theories about how
these different life domains ought to change over time, and whether these theories
are accurate.42 Thus, for example, a patient might assume at baseline that both
his health and well-being will improve in the next six months. If his health then
declines however, due potentially to unforeseeable events, our method allows us to
test with the recall measure whether he recognizes this decline in health or, instead,
whether his theory about how his health has changed will trump his actual expe-
rience. Second, we mailed our first survey within several days to one week after
patients were discharged from the hospital following their surgery, thus capturing
earlier experiences and predictions than we captured in Study 1.
8.3 Study 2: Predicting and recalling well-being,
physical functioning, and general health after
colostomy surgery
8.3.1 Overview
In Study 2, we recruited patients undergoing colostomy surgery at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Medical Center. We assessed their physical functioning, general
health and well-being at three time points: (1) baseline (within one week of leaving
the hospital), (2) one month after baseline, and (3) seven months after baseline. At
baseline, we also asked people to make predictions about their lives one month later.
And at one month, we had them make predictions about their lives at the seven
month period, while also asking them to recall their physical functioning, health
and well-being at baseline. Finally, at seven months, we asked people to recall how
they stood on these three domains at the one month time point.
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Table 8.3 Patient Characteristics of Patients who had Colostomy Surgery
One month after release (N = 55) Six month after release (N = 34)




Non White 7(13%) 6(18%)
Marital status
Married 37(68%) 24(71%)
Divorced/ Widow 9 (16%) 6(17%)




Inflammatory bowel disease 18 (33%) 12 (35%)
Familial adenomatous polypsis 2 (4%) 1 (3%)
Cancer 21 (38%) 15 (44%)
Trauma/accident 2 (4%) 1 (3%)
Spinal Cord Injury 2 (4%) 1 (3%)
Other cause 14 (26%) 9 (27%)
More than one reason listed 4 (7%) 5 (15%)
8.3.2 Participants
107 patients at the University of Michigan Medical Center who had either
a colostomy surgery were recruited shortly after their surgery. Out of these 107
patients 11 patients were excluded because they could not speak English or had
poor health. Participants were paid $40 for each completed survey.
In total 76 (79%) of the 96 patients agreed to participate and returned the
first survey by mail. Of these 76 patients, 3 had their colostomy reversed between the
first and second measurement and 14 between the second and third measurement.
Only patients who did not have their colostomy reversed during the study period




8.3.3 Study design and measurements
General Health and Physical functioning (Cronbach’s α = 0.58) were measured
in the same way as in Study 1. We added a Quality of Life rating to the measures of
well-being (on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the worst imaginable
quality of life and 100 represent the best imaginable quality of life). (Cronbach′sα =
0.75). When people receive colostomy surgery, the colostomy can be intended to be
permanent or temporary, creating two subgroups of colostomy patients with different
ultimate outcomes.184 All of the following analyses focused on patients who still had
their colostomy at the time of assessment, even though some still expected to get
their colostomy reversed in the future. We also included this variable-permanent
versus temporary colostomy-in analyses and checked for any interactive effects. We
did not find any significant or near-significant (p < 0.10) interactions, and therefore
combined the data across these two groups of patients.
8.3.4 Results
Figure 8.1 illustrates changes in well-being, physical functioning and general
health from baseline to one month, and contrasts these actual changes with predicted
changes (how much people thought at baseline that these domains would change over
that time), and recalled changes (how much people thought, at one month, that those
domains had changed). Students’ t − tests were conducted to test the significance
of these changes.
From baseline to one month, people’s overall well-being increased by
approximately four points, (t(37) = 1.86; p = 0.07; effect size = 0.27), an almost
statistically significant improvement, but one that paled in comparison to people’s
expectations (with people predicting approximately a ten point increase (t(37) =
5.26; p < 0.001; effect size = 0.66)) and also compared to their recollections (with
people recalling approximately a nine point increase (t(37) = 4.96; p < 0.001; effect
size = 0.48)). A similar pattern emerges for the other domains. The patients did
experience significant improvement in physical functioning, (t(50) = 3.10; p = 0.003;
effect size = 0.39), approximately what they predicted , (t(50) = 1.27; p > 0.05; effect
size = 0.14), but significantly less than what they recalled (t(50) = 2.23; p = 0.03;
effect size = 0.32). This pattern was even more dramatic for measures of general
health, which did not change significantly from baseline (t(52) = 0.19; p > 0.05;
effect size = 0.02) despite people both predicting that it would change (t(52) =
5.39; p < 0.001; effect size = 0.34) and remembering that it had changed (t(52) =
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Figure 8.1 Actual, predicted and recalled mean change in well-being, functioning and
general health between 0 and 1 month
Actual, predicted and recalled change on well-being, functioning and general health
reported by patients with colostomy surgery within one week of leaving the hospital
and 1 month.
>
⊥95% Confidence Interval **p < .001, *p ≤ .05
5.34, p < 0.001; effect size = 0.50).
Figure 8.2 illustrates the actual changes patients experience from one to
six months, as well as their beliefs about these changes. Again students’t-tests were
conducted to test the significance of these changes. For space reasons, and because
they were substantively similar to the baseline/one month comparisons, we briefly
summarize these results. Once again, the data demonstrate striking disparities be-
tween actual experience and belief. And once again, the main error people make is
to expect (and remember) more improvement than they actually experience.
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Figure 8.2 Actual, predicted and recalled mean change in well-being, functioning and
general health between 1 and 7 months after release
Actual, predicted and recalled change on well-being, functioning and general health




* p < .001, *p ≤ .05
8.4 Discussion
Across two very different health conditions, we discovered that people newly
experiencing a serious adversity overestimated their own hedonic adaptation; they
expected their overall sense of well-being to improve more than it actually did.
In addition, they overestimated how much their general health and physical func-
tioning would improve over the same time period. Finally, when asked to recall
changes over these same time periods, people “remembered” experiencing substan-
tial improvements in all three domains; their recollections, like their expectations,
indicated substantial overestimatation of adaptation. The patients’ apparent belief
that they would quickly thrive in the face of adversity stands in contrast to prior
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research, which has shown that people underestimate their ability to adapt to a wide
range of adverse circumstances.
Why did the mispredictions in this study run in the opposite direction of those
found in so many other studies? One possible factor that could account for the
differences is that, in contrast to other studies that have elicited estimates of adap-
tation before individuals experienced adverse events, our study assessed people early
in their experience of the new circumstance. This raises the possibility that mispre-
dictions differ depending on whether one is viewing circumstances completely from
the inside or partially from the outside. When healthy people imagine life with a
colostomy, for example, they recognize that life with normal bowel function is better
than life with a colostomy, and theorize that these differences must therefore signif-
icantly influence overall well-being.185 By contrast, people with a new colostomy,
when imagining their well-being over the next six months, are imagining life from
the inside. They are still imagining themselves as someone with a colostomy, and
might therefore tap into different theories about how their well-being will change
over time, theories about how emotions, in general, change over short periods of
life, or theories about the likelihood that early improvements in physical function
or well-being will persist, and will have large, positive effects on overall well being.
As described in the introduction, people expect positive events in their own future
even when there is no supportive evidence for it.42
In the studies described, patients predicted on average that their general health
would improve over time, and yet they did not as a group report such improve-
ments. It is possible that the patients in our studies simply did not experience the
kind of health improvements that they expected to. These mispredictions could
have contributed to their affective forecasting errors. But we favor an alternative
explanation-that the lack of improvement in general health seen in our studies reflects
the subjective nature of our health measures, which relied on patient self-report. For
example, new amputees, recently home from a stay in the hospital, may have con-
sidered their health to be relatively good compared to what it had been immediately
after their operation. One month later in our follow up survey, patients might have
reported a decline in health even though their objective health was stable, because
they now judged their health relative to different standards. Our data cannot de-
termine whether this kind of scale recalibration occurred. But in support of this
theory, the patients in study 2 demonstrated recall bias not only in measures of
self-reported well-being, but also in measures of self-reported health. Our health
measures, in other words, behaved similarly to our measures of well-being.
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Our findings add nuance to the story researchers have been developing about
hedonic adaptation. In early studies, researchers established the surprising frequency
and intensity of adaptation. People’s emotions were shown to be relatively resistant
to even substantial changes in their circumstances33 and people often underestimate
the extent of their hedonic adaptation .178 More recently, researchers have uncovered
more subtle findings about adaptation and affective forecasting. Adaptation is not
as universal as experts once believed, nor as complete.186 Individual differences, too,
have been shown to influence people’s ability to adapt to specific circumstances.187
Our research adds yet another twist to the plot. We have shown that, at least in
some circumstances, people shift from underestimating adaptation to overestimating
it. Future research is needed to elucidate when people are prone to making these
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CHAPTER 9. A PLEA FOR CONCEPTUAL CLARITY
Abstract Quality of life researchers have been studying ”response shift”
for a decade now, in an effort to clarify how best to measure QoL over
time and across changing circumstances. However, we contend that this
line of research has been impeded by conceptual confusion created by
the term ”response shift”, that lumps together sources of measurement
error (e.g., scale recalibration) with true causes of changing QoL (e.g.,
hedonic adaptation). We propose abandoning the term response shift, in




In 1999, Social Science and Medicine published a series of articles on the
methodological importance of understanding response shift in quality of life re-
search.41,188,188–192 Since that time, researchers have published more than 100
studies exploring various aspects of response shift.193 As a consequence of this
work, quality of life researchers have becoming increasingly aware of issues relevant
to the measurement of quality of life over time. Response shift experts have drawn
researchers’ attention to sources of bias in quality of life estimates. They have shed
light on important mysteries relevant to understanding the experience of people with
chronic illness and disability.194 And they have focused researchers on the challenge
of explaining why people with disabilities often provide quality of life reports that
seem to belie their objective circumstances.18
But it is time to abandon the term “response shift.” As we explain below,
the term response shift is currently being used to lump together distinct phenom-
ena that often have very different implications for the accuracy of quality of life
measurement. Moreover, the specific term “response shift” has misleading conno-
tations. The term suggests that the high quality of life reported by many people
with chronic illness and disability are measurement artifacts-their “responses” have
“shifted”-and that such people are not really experiencing high quality of life. We
think such connotations, even if not originally intended, are misleading. A major
goal of QoL measurement is to discern to what extent changes in QoL reports over
time represent true changes in QoL and to what extent they reflect measurement
error. Unfortunately, the response shift literature often fails to make this impor-
tant distinction. At times, the term response shift is equated with measurement
error, while at other times, the term is used to characterize a mechanism by which
people’s true QoL changes. In this paper, we respectfully contend that the field of
response shift research has been characterized from its outset by conceptual confu-
sion. We propose that QoL researchers should abandon the term response shift and
focus instead on developing ways to disentangle measurement error-specifically scale
recalibration-from true changes in QoL.
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9.2 Two examples of response shift: hypothetical
case studies
To illustrate our central concern about the term response shift, consider the fol-
lowing two hypothetical case studies. We use these oversimplified cases to elucidate
our distinction between measurement error and true change.
Happiness after paraplegia
The first case involves a man who develops paraplegia as a result of an accident.
Early on, he is emotionally devastated by his disability. But over time, he begins
to recover. In part, his recovery is aided with the help of physical therapists and
occupational therapists, who teach him how to engage in important activities, like
getting in and out of a wheelchair and driving a car. Yet despite these advances,
several months after the accident, he remains unhappy.
But after many months, his mood improves. He no longer spends time focusing
on what he cannot do. Instead, he shifts his attention toward new goals, such as
participating in wheelchair basketball tournaments. He even gets more involved in
church, reestablishing a spiritual life that had slipped away from him before his
accident. Even though his physical function is stable by all objective measures, his
emotional response to his disability has abated. Eventually, his mood is close to
what it was prior to the accident. Indeed, for the purposes of our discussion, let us
assume that emotion researchers have videotaped this man’s facial expressions over
time and confirmed that in the early months after his injury, he rarely smiled and
frequently frowned, but over time his face revealed an increasing percentage of time
experiencing positive rather than negative emotions.195 Let us suppose that QoL
researchers have been surveying this man over time. As part of a multi-dimensional
QoL scale, they ask him to provide a global report of his overall QoL, on a 0-100
scale. Several months after his accident, he rates his QoL as 36 out of 100, a very
low score. By eighteen months, his self-reported QoL has risen to 67 out of 100.
A person with chronic pain who experiences kidney stones
In our second case, we ask you to imagine a thirty-year-old woman who suffered
a leg wound while serving in the armed forces and has experienced chronic leg pain
ever since. The pain interferes with her sleep and makes it difficult for her to
concentrate. She rates the pain on average as being 7 out of 10 most days. Then,
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this woman experiences kidney stones, with pain significantly more intense than
anything she has previously experienced, 10 out of 10. Indeed, she cannot believe
that she thought her leg pain qualified for a score as high as 7 out of 10.
After her kidney stones are treated, her life is unchanged. Her leg pain continues
unabated. A researcher monitoring her facial expressions records that she exhibits
just as many grimaces of pain now as she did before her kidney stones. Her leg
pain, in other words, is exactly the same. But now, her interpretation of this 0 to 10
pain scale has changed. She has a very different idea about what a pain score of 10
means. Therefore, when asked to rate her leg pain now, she replies that it averages
about 5 out of 10.
9.2.1 Viewing these case studies through the lens of response
shift
These two hypothetical studies carry quite different implications for the mea-
surement of subjective experiences like QoL and pain. In the first case, QoL measure-
ment appears to have accomplished exactly what researchers want it to accomplish-it
has captured the true change in QoL that this person experienced when he emotion-
ally adapted to his chronic disability.35 In the second case, however, a person with
stable pain reported a change in her pain score. And yet her pain had not changed.
In this case, the pain measure failed to provide us with a valid way of comparing
this person’s pain over time.
In the first case, a person emotionally adapted to a chronic disability and thus
reported a change in QoL. In the second case, a person recalibrated the pain scale
and thus, despite experiencing stable pain, reported a changing pain score. Two very
different phenomena. And yet both stand as examples of response shift. Admittedly,
these two cases are not only hypothetical, but also relatively simplistic, lacking the
complexity of actual patient trajectories. In addition, both cases make reference
to unidimensional measures (of QoL and pain, respectively), whereas many actual
measures are multidimensional. Nevertheless, these cases are meant to illustrate our
main point: that response shift lumps together quite distinct, and potentially dis-
tinguishable, phenomena, ones that seem better off separate than lumped together.
(We expand on this argument below.) In addition, the issues we raise with these
hypothetical cases are not limited to unidimensional outcome measures. Indeed,
many multidimensional measures contain items within that are susceptible to the
same phenomena illustrated above, phenomena like adaptation and recalibration.
Our concern is that these two cases came to be lumped together under one rubric,
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of ”response shift.” To understand how this lumping has occurred, we need to look
more closely at how experts have defined response shift.
9.3 Defining response shift
Sprangers and Schwartz define response shift as: A change in the meaning of one’s
self evaluation of a target construct as a result of: (a) a change in the respondent’s
internal standards of measurement (scale recalibration, in psychometric terms); (b)
a change in the respondent’s values (i.e. the importance of component domains
constituting the target construct); or (c) a redefinition of the target construct (i.e.
reconceptualization).41 They pack a great deal of meaning into this description, so
it is worth unpacking their definition.
9.3.1 Scale recalibration
The first component of response shift, scale recalibration, occurs when chang-
ing circumstances cause people to change how they interpret a subjective response
scale. In our hypothetical example, the woman with chronic leg pain exhibited scale
recalibration-her experience of kidney stones changed how she interpreted the 0 to
10 pain scale. Scale recalibration is a threat to the validity of self-reports. For
example, imagine an 85-year-old man who rates his health as 90 out of 100 on a
scale where 100 is defined as “perfect health.” Imagine a 35-year-old man who also
rates his health as 90 out of 100. How confident would you be that the two men
mean the same thing by 90 out of 100? In a survey of people 50 or older in the
United States, we found evidence for scale recalibration in how people interpret the
phrase “perfect health.”177 We discovered that as people get older, they redefine
what perfect health means. This makes it difficult to compare subjective health
ratings across people of different age groups. By similar logic, it is possible that
people who experience chronic illness or disability will redefine what it means to
have “high” levels of happiness or “7 out of 10” quality of life.
9.3.2 Change in values
Quality of life reports can also be influenced by how people’s values change in
response to their circumstances. For example, imagine that soon after developing
paraplegia, a person is despondent, because he has to give up physical activities that
mattered a great deal to him. But over time, his values change. He places a higher
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value on intellectual pursuits than on physical activity. And with that change in
values, comes a change in his self-reported quality of life.
Changing values can be a mechanism by which people emotionally adapt to
illness or disability.196 For example, a study of patients with prostate cancer who
had experienced treatment side effects showed that those men who were able to
change their values, by shifting what was important in their lives, were able to
maintain a high QoL in the face of treatment complications, whereas those men who
did not change their values experienced a decline.197
Note that by changing values, people exhibit response shift, but this cause
of response shift does not necessarily invalidate QoL measures. By contrast, scale
recalibration is by definition a threat to the validity of QoL measures. A person
who recalibrates a scale makes it hard for researchers to compare one self-report to
another. But a person who changes her values has not necessarily invalidated her
QoL reports. Instead, changing values in this way can simply be a mechanism by
which people gain true changes in QoL.
9.3.3 Reconceptualization
A third component of response shift is reconceptualization of the construct being
measured. Reconceptualization is a challenge for QoL measurement, because the
meaning of QoL is broad, and therefore can be interpreted differently by different
people and, of even more concern, can be interpreted differently by the same per-
son at two points in time. For example, prior to experiencing an illness, a person
may evaluate his QoL primarily on affective or emotional grounds. By this inter-
pretation, he would provide a high QoL rating only if the frequency and intensity of
positive affect in his moment to moment life significantly outweighed the frequency
and intensity of negative affect.198 But in response to his illness, he may care less
about his mood and place more importance on the frequency with which he pursues
meaningful activities.199 What does reconceptualization mean for the validity of
QoL reports? The answer is not clear. If we want people to freely interpret QoL
(or happiness, or well-being), then reconceptualization is not a threat. However,
if we want them to judge their QoL at any given time using the exact same def-
inition of QoL, then this is a threat, and we need either to find ways to prevent
such reconceptualization or, instead, to develop methods to discover whether such
reconceptualization is influencing people’s self-reports.
For example, it is plausible that people adapt to chronic illness or disability in
part by changing their values. Prior to an illness, a person might consider athletic
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activity to be an important component of his QoL. After being sick, he may think of
QoL in different ways, no longer feeling that a vigorous workout is key to the good
life. His life goals and values may migrate from physical recreation to intellectual
pursuits. Indeed, this change in values may even lead him to redefine what it means
to have good QoL (hence, showing the subtleness of the distinction between the
second and third parts of Sprangers’ definition of response shift).
9.4 Problems with current conceptualization re-
sponse shift
Based on Sprangers’ definition, response shift can occur through several mechanisms,
some of which raise fundamental questions regarding the validity of self-reported
QoL, but others which do not.
9.4.1 Connotation that response shift is always a threat to
validity of self-reports
The way response shift is defined, a phenomenon like scale recalibration-a true source
of measurement error-is lumped together with other phenomena that do not necessar-
ily create measurement error. Unfortunately, the term “response shift” conjures con-
notations that more clearly resemble scale recalibration than the other phenomena.
Consequently, some people have mistakenly assumed that response shift is always
evidence that QoL measures are not valid. For instance, Brossart and colleagues
describe response shift as a “threat to validity of outcome data”.200 Wilson writes
about distinguishing ”between true change (which here is called a “shift”) and scale
recalibration, concept redefinition or a change in values (“response shift”)”.192 In
other words, Wilson believes response shift is pseudo change, not true change. Sim-
ilarly, in introducing medical researchers to response shift, Schwartz and Sprangers
state that when response shift occurs: “answers to the same items by the same
individual may not be as comparable as originally thought.”
In a longitudinal study of people with multiple sclerosis, Schwartz and col-
leagues continue this line of reasoning: The apparent stability in these QoL out-
comes over five years of follow up might be considered a gain from the perspective
of optimal rehabilitation. Our data suggest that this ”gain” [their quotation marks]
may reflect recalibration and reconceptualization response shiftsĚThus, overall pa-
tients’ QoL conceptualizations seemed to reduce an emphasis on physical functioning
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and increase an emphasis on psychological well-being.201 This quote implies that
the QoL of people with multiple sclerosis is a measurement artifact, because people
have found happiness by changing their life goals. Clearly, to understand the QoL of
people with chronic illness or disability, it is important not only to know what their
overall quality of life is, but also to understand what they mean by quality of life.
It is valuable to determine whether the things they value in their lives have been
changed by their experiences. But to lump all of these together under one header,
”response shift,” and to then imply that high reported quality of life is not to be
trusted, is not justifiable. The problem, once again, is that the term ”response shift”
carries a specific connotation-that the self-reports of people with chronic illness and
disability are misreports. Yet when people find happiness by shifting their values,
their high self-reported QoL may simply reflect that they have a good QoL!
9.4.2 Identification of response shift with the “Then Test”
Why do people believe that response shift does not reflect true change? One
possible reason, as we have suggested, is that the term response shift carries con-
notations that fit much better with scale recalibration than with the other two
components of response shift. In fact, the term response shift was initially used in
the educational literature in the 1970s and was specifically limited to the concept of
scale recalibration.
There is another reason, however, why researchers often equate response shift
with measurement error-because they have too often relied on the Then Test to
determine whether a QoL self-report is being influenced by response shift.193 In the
Then Test, researchers collect at least three data points: (1) a baseline or “Time
1” measure of QoL; (2) a “Time 2” measure of QoL; and (3) a “Then” measure of
QoL-a retrospective assessment at Time 2 of what one’s QoL was at Time 1. For
example, imagine a patient with chronic 7/10 pain at Time 1, who receives a new
treatment for his pain and at Time 2 reports experiencing only 5/10 pain. Without
conducting a Then Test, many researchers would conclude from these data that this
patient experienced a 2 out of 10 reduction in his pain. But suppose the Then Test
reveals that this patient now judges his Time 1 pain as having been 9/10. This
suggests that the patient has reinterpreted what the points on the pain scale mean.
The patient is telling us that he experienced a 4 out of 10 reduction in his pain (from
9 to 5), according to his new interpretation of the pain scale.
In the next section, we will explain why we believe people are misinterpreting
the Then Test. But for our present purposes, we merely want to establish that
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the vast majority of researchers, when studying a response shift, have focused on
the Then Test and have therefore equated response shift with scale recalibration.
Response shift means, for most people, the same thing as scale recalibration, and
so when they find evidence of response shift, they assume that they have found
evidence of measurement error.
9.4.3 Misinterpretation of the Then Test
As we have explained, response shift is primarily identified by use of the
Then Test. This reliance on the Then Test is troubling, because most researchers
misinterpret the data from this test, by assuming that if the Time 1 measure differs
from the retrospective measure, then patients must be recalibrating the outcome
scale. By making this false assumption, researchers have been downplaying the
likelihood that the retrospective measure is being influenced by recall bias [20].
People’s theories about how a life domain is supposed to have changed over
time can bias their retrospective reports about those very domains. For example,
Ross conducted a study in which he assessed people’s study skills, by an objective
measure of such skills. He also had people provide self-reports of their own study
skills. He found at baseline that people had very good insights into their study skills-
a person who was, say, 6/10 on a study skills score typically perceived himself as
being a 6/10. Then, Ross followed these students after they took a course designed,
purportedly, to improve their study skills. As it turns out, the course had no effect
at all on people’s study skills. A student who began with study skills of 6/10 would
typically end up with study skills of 6/10 at the end of the course. When Ross
reassessed these people’s study skills, he demonstrated that the course had failed,
and he also found that students still had accurate perceptions of their own study
skills. A student who was still 6/10 typically perceived himself as being 6/10.42
But here is the catch: at the end of the course, Ross asked the students to
recall what their study skills had been before they began the course. Students had
a theory that this course would improve their study skills. So at the end of the
course, a student who accurately reported himself as having study skills of 6/10
would typically “remember” that he began the course with study skills of only 3
or 4/10. The students, in other words, misremembered their previous study skills,
because their memory was influenced by their theory about how their study skills
should have changed over time.
In this example, students did not exhibit any scale recalibration. Their Time
1 and Time 2 self-reports were entirely accurate. Yet, response shift researchers,
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relying on the Then Test, could potentially look at these same data (in the absence
of objective measures of study skills) and conclude that response shift had occurred-
that people had recalibrated the study skills scale. Our research team has found a
similar theory-driven recall bias affecting people’s beliefs about how their happiness
has changed over their life span.43 We have also shown that recall bias influences pa-
tients’ assessments of how much they have benefited from kidney transplantation.202
The key point here is that the Then test is not able to distinguish between scale
recalibration and recall bias, two distinct phenomena.
9.4.4 Lumping instead of splitting
The most fundamental problem with the term response shift is that it lumps together
distinct phenomena, and in doing so makes it harder for researchers to disentangle
scale recalibration from true change. Response shift theorists are correct to note
that multiple phenomena could be simultaneously influencing people’s subjective
self-reports. A person’s pain score over time may be influenced by both scale recali-
bration and true change; her retrospective report might simultaneously be influenced
by both scale recalibration and recall bias. Leaders in response shift theory have
advanced the field by drawing attention to those important phenomena. But for the
field to reach its potential, the time has come to disentangle these phenomena. And
we believe this disentangling will move forward more quickly if researchers adopt
more precise language.
9.5 Where do we go from here?
QoL researchers want to know when their measures are reliable, valid, and com-
parable within people across time. When patients receive healthcare interventions,
or experience changes in health, researchers want to know what it means when their
QoL scores also change. Researchers also want to know whether these changes are
real or instead reflect measurement bias. We think that conceptual confusion around
the concept of response shift has impeded researchers in pursuing these important
goals. We suggest the following to address this problem: “Abandon response shift”
To achieve this goal, researchers need to abandon the term “response shift.” The
term is simply too confusing to help researchers disentangle these very complicated
issues. The language and definition of response shift impedes research by lumping
together sources of measurement bias-scale recalibration-and other phenomena-like
change in values-that may simply reflect mechanisms by which people experience
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true change.
9.5.1 Use precise language
In place of response shift, researchers should use more precise language to
characterize the specific issues they are assessing. Scale recalibration, for example,
has a more precise and narrow connotation than response shift. By definition, scale
recalibration is an example of measurement bias. If scale recalibration has occurred,
researchers can be confident that measurement bias exists, and therefore that the
measures are not comparable over time. If response shift has occurred, however,
researchers do not know whether QoL measures over time are comparable or not.
Other terms exist in the scientific literature that capture other relevant phenom-
ena currently lumped together under the concept of response shift. For example,
emotional adaptation, or hedonic adaptation, is a term used by psychologists to
characterize true changes in subjective wellbeing or happiness over time, when peo-
ple’s emotional reaction to changing circumstances weakens.31,35 We predict that
if researchers set out in advance to identify whether a specific change in QoL is
a result of scale recalibration versus adaptation, they will be much more likely to
generate useful research results than if they simply set out to determine whether the
measurement reflects the more ambiguous concept of response shift.
9.5.2 Move beyond the Then Test
Researchers should not rely on the Then Test to reveal whether scale recalibra-
tion has occurred. The causes of Then Test discrepancies are too ambiguous to lay
out solely at the feet of scale recalibration. Discrepancies between time 1 measures
and recalls of time 1 could result from scale recalibration, but could also result from
recall bias. In place of the Then Test, researchers should use other methods to test
for scale recalibration. We presented one such method in this article, when we dis-
cussed how scale recalibration influences people’s interpretation of ”perfect health”
as a function of their age. We elaborate on other methods elsewhere.112
9.5.3 More careful review of response shift research
Journal editors and reviewers should look carefully when scrutinizing studies
that explore the concept of response shift. They should look to see whether the
study focuses solely on scale recalibration. When it does so, they should ask the
researchers to rewrite the study using more precise terminology. If they note that
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the researchers are using the Then Test as the sole evidence of scale recalibration,
they should make sure the authors indicate that other phenomena, like recall bias,
could be influencing their results. And when the research focuses on how things like
change in values can lead people to experience true increases in their quality of life,
they should ask authors not to call this an example of response shift, but instead to
use other appropriate terminology, such as adaptation or resilience.
9.6 Concluding remarks
We expect that the ideas we present here will be controversial. Some schol-
ars have made reputations for themselves by disseminating the concept of response
shift. But the long-term success of QoL research depends on researchers striving for
precision and clarity in their work. Concise, specific terminology is an important
part of this research enterprise.
Response shift experts have done a worthy job of drawing scholars’ attention to
important issues like scale recalibration and adaptation. They should be commended
for generating so much interest in these important topics. Now, however, it is time
for QoL researchers to abandon the term response shift and focus their efforts on
determining when they can trust the comparability of their QoL measures across
time. We recognize that our article raises more questions than it answers. Future
research should explore better ways to empirically disentangle some of the concepts
we identify in this manuscript. But our goal in this article is not to show the field
how to disentangle all these complex issues. Instead, we have set out to demonstrate
that, by lumping distinct phenomena under a single term, response shift, we make it








In medical care resources are scarce and choices have to be made about how
these resources are distributed. To judge the optimal allocation of medical resources,
cost-utility analyses can be used. In cost-utility analysis costs of a therapy are
compared with the benefits in health. These benefits are estimated by health state
utilities, preferences for certain health states compared to perfect health and death.
Health state utilities can be elicited from patients or from members of the public.
Whose’ utilities are used does matter. Utilities of members of the public are found to
be lower than health state utilities of patients. Several mechanisms causing this gap
in health state utilities between patients and members of the public have been put
forward as explanations.17,18,203 The overall objective of this thesis is to examine
some of these mechanisms, in order to gain insight in the validity of health state
utilities estimated by patients or by members of the public.
Previous studies have described contrasting findings about the gap in health
state utilities given by patients or members of the public.16,44 Chapter 2 presents a
meta-analytical comparison of health state utilities given by patients or members of
the public. This comparison is based on 30 eligible studies including 40 estimators,
which were rated by two independent judges. Overall it was found that patients gave
significantly higher valuations than nonpatients (Cohen’s d = 0.20, p < 0.01). For
each elicitation method separately this resulted in an unstandardized d = 0.05(p <
0.05) for the TTO, an unstandardized d = 0.04(p < 0.05)for the VAS, and an
unstandardized d = 0.01(p = 0.70) for the SG. Post hoc moderator analyses showed
that the difference between patients and nonpatients became smaller when an illness
label was provided or when patients were asked to give valuations for a health state
description instead of for their own health. We can conclude that the respondent
group used does influence health state utilities elicited.
In Chapter 3 the effect of the health state description on health state utilities
among patients with RA was investigated. Patients were asked to rated their own
health based on three different descriptions. First, patients gave a valuation of their
own experienced health of the previous week, secondly, they were asked to value a
standard EQ-5D description of their own health (which was untold to them), and
third, patients valued a standard EQ-5D description of their own health (identified
as such) enriched with individual attributes. All valuations were given on a TTO.
We found no differences in health state valuations between the three health state
descriptions, but an interaction effect showed that patients with better health ap-
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peared to give lower valuations to their own experienced health compared to the
enriched EQ-5D health state description of their own health. Surprisingly, utilities
for scenarios enriched with exclusively negative individual attributes were not lower
than those for the own standard EQ-5D description. In conclusion, it remains un-
clear if disparities in valuations can be attributed to the EQ-5D description being
too sparse.
Chapter 4 describes a study in which the mechanisms of focusing illusion and
adaptation are examined. Patients with RA and members of the public imagining
having RA were asked to name aspects that were important to them in their previous
week. Secondly, all participants rated the importance of these self-named aspects
and of the EQ-5D dimensions. Overall we found that members of the public tend to
name more aspects in life domains which are negatively influenced by the disease.
Patients named both positive and negative aspects, reflecting life in general as well as
their illness. Members of the public rated their own named aspects as less important
compared to the EQ-5D dimensions, whereas patients found both groups of aspects
equally important.
In Chapter 5 we compared values of patients, their partners, and members of
the public to examine the effect of vicarious experience. The inconclusive findings
described in Chapter 3 led us to question whether enriching a scenario would make
valuations of members of the public more similar to those of patients. Therefore we
also whished to assess whether the difference in health state valuations maybe due
to a scenario-effect, and whether ’enriching’ a scenario reduces differences between
the groups. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, similar as the one
used in chapter 3, among patients with RA, partners of patients and members of
the public. For all three health state descriptions ratings were significantly higher
for patients than for the general public. Ratings for partners were in between.
Differences between patients and the public are not likely to be due to sparseness
of the scenarios, but may be due to a focusing illusion, enhanced by the negative
framing of scenarios.
Chapter 6 examines the effect of adaptive abilities on health state utilities.
We investigated the direct effect of adaptive abilities on health state utilities and
the effect mediated by mental HRQL. Adaptive abilities were conceptualized by
combining the three constructs Self-esteem, Mastery, and Optimism, as suggested
by Cognitive Adaptation Theory. In an interview, patients with RA gave health state
valuations for their previous week on a VAS and TTO, and filled in questionnaires
measuring Self-esteem, Mastery, Optimism, and HRQL. Persons’ ability to adapt
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did not add considerably to the explanation of health state utilities above HRQL.
In the TTO no additional variance was explained by adaptive abilities (∆R2 =
.00, β = .02), in the VAS a minor proportion of the variance was explained by
adaptive abilities (∆R2 = .05, β = .33). However, the effect of adaptation on health
state utilities seemed to be mediated by the mental health domain of quality of
life. Patients with stronger adaptive abilities may more easily enhance their mental
health after being diagnosed with a chronic illness, which leads to higher health state
utilities.
Chapter 7 further describes adaptation and examines valuation shift, in a longi-
tudinal study among patients with Spinal Cord Injury (SCI). Health state valuations
of patients with recent onset SCI were assessed at three points in time. At each time
point patients gave valuations for their own health and for a hypothetical health
state on a TTO and VAS. Furthermore patients rated their adjustment and filled in
a questionnaire measuring their independence. Valuations given on the TTO for the
own health did change over time, above improvement in independence. Furthermore
we found that this change was partly related to change in self-rated adjustment.
Health state valuations for the own health given on the VAS and corrected for in-
dependence did not change over time. No change was found either in valuations
for the hypothetical health state description. We can conclude that the effect of
psychological adaptation has an impact on the valuations of the own health based
on the TTO in serious incurable disease. No support was found for the effect of
valuation shift.
In Chapter 8 the effect of adaptation as well as the effect of implicit theories
of stability and change were studied. Two longitudinal studies are presented: one
study among patients experiencing new limb amputations, and one among patients
experiencing new colostomies. In both studies patients estimated at two points in
time their current well-being, functioning, and general health and predicted of their
future well-being, functioning, and general health. In the second study patients
not only predicted their well-being, functioning, and general health, but they also
recalled previous performance on these domains. In both studies the actual change
was compared to the change expected and recalled by patients. It appeared that
patients expect a significant improvement and recall significant improvement on all
three domains, but report little actual improvement. Apparently, patients expect
stronger improvement than they actually experience: they overestimate their hedonic
adaptation.
While examining the different mechanisms suggested in the literature causing
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the difference between health state valuations of patients and members of the public
we were often challenged by ambiguous descriptions of the mechanisms. Chapter 9
describes such a conceptual confusions specific to the field of “response shift”. To
clarify the conceptual confusion around “response shift” a suggestion is made about
abandoning this term and instead to use more precise language. First, response
shift confounds sources of measurement error, ’scale recalibration’, with true causes
of change which in the language of response shift are described as ’change in values’
and ’reconceptualization’. Secondly ’change in values’ or ’reconceptualization’ might
better be changed into conceptualizations such as adaptation, which is a common
term used by psychologist.
10.2 General Discussion
The main objective of this thesis was to examine mechanisms that have been
suggested to explain the gap between health state utilities given by patients and by
members of the public. By examining these mechanisms more insight in the validity
of health state utilities of patients and members of the public is gained. In the first
part of this discussion the conclusions retrieved from the previous Chapters 2 - 9 are
described. The next part consists of an evaluation of the results. Finally the policy
implications, implications for patient decision making and suggestions of areas for
future research are discussed.
10.2.1 Mechanisms underlying the gap between members of
the public and patients
Lack of Scope The results of this thesis give only limited ground for the effect
of Lack of Scope. Throughout the whole thesis exploratory findings tentatively
confirmed an effect of Lack of Scope. That is, in Chapter 2 the discrepancy between
health state utilities of patients and members of the public was shown to be smaller
in studies in which a label was provided. In Chapter 3 the EQ-5D seemed to be
too sparse for patients in better health, and in chapter 4 patients valued their own
named aspects as important as EQ-5D dimensions. These findings were often based
on post hoc analyses, however, and were not very strong. Lack of Scope was most
thoroughly examined in Chapters 3 and 5, using different health state descriptions.
In both chapters the effect of using different health state descriptions was minor.
Focusing illusion Support was found for a focusing illusion. Members of the
public were more focused on life domains that are negatively influenced by a health
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state compared to patients (Chapter 4). Patients seemed not overly optimistic; they
did not overlook the negative aspects of their health state (chapter 4).
Valuation shift Previous lack of support for valuation shift was suggested to
be due to studies investigating rather mild, non-permanent health states.,2040 In
this thesis, patients with Spinal Cord Injury, a serious condition with little or no
prospect for cure, were studied, but still no support for valuation shift was found
(Chapter 7).
Adaptation The results of this thesis showed that an effect of adaptation cannot
be ruled out. Adaptive abilities indirectly influenced health state utilities, (Chap-
ter 6) health state utilities measured with a TTO did change over time due to adap-
tation over and above improvement in independence (Chapter 7). Further, based on
aspects indicated as important to patients, patients seemed to have different inter-
ests compared to members of the public (Chapter 4). Interestingly, the influence of
adaptation was also seen in partners (Chapter 5) and patients early in the experience
of an illness (Chapter 8). Yet, this latter group tended to overestimate their ability
to adapt.
Implicit theories of stability and change Patients early in the experience of an
illness seemed to base their valuations on implicit theories of stability and change.
They assumed that after surgery they will get better, and that this improvement
will continue over time, leading to an underestimation when recalling previous health
and an overestimation when making predictions of their future health (Chapter 8).
10.2.2 Evaluating the results
Health state utilities used in cost-utility analyses to compare the costs and
benefits of interventions have generally been elicited from members of the public
or patients.15 Whose preferences are used does have influence, patients tend to
give higher valuations compared to members of the public (Chapter 2). Based on
the results described in this thesis most of the mechanisms generally suggested do
not or only marginally explain the gap between patients and public, except for
the mechanisms focusing illusion and adaptation. Clearly no conclusion can be
drawn about mechanisms not examined. Most of the mechanisms described in the
introduction were examined, but the intensity differed.
Focusing illusion is the tendency of members of the public to focus on the
difference between their current situation and a situation under consideration.27 In
previous studies in the field of medical decision making no empirical evidence for
this focusing illusion has been described. Studies have aimed to defocus members of
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the public through a defocusing task24 but they were not able to reduce the focusing
illusion. The study described here (chapter 4) in which evidence for focusing illusion
in medical decision making was shown, was directed at describing focusing illusion.
Health state valuations of members of the public seem to be biased due to focusing
illusion, but reduction of this focusing illusion is challenging.
The second mechanism for which support has been found is adaptation. Adap-
tation is one of the most often suggested mechanisms causing the gap, especially
when coping strategies and the constructs “change in values” and “reconceptualiza-
tion” of response shift (Chapter 9) are taken into account. Damschroder et al.38
found tentative support for the effect of adaptation when using an adaptation task.
Members of the public who received an adaptation task gave higher health state val-
uations on PTO and VAS compared to members of the public who did not receive
this task. However in a follow up study using the TTO and SG no such difference
was found.39
It has been argued that the expected impact of adaptation on health state
utilities is less prevalent than previously assumed. For instance, Lucas186 described
that patients do not adapt to onset of major disability. In this study, two nationally
representative panel studies from Germany and from the United Kingdom were used.
Based on these data it was shown that patients with onset major disability did not
return to their previous levels of life satisfaction (prior to their injury). Even seven
years after the injury the life satisfaction was as low as in the first year after onset
of the disability. Surely this study reveals much interesting information but it is
limited by the fact that the results were restricted to annual measurement points in
time.
The effect of adaptation on health state utilities in this thesis is shown among
patients with RA and patients with SCI. Anticipated adaptation is shown among pa-
tients who underwent amputation or colostomy surgery and partners of patients with
RA. The effect of adaptation seems to generalize among different patient groups and
even partners of patients. But even though the main conclusions are similar, some of
the underlying results point to interesting differences. The adaptive abilities among
patients with RA seemed to have more impact on the VAS (Chapter 6) whereas the
change over time among patients with SCI was only prevalent in valuations elicited
with the TTO (Chapter 7). These distinct findings might have been caused by
the affective and cognitive nature of the measurements. The VAS can be seen as
a more affective measurement whereas the TTO as a more cognitive measurement.
Affective measurements have been found to be more sensitive to change,172 leading
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to a stronger effect of adaptive abilities on the VAS in Chapter 6. Yet, cognitive
measurements might be more strongly related to cognitive change, such as cognitive
adaptation. The TTO in chapter 7 might have triggered patients with SCI to think
about future life goals which may be influenced by cognitive adaptation. A different
explanation for the distinct findings in Chapters 6 and 7 might be related to the
severity of the health states under consideration. Adaptation and adaptive abilities
might have a different impact on health states of varying severity levels.
The mechanisms causing the gap between health state utilities of patients and
members of the public have been suggested based on cross fertilization between
research fields such as the fields of HRQL research, medical decision making, and
social and health psychology. However, the translation of a theory from a partic-
ular research field into a mechanism explaining the gap in health state utilities is
challenging. Theories from different research fields may lead to similar mechanisms
with only subtle differences. Given these subtle differences and often ambiguous
descriptions, similar mechanisms are difficult to examine separately.
For instance, the distinction between the failure to anticipate on adaptation
on the one hand and focusing illusion on the other can be ambiguous. Some of the
findings in Chapter 4 on attributes of importance could be caused by a failure to
anticipate on adaptation, or by a focusing illusion, or maybe by both. Ubel et al.24
tried to describe how to distinguish between these mechanisms. According to these
authors focusing illusion is defined as a failure to appreciate that not all life domains
or life events will be equally affected by a given change in circumstances. Failure to
anticipate on adaptation is defined as the failure to appreciate that one’s emotional
response to the given change in circumstances will diminish over time. However,
they do not elaborate on the distinction between focusing illusion and other aspects
of adaptation, such as shifting goals and priorities, which they had described as
aspects of adaptation in previous papers.18,177
Both in the definition of Ubel et al.18 and according to Schkade and Kah-
neman,181 focusing illusion is caused by overweighting of a subset of aspects of an
entire object under consideration, for instance when only attention is drawn to a
change in significant aspects of life. If we revert to this definition of focusing illu-
sion, a failure to anticipate on a shift in priorities or goals then seem to be distinct
from focusing illusion by the fact that it is not caused by an exaggerated focus on
a subset of the object under consideration. Regarding the findings in Chapter 4 it
seems that the distinction between focusing illusion and adaptation remains chal-
lenging due to the limited information we have. By statements as “I am not able to
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play soccer” no information is provided about the underlying grounds. If a member
of the public makes such statement he or she might have been thinking about the
differences between his or her current situation compared to the situation when hav-
ing RA (focusing illusion) or might have thought about both situations in general
but failed to imagine that instead of playing soccer fulfillment can be retrieved by
watching soccer instead (adaptation).
10.2.3 Policy implications
Organizations developing guidelines on the use of new and existing treatments
(NICE, the panel of the U.S. Public Health Service, CvZ) advise the use of a societal
perspective in which health state utilities elicited from members of the public are
preferred.12,14 However given the experience of patients it has incidentally been
argued that patient valuations should be used instead.12 The findings described in
this thesis reveal that health state utilities of patients and public do differ (Chapter 2)
which is mostly caused by adaptation (Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7) and focusing illusion
(Chapters 4 and 5 ).
Whose utilities we should use depends on whose utilities are most valid. This
validity depends on the effect that the underlying mechanisms have, that is, do they
cause a true effect or do they cause an error in the health state utility elicited?
Obviously utilities of members of the public that are shaped by focusing illusion are
biased.26,37 If members of the public focus too narrowly on only negative conse-
quences of the health state under consideration they overestimate the burden of the
health state leading to too low health state utilities.
The question if patients’ health state utilities shaped by adaptation are biased is
more difficult to answer. Ubel et al.37 assume that failure to anticipate on adaptation
leads to misjudgments of members of the public. Yet, in the field of response shift,
patients’ adaptation is seen as a validity threat leading to misjudgments of patients,41
assuming that adaptation is described as change in values and reconceptualisation
(Chapter 9). According to Oort et al.204 and Sprangers and Schwartz,41 true change
in Quality of Life (QL) is only reflected when it is corrected for change in values,
reconceptualization, and scale recalibration. This implies that change in patients’
QL due to adaptation is regarded as untrue change. However, given that by definition
(World Health Organization) QL is based on an individual’s perception, change as
experienced by a patient must truly reflect change. That is, QL is a subjective
concept based on individual perceptions and should include subjective change if
this reflects true change from the patients’ point of view. A change in perception
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does not have to harm the validity of QL measurement. Therefore, health state
valuations shaped by adaptation do reflect true experienced health. It also seems
necessary to use health state valuations shaped by adaptation when it comes to
the fact that health state utilities should include all aspects of life that are affected
by the health state. Patients’ understanding of life in their current health state
includes the influence of adaptation, especially as the influence of adaptation will
differ between health states, thereby providing valid information about the perceived
severity of the illness. In other words, if the ability to adapt differs between health
states this does reveal important information about the severity of the illness, which
should be accounted for in cost-utility analyses. Moreover, the health care system
does put effort in developing physical rehabilitation and psychological interventions
to help people to adjust to their illness, since this leads to an improved QL. We
have to keep in mind that although patients do adapt, when given the choice they
probably would not have wanted to adapt in the first place. It may even seem
counterintuitive to take full adaptation into account. Gilbert et al.26 argue that
if people would take their ability to adapt into account, they would not engage in
problem avoiding behavior and become “happily extinct”. Although this suggestion
is made for coping behavior of individual people, it can be transposed to cost-utility
analyses. If people adapt to their illness anyway, we would not have to worry about
health state utilities but only take the number of lives saved into account.
Further, health state utilities shaped by adaptation leave less space for a gain
in benefit by treatment. The effort that patients put in adapting to their illness will
cause effectiveness of treatments to decrease.36 This creates an ethical problem; by
using health state utilities shaped by adaptation the effort that patients make in
adapting will lead to a decrease in availability of resources.
In summary, health state utilities shaped by adaptation are not biased, they do
reflect true values, and more importantly they provide valuable information about
the severity of health states. However, using utilities shaped by adaptation will lead
to ethical challenges. That is, if people fully adapt, medical treatment would not be
necessary anymore, or would not be cost-effective. Therefore adaptation should be
taken into account in cost-utility analyses but only to a certain extent.
Concerning to what extent health state utilities shaped by adaptation should
be used some suggestions from the literature may be relevant. Menzel et al.205 sug-
gested that disabled and chronically ill should be consulted on this topic. Another
approach is that of “cost-value analysis”.10 In this approach two stages are used
to construct a valuation. In stage 1, patients assign health-related utilities, and in
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stage 2, based on these health state utilities, the general public assigns weights to
different gains in utility. A third approach might be asking patients to recall how
their health state has changed over time.37 However, given the findings described
in Chapter 8 the recalled health valuation will be significantly different from the
actual health valuation. Until now it remains unclear which valuation reflects the
true value. Another approach examined in this thesis might be using health state
utilities of patients given to unfamiliar health states. Given the lack of evidence
for valuations shift, it might be concluded that utilities of patients imagining an
unfamiliar health state are similar to valuations given by members of the public.
Also examined in this thesis are health state utilities given by proxies. These val-
uations appeared to lie between valuations given by patients and members of the
public (Chapter 5). Likewise in the meta-analyses we found health state valuations
of proxies to lie between valuations given by members of the public and patients
(Chapter 2). Partners do seem to incorporate (vicarious) experience. The use of
partners’ valuations might be an interesting new approach.
For now, no conclusive advice can be given on the extent to which health state
utilities should incorporate health state valuations of patients, to be used in cost-
utility analyses. We do conclude that health state utilities of members of the public
are biased by focusing illusion and that adaptation should be incorporated to some
extent, but not fully. Therefore the use of health state utilities of patients or maybe
partners of patients should be open to consideration by organizations developing
guidelines on the use of new and existing treatments.
10.2.4 Implications for patient decision making
In individual treatment decisions, understanding of the mechanism causing
the gap in health state utilities between patients and members of the public is also
important.206 It seems that when people imagine living in a certain health state
they fail to anticipate on adaptation and focus only on those life domains that are
influenced by the illness. To be able to make treatment decisions, people have to
make such affective forecasts of their life in a certain health state. Based on the
found biases people might make the wrong decision.
People should be made aware of these biases prior to making treatment deci-
sions. Admittedly, given the results of Chapter 8 this suggestion has to be made
with caution. Patients just recovering from surgery overpredicted their ability to
adapt. Before being able to inform patients about these biases we have to under-
stand if this overprediction occurs only in patients just having received treatment
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or also in patients anticipating on their treatment. Secondly, variation exists among
people’s ability to adapt (Chapter 6 ). People who have to make treatment decisions
might not only benefit from information about their failure to anticipate on adap-
tation and on their focusing illusion, but also from information on their personal
ability to adapt. Finally and most importantly, we always have to keep in mind that
patients do adapt but when given the choice they probably would not have wanted
to adapt in the first place.
10.2.5 Future research
Even from the findings described in this thesis and several studies performed
before20,38,40,107 the gap in health state utilities between patients and members of
the public can still not be fully explained with certainty. More research can always
be performed to further investigate mechanisms underlying this gap, but it can
be questioned if this will lead to more conclusive information. Based on previous
finings it seems that several mechanisms are layered on top of each other, although
adaptation and focusing illusion seem to have the most influence on health state
valuations.
Regarding policy, future research should concentrate on how the effect of adap-
tation and focusing illusion on health state utilities should be handled. Concerning
the ethical dilemma of using health state utilities shaped by adaptation, Menzel
et al.205 suggested that disabled and chronically ill should be consulted. In the
medical context future research should concentrate on how and which information
about the biases should be provided to patients. However, first the ability to antici-
pate on adaptation should be investigated among people who are confronted with a
treatment decision.
Finally it has to be emphasized that the findings described in this thesis are
based on physical health problems. From recent research we know that that the
gap in health state valuations between patients and members of the public might
be different for mental disorders. Given the burden of mental disorders on society,






Bij beslissingen over het al dan niet vergoeden van behandelingen wordt
vaak gebruikt gemaakt van kosteneffectiviteitsanalyses, waarin de kosten worden
afgezet tegen de baten. Voor het bepalen van deze baten is het nodig om een
waardering voor een bepaalde gezondheidstoestand te hebben. Een waardering kan
worden gegeven op basis van een gezondheidsbeschrijving of van de eigen ervaren
gezondheidstoestand en wordt meestal bepaald aan de hand van één van drie meth-
oden; de Visueel Analoge Schaal (VAS) Time TradeOff (TTO) of de Standard Gam-
ble (SG). De Visueel Analoge Schaal (VAS) is een lijn van 100 mm. die loopt van 0
(overleden of dood) tot 1 (perfecte gezondheid). Respondenten krijgen een omschri-
jving van een gezondheidstoestand en geven aan waar op deze lijn zij zich plaatsen
als ze zich in de beschreven gezondheidstoestand zouden bevinden. De afstand
tussen dood (0) en de plek die wordt aangeven is de waardering. De Time Trade-
Off (TTO) is een methode waarin respondenten afwegen hoeveel jaar ze in perfecte
gezondheid ze gelijk vinden aan een bepaald aantal jaar (in dit proefschrift wordt de
levensverwachting gebruikt) in de beschreven gezondheidstoestand. Hiervoor wor-
den respondenten allereerst gevraagd of ze liever x-jaar in perfecte gezondheid of
x-jaar in de beschreven gezondheidstoestand willen leven - na deze periode zou de
respondent plotseling overlijden. De meeste mensen kiezen dan voor x-jaar in per-
fecte gezondheid. Vervolgens wordt dezelfde vraag gesteld maar dan met x/2-jaar
in perfecte gezondheid. Ook nu maakt de respondent een keuze op basis waarvan
het aantal jaren in perfecte gezondheid weer wordt aangepast. De waardering is het
aantal jaar in perfecte gezondheid gedeeld door x (het aantal jaar in de beschreven
gezondheidstoestand). In de Standard Gamble maakt de respondent steeds een keuze
uit leven in de beschreven gezondheidstoestand of een kans (p) op perfecte gezond-
heid maar ook een kans van (1 − p) op overlijden. De kans op perfecte gezondheid
wordt, net zoals de jaren in de TTO, gevarieerd totdat de respondent niet meer kan
kiezen. Deze kans (p) is dan de waardering voor de beschreven gezondheidstoestand.
Dergelijke waarderingen, ook wel utiliteiten genoemd, worden meestal gegeven
door de algemene bevolking op basis van een gezondheidsbeschrijving die vaak sum-
mier is en de negatieve kant van de gezondheidstoestand overbelicht. Daarom is
gesuggereerd dat, in de plaats van de algemene bevolking, juist patiënten de waarder-
ing moeten geven. Patiënten hebben ervaring met de gezondheidstoestand en daar-
door een beter beeld van de situatie. In de praktijk blijkt de algemene bevolk-
ing lagere utiliteiten toe te kennen aan hypothetische gezondheidstoestanden dan
patiënten die ervaring hebben met die gezondheidstoestand. Het is daarom belan-
grijk inzicht te krijgen in de wijze waarop patiënten in vergelijking tot de algemene
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bevolking tot een oordeel komen over een bepaalde gezondheidstoestand. In dit
proefschrift hebben we gekeken naar welke aspecten ten grond slag liggen aan het
verschil in waarderen. Door hier inzicht in te krijgen, hoopten we een onderbouwde
suggestie te kunnen doen wiens gezondheidswaarderingen zouden moeten worden
gebruikt in kosteneffectiviteitsanalyses.
Omdat in de toch literatuur discussie blijft bestaan over het verschil in waarderen
tussen patiënten en algemene bevolking en de hogere waarderingen van patiën-
ten soms in twijfel getrokken worden, is in hoofdstuk 2 allereerst een beschrijving
gegeven van een meta-analyse waarin we dit verschil nader onderzocht hebben. Op
basis van 40 waarderingen voor gezondheidstoestanden van zowel patiënten als de
algemene bevolking - beschreven in 30 artikelen - zagen we dat patiënten signifi-
cant hogere waarderingen geven ten opzichte van de algemene bevolking. Wanneer
we deze gegevens opsplitsen naar methode (VAS, TTO & SG), bleek dit verschil
zowel in waarderingen gegeven op de VAS als op de TTO voor te komen, maar
niet in waarderingen gegeven op de SG. Daarnaast zagen we dat het verschil tussen
patiënten en algemene bevolking kleiner werd wanneer de te waarderen gezondheid-
stoestand was voorzien van de naam van de beschreven ziekte, of, wanneer patiënten
en de algemene bevolking beide waarderingen gaven aan gezondheidsbeschrijvingen.
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we het effect van de gezondheidbeschrijving op de
waardering. Patiënten met reuma werden gevraagd hun eigen situatie drie keer te
waarderen op de TTO aan de hand van drie verschillende omschrijvingen. Allereerst
gaven ze een waardering van hun eigen gezondheidstoestand zoals ze deze hadden
ervaren in de voorafgaande week, daarna van een EQ-5D beschrijving van hun eigen
situatie (waarvan ze niet wisten dat het over hun eigen situatie ging) en tot slot
een geïndividualiseerde EQ-5D beschrijving (waarvan ze wel wisten dat het over
hun eigen situatie ging). De EQ-5D beschrijving was gebaseerd op antwoorden die
patiënten eerder in het onderzoek gaven op de EQ-5D vragenlijst. De EQ-5D vra-
genlijst bestaat uit vijf vragen over de mate van problemen die patiënten hebben
op respectievelijk mobiliteit, zelfzorg, dagelijkse activiteiten, pijn & andere klachten
en angst & depressie. De mate van problemen op deze vijf domeinen vormt de EQ-
5D beschrijving. De EQ-5D beschrijving werd geïndividualiseerd door patiënten te
vragen welke aspecten belangrijk waren voor hun Kwaliteit van Leven (KvL) in de
voorafgaande week. Deze aspecten, maximaal vijf, werden aan de EQ-5D omschrijv-
ing toegevoegd. Uit de resultaten van deze studie bleek dat de gezondheidsbeschri-
jving weinig invloed heeft op de waardering, alle beschrijvingen werden hetzelfde
gewaardeerd. Wel zagen we een interactie effect; patiënten met een betere gezond-
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heidstoestand gaven een lagere waardering aan hun eigen gezondheidstoestand zoals
ze deze hadden ervaren in de voorafgaande week ten opzichte van de EQ-5D beschri-
jving en de geïndividualiseerde EQ-5D beschrijving. Mogelijk dachten deze patiën-
ten aan kleine irritaties (bijvoorbeeld dat ze vanwege medicatie geen alcohol konden
drinken op een feest) tijdens de waardering van hun eigen gezondheidstoestand van
de voorafgaande week. Het denken aan dergelijke irritaties zal veel minder waarschi-
jnlijk zijn tijdens de waardering van de EQ-5D, omdat zulke irritaties hier niet in
terug te zien zijn.
In hoofdstuk 4 gaan we verder in op de aspecten die patiënten genoemd hebben
tijdens het interview dat hierboven beschreven staat. Naast patiënten hebben we
hetzelfde interview ook bij mensen uit de algemene bevolking afgenomen. Deze
groep hebben we gevraagd welke aspecten zij belangrijk gevonden zouden hebben in
de voorafgaande week wanneer ze reuma zouden hebben zoals beschreven (Appendix
C). Daarnaast vroegen we alle deelnemers aan het onderzoek de eigen aspecten en
de EQ-5D domeinen op volgorde van belangrijkheid te leggen. Uit de genoemde
aspecten bleek dat de algemene bevolking gericht is op de negatieve invloed die
het hebben van reuma zal hebben op hun leven (focusing illusie) terwijl patiënten
zowel de negatieve als de positieve kant benoemen. Als we de eigen aspecten laten
vergelijken met de EQ-5D dimensies, zien we dat de algemene bevolking de EQ-
5D dimensies belangrijker vindt dan de eigen aspecten, terwijl patiënten de EQ-5D
dimensies en hun eigen aspecten even belangrijk vinden.
Naar aanleiding van de bevindingen die beschreven staan in hoofdstuk 3 wilden
we nagaan of de gezondheidsbeschrijving effect heeft op waarderingen van mensen
uit de algemene bevolking of partners van patiënten met reuma (hoofdstuk 5). Zoals
we hadden verwacht waren alle patiënt waarderingen hoger dan waarderingen van
de algemene bevolking en lagen waarderingen van partners er tussen in. Er bleek
echter ook hier geen effect van de gezondheidsbeschrijving op de waarderingen die
mensen uit de algemene bevolking of partners van patiënten gaven. Op basis van
de resultaten beschreven in dit en bovenstaande hoofdstukken lijkt het verschil in
waarderen tussen patiënten en algemene bevolking niet veroorzaakt te worden door
de beperkte gezondheidsbeschrijvingen.
In hoofdstuk 6 hebben we onderzocht of het vermogen van patiënten om zich
aan hun ziekte aan te passen invloed heeft op de waardering die patiënten geven.
Daarnaast hebben we onderzocht of het effect van dit vermogen om zich aan te
passen op waarderingen via mentale Kwaliteit van Leven (KvL) verloopt. Dat wil
zeggen, heeft het vermogen om aan te passen effect op mentale KvL dat dan weer de
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waarderingen beïnvloed, of is er een direct effect van het vermogen om aan te passen
op waarderingen. De waardering die patiënten met reuma gaven aan hun eigen
situatie van de voorafgaande week op zowel de TTO als op de VAS worden inderdaad
beïnvloed door het vermogen om aan te passen. Dit effect bleek grotendeels via
mentale KvL te verlopen. Het vermogen om zich aan een ziekte aan te passen heeft
effect op de mentale KvL en dit heeft effect op de waardering die patiënten geven.
We hebben het effect van aanpassing op waarderingen niet alleen onderzocht
onder patiënten met reuma maar ook onder patiënten met een dwarslaesie (Hoofd-
stuk 7). Patiënten met een dwarslaesie werden drie keer geïnterviewd, (1) zo snel
mogelijk na opname in het revalidatie centrum, (2) gedurende actieve revalidatie,
en (3) minstens een half jaar na ontslag uit het revalidatie centrum. Alle patiënten
gaven een waardering voor hun eigen gezondheidstoestand en voor een hypothetis-
che gezondheidstoestand (Appendix C). Daarnaast vulden we samen met patiënten
vragenlijsten in, waaronder een vragenlijst die de onafhankelijkheid in dagelijkse ac-
tiviteiten meet en een vragenlijst die de mate van aanpassing meet. De waardering
op de TTO en de VAS die patiënten gaven aan hun eigen gezondheidstoestand steeg
over de tijd. Op de VAS bleek dit effect geheel veroorzaakt te worden door de verbe-
tering in onafhankelijkheid in dagelijkse activiteiten. Met andere woorden, patiënten
revalideren en dat is terug te zien is in hun waardering voor hun eigen gezondheid-
stoestand op een VAS. Op de TTO wordt deze stijging slechts gedeeltelijk verklaard
door verbetering in onafhankelijkheid in dagelijkse activiteiten. Aanpassing verk-
laart verdere stijging, daarnaast blijft een gedeelte onverklaard. De waarderingen
op de VAS en TTO voor de hypothetische gezondheidstoestand blijken niet te ve-
randeren over de tijd. In hoofdstuk 8 beschrijven we een studie waarin we hebben
onderzocht of patiënten die nog maar weinig ervaring hebben met hun ziekte an-
ticiperen op aanpassing. We geven in dit hoofdstuk een omschrijving van twee
longitudinale studies. De eerste studie is uitgevoerd onder patiënten die recentelijk
een amputatie hadden ondergaan, de tweede studie is uitgevoerd onder patiënten
die recentelijk een stoma hadden gekregen. Patiënten gaven op twee momenten een
schatting van hun welzijn, functioneren en algemene gezondheid. Daarnaast gaven
ze in het eerste interview een schatting van hun verwachte waarderingen tijdens
het tweede interview. In de tweede studie gaven patiënten ook nog in het tweede
interview een schatting van hun waardering tijdens het eerste interview. Patiën-
ten verwachtten en herinnerden een significante vooruitgang over de tijd, maar de
werkelijke waarderingen waren niet vooruit gegaan. Mogelijkerwijs zijn deze inschat-
tingsfouten te wijten aan onrealistisch optimisme over de toekomst. Aan de andere
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kant kan het ook veroorzaakt zijn door de manier waarop welzijn, functioneren en
algemene gezondheid zijn gemeten. Misschien hebben patiënten in hun waardering
rekening gehouden met de periode dat ze uit het ziekenhuis waren. Patiënten die
een amputatie hadden ondergaan dachten waarschijnlijk in het eerste interview dat
hun functioneren best goed was gegeven dat ze pas een week ontslagen waren uit het
ziekenhuis, en in het tweede interview dat hun functioneren best goed was gegeven
dat ze al weer een maand ontslagen waren uit het ziekenhuis.
Tijdens ons onderzoek merkten we dat de mechanismen die wij probeerden
te onderzoeken niet altijd goed omschreven staan in de literatuur. In hoofdstuk 9
gaan we in op de conceptuele verwarring in de response shift-literatuur. Volgens
de response-shift theorie wordt er onterecht gesproken van verandering in KvL wan-
neer (1) patiënten het concept KvL veranderen (bijvoorbeeld: een patiënt waardeert
tijdens het eerste interview vooral lichamelijke gezondheid en op een later tijdstip
psychische gezondheid); (2) wanneer de waardering van aspecten van KvL verschuift
(bijvoorbeeld: een patiënt geeft eerst een lage waardering omdat hij of zij niet meer
kan sporten, maar over de tijd wordt het sporten minder belangrijk en hierdoor
stijgt de waardering van KvL) of; (3) wanneer patiënten de schaal waarop KvL
gemeten wordt anders gaan interpreteren (bijvoorbeeld: zoals beschreven in hoofd-
stuk 8, mogelijk hebben de patiënten hier hun antwoorden gegeven in relatie tot
wat ze verwachten voor de specifieke periode na ontslag uit het ziekenhuis). Wij
vragen ons af of een verandering van het concept van KvL en van waardering van
KvL niet vergelijkbaar zijn met aanpassing en daarmee valide veranderingen in KvL
veroorzaken.
Uit onze studies zoals hierboven beschreven blijkt dat het verschil in waarderin-
gen tussen patiënten en mensen uit de algemene bevolking niet zo zeer beïnvloed
wordt door de vaak beknopte gezondheidsbeschrijving, maar grotendeels ontstaat
door cognitieve processen binnen beide groepen. Enerzijds passen patiënten zich
aan hun situatie aan, terwijl mensen uit de algemene bevolking niet op deze aan-
passing anticiperen bij het geven van een waardering. Anderzijds is de algemene
bevolking gericht op de negatieve aspecten van de gezondheidstoestand. Dit zou
komen omdat zij zich focussen op het verschil tussen hun huidige toestand, meestal
perfecte gezondheid, en de gezondheidstoestand die ze moeten beoordelen. Omdat
beide groepen worden beïnvloed door deze cognitieve processen blijft het discutabel
wiens waardering een beter weergave geeft van de ernst van een ziekte. In de dis-
cussie gaan we hier op in.
Het lijkt duidelijk dat wanneer de algemene bevolking zich te zeer richt op alle
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negatieve aspecten van een gezondheidstoestand hun waarderingen ook te negatief
zullen zijn. Het is echter discutabel of waarderingen van patiënten te hoog worden
door aanpassing. Ondanks het feit dat fysiek de gezondheidstoestand niet verandert
over de tijd, kunnen patiënten wel een hogere waardering geven aan hun gezond-
heidstoestand na fysieke en psychische aanpassing. Wanneer een patiënt met een
dwarslaesie zich aanpast door zich bijvoorbeeld te richten op nieuwe activiteiten,
kan deze hierdoor gelukkiger worden. Moeten we in kosteneffectiviteitsanalyses
waarderingen voor de “objectieve” gezondheidstoestand gebruiken, of mag dergeli-
jke psychische aanpassing worden meegenomen? Na deze aanpassing gaat immers
wel de kwaliteit van leven van de patiënt omhoog. Het meenemen van aanpassing
in kosteneffectiviteitsanalyses zou echter kunnen zorgen voor een vermindert effect
van behandel methoden. De effectiviteit van een behandeling wordt bepaald aan
de hand van het verschil tussen de waardering voor en na behandeling. Wanneer
een patiënt een 0.8 geeft aan zijn of haar gezondheidstoestand kan een behandeling
maximaal een effect van 0.2 hebben, terwijl voor iemand uit de algemene bevolk-
ing die dezelfde gezondheidstoestand een 0.5 geeft de behandeling een effect van
0.5 kan hebben. Hierdoor ontstaat een ethisch probleem, het meenemen van aan-
passing zou een vermindering van beschikbaarheid van behandel methoden kunnen
veroorzaken. In een van onze studies hebben we gekeken naar waarderingen van
partners van patiënten. Deze waarderingen liggen tussen die van patiënten en de
algemene bevolking in. Mogelijk zijn ’partnerwaarderingen’ een goed alternatief;
partners hebben een beter beeld over het leven met een bepaalde gezondheidstoe-
stand maar worden minder beïnvloed door de verschillende cognitieve processen in
vergelijking met patiënten. Waar men zich bij patiënten kan afvragen of aanpassing
daadwerkelijk plaats vindt of dat patiënten hun situatie beter voor spiegelen om er
zo zelf mee om te kunnen gaan, lijkt dit bij partners minder van belang.
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RA health state description
Imagine that your have been diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. This means that:
• some of your joints in your fingers and feet are swollen
• you have pain due to mild inflation in your tendons
• you have difficulty performing fine motor skills with your hands
• you have sore feet after walking more than half an hour
• you have some problems with your self-care, such as brushing hair, tying knots,
washing your back, opening certain packages, and with cooking, e.g. with peel-
ing potatoes
• you have some difficulty in using a computer mouse or keyboard, and with
lifting items onto a shelf above your head at work




Coding system chapter 4
Physical (in)convenience RA-related
Physical inconvenience that is obviously related to RA such as stiffness, medi-
cation or pain. Taking a rest, physical state, and fatigue were also included as
well as undesirable effects of medication. Other aspects included were; the RA
was improved, that momentarily the RA did not give problems, constraints or
pain, or that it is possible to find solutions.
Illness/inconvenience not RA-related
Illness or inconvenience that is not RA-related, such as headache or kidney
problems. Losing weight and medication or undesirable effects of medication
are also included if these were not RA-related.
Family
Family or activities in which family was important, such as (grand)children or
party of a son. Family members who are ill are also included.
Other social contacts
Social contacts such as friends, colleagues or acquaintances excluding family
members.
Emotions/Worries
All emotions and worries and aspects in which the emotion or worry was most
important. Emotions due to social contacts like conflict with a child and in-
somnia due to emotions, are included; as well as worries due to medication,
the future or growing old. Hope, satisfaction, contentment, and rejoicing also
belong to this category.
Sports/Mobility
Sport activities and mobility, such as playing soccer, swimming, sitting inside,
constraints in walking and cycling around. Participants sometimes named as-
pects as walking or cycling as their sport, sometimes as (limitation) in their
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mobility and sometimes without referring to one of both. All aspects were in-
cluded in this domain, therefore no distinction could be made between sports
& mobility.
Leisure activities
Leisure activities, such as sewing or reading. When bicycling is named as a
pleasant, relaxing and social activity it is included as leisure activity instead
of a sport.
Work
All work related aspects. Housekeeping is also included.
Broad every day life
Performance of activities of daily living, such as I am able to do what I want,
I only need to adjust my tempo and am able to do the things someone does in
every day life.
Others
Dimensions that could not be included in any of the categories or that can be




[1] GGD rivierenland. Bofvirus in aantal nederlandse studentensteden, 2010.
[2] InfoNu.nl. Arthrose: Nieuwe kraakbeentransplantatietechniek, 2010.
[3] M.F. Drummond, G.L. Stoddart, and G.W. Torrance. Critical assess-
ment of economic evaluation. In Methods for the Economic Evaluation
of Helath Care Programmes, number 3, pages 18–38. Oxford Medical
publications, Oxford, 1990.
[4] A.M. Stiggelbout and J.C. de Haes. Patient preference for cancer ther-
apy: an overview of measurement approaches. Journal of Clinical On-
cology, 19(1):220–230, January 2001.
[5] C. Harries and A.M. Stiggelbout. Approaches to measuring patients’
decision-making. In Ebrahim S.(eds.) Bowling, A., editor, Handbook
of Health Research Methods: Investigation, Measurement and Analysis.,
number 16, pages 362–393. Open University/McGraw Hill, Maidenhead,
2005.
[6] Morgenstern O. Neumann J.von. Theory of games and economic behavior
(First Edition ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.
[7] G.W. Torrance. Social preferences for health states - empirical evalua-
tion of 3 measurement techniques. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences,
10(3):129–136, 1976.
[8] P. Wakker and A.M. Stiggelbout. Explaining distortions in utility elic-
itation through the rank-dependent model for risky choices. Medical
Decision Making, 15(2):180–186, April 1995.
[9] H. Bleichrodt. A new explanation for the difference between time trade-
off utilities and standard gamble utilities. Health Economics, 11(5):447–
456, July 2002.
[10] E. Nord. Methods for quality adjustment of life years. Social Science &
Medicine, 34(5):559–569, March 1992.
[11] P. Dolan. Modeling valuations for euroqol health states. Medical Care,
35(11):1095–1108, November 1997.
[12] M.R. Gold, J.E. Siegel, L.B. Russell, and M.C. Weinstein. Cost-
effectiveness in health and medicine. Oxford University Press Inc., New
York, 1996.
[13] Luijn JCF Wolff I. Riteco JA, Heij LJMD. Richtlijnen voor farmaco-
economisch onderzoek. rapport uigebracht aan de minister van volksge-
zondheid, welzijn en sport. amstelveen. Technical report, College voor
Zorgverzekeringen, 1999.
[14] National Institue for Clinical Excellence. Guide to the methods of
techonology appraisal. Technical report, NICE, 2004.
[15] A.M. Stiggelbout and E. Vogel-Voogt. Health state utilities: A frame-
work for studying the gap between the imagined and the real. Value in
Health, 11(1):76–87, January 2008.
[16] G.A. De Wit, J.J.V. Busschbach, and F.T. De Charro. Sensitivity
and perspective in the valuation of health status: Whose values count?
Health Economics, 9(2):109–126, March 2000.
[17] P. Dolan. Whose preferences count? Medical Decision Making,
19(4):482–486, October 1999.
[18] P.A. Ubel, G. Loewenstein, and C. Jepson. Whose quality of life? a
commentary exploring discrepancies between health state evaluations of
patients and the general public. Quality of Life Research, 12(6):599–607,
September 2003.
[19] D. Kahneman and A.B. Krueger. Developments in the measurement
of subjective well-being. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1):3–24,
2006.
[20] S.J. Jansen, A.M. Stiggelbout, P.P. Wakker, M.A. Nooij, E.M. Noordijk,
and J. Kievit. Unstable preferences: a shift in valuation or an effect of the
elicitation procedure? Medical Decision Making, 20(1):62–71, January
2000.
[21] J. Horsman, W. Furlong, D. Feeny, and G. Torrance. The health utili-
ties index (hui(r)): concepts, measurement properties and applications.
Health and Quality of Life Outcomes, 1 (54)(1):–, October 2003.
[22] P. Dolan, C. Gudex, P. Kind, and A. Williams. A social tariff for euroqol:
Results from a uk general population survey. Technical report, York,
York, 1995.
[23] R.P. Insinga and D.G. Fryback. Understanding differences between self-
ratings and population ratings for health in the euroqol. Quality of Life
Research, 12(6):611–619, September 2003.
170
[24] P.A. Ubel, G. Loewenstein, and C. Jepson. Disability and sunshine:
can hedonic predictions be improved by drawing attention to focusing
illusions or emotional adaptation? Journal of Experimental Psychology
Applied, 11(2):111–123, June 2005.
[25] P.A. Ubel, G. Loewenstein, J. Hershey, J. Baron, T. Mohr, D.A. Asch,
and C. Jepson. Do nonpatients underestimate the quality of life as-
sociated with chronic health conditions because of a focusing illusion?
Medical Decision Making, 21(3):190–199, May 2001.
[26] D.T. Gilbert, E.C. Pinel, T.D. Wilson, S.J. Blumberg, and T.P. Wheat-
ley. Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(3):617–638, September
1998.
[27] T.D. Wilson, T. Wheatley, J.M. Meyers, D.T. Gilbert, and D. Axsom.
Focalism: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 78(5):821–836, May 2000.
[28] M.F. Luce. Decision making as coping. Health Psychology, 24(4):S23–
S28, July 2005.
[29] G. Salkeld, M. Ryan, and L. Short. The veil of experience. do consumers
prefer what they know best? Health Economics, 9(3):267–270, April
2000.
[30] Tversky A. and Kahneman D. Loss aversion in riskless choice: a
reference-dependent model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
106(4):1039–1061, 1991.
[31] S. Frederick and G. Loewenstein. Hedonic adaptation. In D. Kahneman,
E. Diener, and N. Schwarz, editors, Well-Being The foundations of he-
donic psychology, number 16, pages 302–329. Russell sage Foundation,
New York, 1999.
[32] S.E. Taylor. Adjustment to threatening events - a theory of cognitive
adaptation. American Psychologist, 38(11):1161–1173, 1983.
[33] P. Brickman, D. Coates, and R. Janoffbulman. Lottery winners and
accident victims - is happiness relative. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 36(8):917–927, 1978.
[34] E. Diener, R.E. Lucas, and C.N. Scollon. Beyond the hedonic treadmill
- revising the adaptation theory of well-being. American Psychologist,
61(4):305–314, May 2006.
171
[35] P.A. Ubel. You’re stronger than you think, volume 1. The McGraw-Hill
companies, New York, 2006.
[36] P. Dolan and D. Kahneman. Interpretations of utility and their implica-
tions for the valuation of health. Economic Journal, 118(525):215–234,
January 2008.
[37] P.A. Ubel, G. Loewenstein, N. Schwarz, and D.M. Smith. Misimagin-
ing the unimaginable: The disability paradox and health care decision
making. Health Psychology, 24(4):S57–S62, July 2005.
[38] L.J. Damschroder, B.J. Zikmund-Fisher, and P.A. Ubel. The impact
of considering adaptation in health state valuation. Social Science &
Medicine, 61(2):267–277, July 2005.
[39] L.J. Damschroder, B.J. Zikmund-Fisher, and P.A. Ubel. Considering
adaptation in preference elicitations. Health Psychology, 27(3):394–399,
May 2008.
[40] P. Dolan. The effect of experience of illness on health state valuations.
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 49(5):551–564, May 1996.
[41] M.A. Sprangers and C.E. Schwartz. Integrating response shift into
health-related quality of life research: a theoretical model. Social Science
& Medicine, 48(11):1507–1515, June 1999.
[42] M. Ross. Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal
histories. Psychological Review, 96(2):341–357, April 1989.
[43] H.P. Lacey, D. Smith, and P.A. Ubel. Hope i die before i get old: mispre-
dicting happiness across the adult lifespan. Journal of Happiness Studies,
7:167–182, 2006.
[44] M.G.T. Dolders, M.P.A. Zeegers, W. Groot, and A. Ament. A meta-
analysis demonstrates no significant differences between patient and pop-
ulation preferences. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 59(7):653–664,
July 2006.
[45] S.E. Taylor, M.E. Kemeny, G.M. Reed, J.E. Bower, and T.L. Grue-
newald. Psychological resources, positive illusions, and health. American
Psychologist, 55(1):99–109, January 2000.
[46] K.E. Bremner, C.A. Chong, G. Tomlinson, S.M. Alibhai, and M.D.
Krahn. A review and meta-analysis of prostate cancer utilities. Med-
ical Decision Making, 27(3):288–298, May 2007.
172
[47] D. Feeny, W. Furlong, G.W. Torrance, C.H. Goldsmith, Z. Zhu, S. De-
Pauw, M. Denton, and M. Boyle. Multiattribute and single-attribute
utility functions for the health utilities index mark 3 system. Medical
Care, 40(2):113–128, February 2002.
[48] M.W. Lipsey and D.B. Wilson. Practival meta-analysis. Number 49.
Sage Puclications, Inc, California, 2001.
[49] D. Smith, R.L. Sherriff, L. Damschroder, G. Loewenstein, and P.A. Ubel.
Misremembering colostomies? former patients give lower utility ratings
than do current patients. Health Psychology, 25(6):688–695, November
2006.
[50] J.E Hunter and F.L. Schmidt. Methods of meta-analysis correcting error
and bias in research findings. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990.
[51] M. Borenstein, L. Hedges, J. Higgins, and H. Rothstein. Comprehensive
meta analysis, 2007.
[52] L.V. Hedges and I. Olkin. Statiscal methods for meta-analysis. Academic
Press, Orlando, FL, 1985.
[53] S. Duval and R. Tweedie. A nonparametric "trim and fill" method of
accounting for publication bias in meta-analysis. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 95(449):89–98, March 2000.
[54] A.S. Elstein and G.B. Chapman. Patients’ values and clinical substituted
judgments: The case of localized prostate cancer. Health Psychology,
24(4):S85–S92, July 2005.
[55] J.F. O’Leary, D.L. Fairclough, M.K. Jankowski, and J.C. Weeks. Com-
parison of time-tradeoff utilities and rating scale values of cancer patients
and their relatives: evidence for a possible plateau relationship. Medical
Decision Making, 15(2):132–137, April 1995.
[56] E.A. Calhoun, C.L. Bennett, P.A. Peeples, J.R. Lurain, P.Y. Roland,
J.M. Weinstein, and D.A. Fishman. Perceptions of cisplatin-related tox-
icity among ovarian cancer patients and gynecologic oncologists. Gyne-
cologic Oncology, 71(3):369–375, December 1998.
[57] M. Happich and B. Mazurek. Priorities and prospect theory. European
Journal of Health Economics, 3(1):40–46, 2002.
[58] X. Badia, M. Herdman, and P. Kind. The influence of ill-health expe-
rience on the valuation of health. Pharmacoeconomics, 13(6):687–696,
June 1998.
173
[59] X. Badia, A. Diaz-Prieto, M. Rue, and D.L. Patrick. Measuring health
and health state preferences among critically ill patients. Intensive Care
Medicine, 22(12):1379–1384, December 1996.
[60] J.H. Goldberg. Being there is important, but getting there matters too:
the role of path in the valuation process. Medical Decision Making,
26(4):323–337, July 2006.
[61] S. Hallan, A. Asberg, B. Indredavik, and T.E. Wideroe. Quality of
life after cerebrovascular stroke: a systematic study of patients’ prefer-
ences for different functional outcomes. Journal of Internal Medicine,
246(3):309–316, September 1999.
[62] V.S. Naraine, N.A. Risebrough, P. Oh, V.S. Blanchette, S. Lee, A.M.
Stain, D. Hedden, J.M. Teitel, and B.M. Feldman. Health-related
quality-of-life treatments for severe haemophilia: utility measurements
using the standard gamble technique. Haemophilia, 8(2):112–120, March
2002.
[63] S.T. Stewart, L. Lenert, V. Bhatnagar, and R.M. Kaplan. Utilities for
prostate cancer health states in men aged 60 and older. Medical Care,
43(4):347–355, April 2005.
[64] A.N.A. Tosteson, S.E. Gabriel, T.S. Kneeland, M.M. Moncur, P.D. Man-
ganiello, I. Schiff, B. Ettinger, and L.J. Melton. Has the impact of hor-
mone replacement therapy on health-related quality of life been under-
valued? Journal of Womens Health & Gender-Based Medicine, 9(2):119–
130, March 2000.
[65] J. Hall, K. Gerard, G. Salkeld, and J. Richardson. A cost utility analysis
of mammography screening in australia. Social Science & Medicine,
34(9):993–1004, May 1992.
[66] M.E. Suarez-Almazor and B. Conner-Spady. Rating of arthritis health
states by patients, physicians, and the general public. implications for
cost-utility analyses. Journal of Rheumatology, 28(3):648–656, March
2001.
[67] M.E. Suarez-Almazor, B. Conner-Spady, C.J. Kendall, A.S. Russell, and
K. Skeith. Lack of congruence in the ratings of patients’ health status by
patients and their physicians. Medical Decision Making, 21(2):113–121,
March 2001.
174
[68] J.A. Hayman, D.L. Fairclough, J.R. Harris, and J.C. Weeks. Patient
preferences concerning the trade-off between the risks and benefits of
routine radiation therapy after conservative surgery for early-stage breast
cancer. Journal of Clinical Oncology, 15(3):1252–1260, March 1997.
[69] J.A. Hayman, M.U. Kabeto, M.J. Schipper, J.E. Bennett, F.A. Vicini,
and L.J. Pierce. Assessing the benefit of radiation therapy after breast-
conserving surgery for ductal carcinoma-in-situ. Journal of Clinical On-
cology, 23(22):5171–5177, August 2005.
[70] A.E. Molzahn, H.C. Northcott, and J.B. Dossetor. Quality of life of
individuals with end stage renal disease: perceptions of patients, nurses,
and physicians. Annals Journal, 24(3):325–333, June 1997.
[71] V.R. Grann, J.S. Jacobson, V. Sundararajan, S.M. Albert, A.B. Troxel,
and A.I. Neugut. The quality of life associated with prophylactic treat-
ments for women with brca1/2 mutations. Cancer Journal From Scien-
tific American, 5(5):283–292, September 1999.
[72] L.A. Prosser, K.M. Kuntz, A. Bar-Or, and M.C. Weinstein. Patient
and community preferences for treatments and health states in multiple
sclerosis. Multiple Sclerosis, 9(3):311–319, June 2003.
[73] S.J. Cunningham and N.P. Hunt. A comparison of health state utilities
for dentofacial deformity as derived from patients and members of the
general public. European Journal of Orthodontics, 22(3):335–342, June
2000.
[74] J. Vanderdonk, P.C. Levendag, A.J. Kuijpers, F.H.J. Roest, J.D.F.
Habbema, C.A. Meeuwis, and P.I.M. Schmitz. Patient participation in
clinical decision-making for treatment of t3 laryngeal-cancer - a com-
parison of state and process utilities. Journal of Clinical Oncology,
13(9):2369–2378, September 1995.
[75] M. Happich and T. von Lengerke. Valuing the health state ’tinnitus’:
Differences between patients and the general public. Hearing Research,
207(1-2):50–58, September 2005.
[76] S.E. Gabriel, T.S. Kneeland, L.J. Melton, M.M. Moncur, B. Ettinger,
and A.N.A. Tosteson. Health-related quality of life in economic evalua-
tions for osteoporosis: Whose values should we use? Medical Decision
Making, 19(2):141–148, April 1999.
175
[77] M. Cappelli, L. Surh, L. Humphreys, S. Verma, D. Logan, A. Hunter, and
J. Allanson. Measuring women’s preferences for breast cancer treatments
and brca1/brca2 testing. Quality of Life Research, 10(7):595–607, 2001.
[78] S. Chen, A. Shaheen, and A. Garber. Cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit
analysis of using methotrexate vs goeckerman therapy for psoriasis. a pi-
lot study. Archives of Dermatology, 134(12):1602–1608, December 1998.
[79] J. Ashby, M. Ohanlon, and M.J. Buxton. The time trade-off technique
- how do the valuations of breast-cancer patients compare to those of
other groups. Quality of Life Research, 3(4):257–265, August 1994.
[80] J. Souchek, M.M. Byrne, P.A. Kelly, K. O’ Malley, M. Richardson,
C. Pak, H. Nelson, and M.E. Suarez-Almazor. Valuation of arthritis
health states across ethnic groups and between patients and community
members. MedicalCare, 43(9):921–928, September 2005.
[81] I.J. Korfage, H.J. de Koning, J.D.F. Habbema, F.H. Schroder, and M.L.
Essink-Bot. Side-effects of treatment for localized prostate cancer: are
they valued differently by patients and healthy controls? British Journal
of Urological International, 99(4):801–806, April 2007.
[82] E.A. Calhoun, D.A. Fishman, J.R. Lurain, E.E. Welshman, and C.L.
Bennett. A comparison of ovarian cancer treatments: analysis of util-
ity assessments of ovarian cancer patients, at-risk population, general
population, and physicians. Gynecologic Oncology, 93(1):164–169, April
2004.
[83] C.D. Wells, W.B. Murrill, and M.R. Arguedas. Comparison of health-
related quality of life preferences between physicians and cirrhotic pa-
tients: Implications for cost-utility analyses in chronic liver disease. Di-
gestive Diseases and Sciences, 49(3):453–458, March 2004.
[84] A.E. Clarke, M.K. Goldstein, D. Michelson, A.M. Garber, and L.A.
Lenert. The effect of assessment method and respondent population on
utilities elicited for gaucher disease. Quality of Life Research, 6(2):169–
184, March 1997.
[85] D.L. Sackett and G.W. Torrance. The utility of different health states as
perceived by the general public. Journal of Chronic Diseases, 31(11):697–
704, 1978.
[86] S.M. van Osch. Construction of TTO utilities. PhD thesis, Leiden Uni-
versity, 2007.
176
[87] R. Bender, C. Bunce, M. Clarke, S. Gates, S. Lange, N.L. Pace, and
K. Thorlund. Attention should be given to multiplicity issues in system-
atic reviews. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 61(9):857–865, September
2008.
[88] D. Polsky, R.J. Willke, K. Scott, K.A. Schulman, and H.A. Glick. A
comparison of scoring weights for the euroqol (c) derived from patients
and the general public. Health Economics, 10(1):27–37, January 2001.
[89] R. Brooks. Euroqol: The current state of play. Health Policy, 37(1):53–
72, July 1996.
[90] L.S. Matza, K.S. Boye, N. Yurgin, J. Brewster-Jordan, S. Mannix, J.M.
Shorr, and B.L. Barber. Utilities and disutilities for type 2 diabetes
treatment-related attributes. Quality of Life Research, 16(7):1251–1265,
September 2007.
[91] H.A. Llewellyn-Thomas, E.C. Thiel, and M.J. McGreal. Cancer patients’
evaluations of their current health states: the influences of expectations,
comparisons, actual health status, and mood. Medical Decision Making,
12(2):115–122, April 1992.
[92] M. Hagedoorn, S.G. Uijl, E. Van Sonderen, A.V. Ranchor, B.M.F. Grol,
R. Otter, B. Krol, W. Van den Heuvel, and R. Sanderman. Structure and
reliability of ware’s patient satisfaction questionnaire iii - patients’ satis-
faction with oncological care in the netherlands. Medical Care, 41(2):254–
263, February 2003.
[93] M. Rosenberg. Society and the Adolescent Self-Image., volume Revised
edition. CT: Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 1989.
[94] Ci3. Ci3 skimsoftware division rotterdam. Technical report, Sawtooth-
Software, USA, 2000.
[95] J.F. Fries, P. Spitz, R.G. Kraines, and H.R. Holman. Measurement of
patient outcome in arthritis. Arthritis and Rheumatism, 23(2):137–145,
1980.
[96] H.P. Lacey, A. Fagerlin, G. Loewenstein, D. Smith, J. Riis, and P.A.
Ubel. It must be awful for them: Perspective and task context affects
ratings for health conditions. Judgement and Decision Making, 1(2):146–
152, 2007.
177
[97] S.J. Walters and J.E. Brazier. Comparison of the minimally important
difference for two health state utility measures: Eq-5d and sf-6d. Quality
of Life Research, 14(6):1523–1532, August 2005.
[98] D.C. Hadorn. The role of public values in setting health-care priorities.
Social Science & Medicine, 32(7):773–781, 1991.
[99] D.G. Froberg and R.L. Kane. Methodology for measuring health-state
preferences .3. population and context effects. Journal of Clinical Epi-
demiology, 42(6):585–592, 1989.
[100] Y. Peeters and A.M. Stiggelbout. Health state valuations of patients
and the general public analytically compared: A meta-analytical com-
parison of patient and population health state utilities. Value in Health,
13(2):306–309, March 2010.
[101] M.F. Janssen, E. Birnie, J.A. Haagsma, and G.J. Bonsel. Comparing
the standard eq-5d three-level system with a five-level version. Value in
Health, 11(2):275–284, March 2008.
[102] P.F. Krabbe, M.E. Stouthard, M.L. Essink-Bot, and G.J. Bonsel. The ef-
fect of adding a cognitive dimension to the euroqol multiattribute health-
status classification system. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 52(4):293–
301, April 1999.
[103] R.A. Carr-Hill. Health related quality of life measurement–euro style.
Health Policy, 20(3):321–328, 1992.
[104] C. Gudex. Are we lacking a dimensions of energy in the euroqol in-
strument? In S. Bjork, editor, EuroQol conference proceedings: Lund
October 1991, number 6, pages 61–81. The Swedish Institute for Health
Economics, Lund, 1992.
[105] The EuroQol Group. Euroqol–a new facility for the measurement of
health-related quality of life. the euroqol group. Health Policy, 16(3):199–
208, December 1990.
[106] Rigby AS. Statistical methods in epidemiology. v. towards an under-
standing of the kappa coefficient. Disability and Rehabilitation 2000
May 20;22(8):339-344., 22(8):339–344, 2000.
[107] J. Riis, G. Loewenstein, J. Baron, and C. Jepson. Ignorance of hedo-
nic adaptation to hemodialysis: A study using ecological momentary
assessment. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 134(1):3–9,
February 2005.
178
[108] N.D. Weinstein. Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5):806–820, 1980.
[109] M.C. Lennon, B.P. Dohrenwend, A.J. Zautra, and J.J. Marbach. Coping
and adaptation to facial pain in contrast to other stressful life events.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(5):1040–1050, Novem-
ber 1990.
[110] Hilgard ER Ruch JC Lange AF Lenox JR Morgan AH and Sachs LB. The
psychophysics of cold pressor pain and its modification through hypnotic
suggestion. American Journal of Psychology, 87:93–105, 1974.
[111] N. Schwarz. Self-reports - how the questions shape the answers. American
Psychologist, 54(2):93–105, February 1999.
[112] D. M. Smith, N. Schwarz, T.R. Roberts, and P.A. Ubel. Why are you
calling me? how study introductions change response patterns. Quality
of Life Research, 15(4):621–630, May 2006.
[113] Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Zelfgerapporteerde medische con-
sumptie, gezondheid en leefstijl. Technical report, CBS, 2010.
[114] P.F.M. Stalmeier, M.K. Goldstein, A.M. Holmes, L. Lenert,
J. Miyamoto, A.M. Stiggelbout, G.W. Torrance, and J. Tsevat. What
should be reported in a methods section on utility assessment? Medical
Decision Making, 21(3):200–207, May 2001.
[115] Y. Peeters and A.M. Stiggelbout. Valuing health: does enriching a sce-
nario lead to higher utilities? Medical Decision Making, 29(3):334–342,
May 2009.
[116] N.F. Boyd, H.J. Sutherland, K.Z. Heasman, D.L. Tritchler, and B.J.
Cummings. Whose utilities for decision-analysis. Medical Decision Mak-
ing, 10(1):58–67, January 1990.
[117] Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek CBS. Overlevingstafels naar leeftijd
en geslacht 2005. Technical report, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek,
September 2007.
[118] M.L. Essink-Bot. Beschrijvend kwaliteit van leven-onderzoek. In
M.P.M.H. Rutten-van Molken, J.J.V. Busschbach, and F.F.H. Rutten,
editors, Van Kosten tot Effecten, number Hoofdstuk 5, pages 63–72. El-
sevier gezondheidszorg, Maarsen, 2000.
179
[119] J. Tsevat. What do utilities measure? Medical Care, 38(9):160–164,
September 2000.
[120] R. Arnold. Quality of life in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and
chronic heart failure. PhD thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2004.
[121] R.E. Lucas. Adaptation and the set-point model of subjective well-being
- does happiness change after major life events? Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 16(2):75–79, April 2007.
[122] J.E. Sherman, D.J. DeVinney, and K.B. Sperling. Social support and ad-
justment after spinal cord injury: Influence of past peer-mentoring expe-
riences and current live-in partner. Rehabilitation Psychology, 49(2):140–
149, May 2004.
[123] E. Martz, H. Livneh, M. Priebe, L.A. Wuermser, and L. Ottomanelli.
Predictors of psychosocial adaptation among people with spinal cord
injury or disorder. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation,
86(6):1182–1192, June 2005.
[124] J.R. Rodrigue, W.F. Kanasky Jr, S.I. Jackson, and M.G. Perri. The
psychosocial adjustment to illness scale–self-report: factor structure and
item stability. Psycholigy Assessments, 12(4):409–413, December 2000.
[125] V.S. Helgeson and H.L. Fritz. Cognitive adaptation as a predictor of new
coronary events after percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty.
Psychosomatic Medicine, 61(4):488–495, July 1999.
[126] V.S. Helgeson. Applicability of cognitive adaptation theory to predicting
adjustment to heart disease after coronary angioplasty. Health Psychol-
ogy, 18(6):561–569, November 1999.
[127] I.W.S. Chan, J.C.L. Lai, and K.W.N. Wong. Resilience is associated
with better recovery in chinese people diagnosed with coronary heart
disease. Psychology & Health, 21(3):335–349, June 2006.
[128] T. Moore, P. Norman, P.R. Harris, and M. Makris. Cognitive appraisals
and psychological distress following venous thromboembolic disease: An
application of the theory of cognitive adaptation. Social Science &
Medicine, 63(9):2395–2406, November 2006.
[129] H.E. Stiegelis, M. Hagedoorn, R. Sanderman, K.I. van der Zee, B.R.
Buunk, and M.C.M. van den Bergh. Cognitive adaptation: A compari-
son of cancer patients and healthy references. British Journal of Health
Psychology, 8:303–318, September 2003.
180
[130] V.S. Helgeson. Cognitive adaptation, psychological adjustment, and dis-
ease progression among angioplasty patients: 4 years later. Health Psy-
chology, 22(1):30–38, January 2003.
[131] J.R. Ickovics, S. Milan, R. Boland, E. Schoenbaum, P. Schuman, and
D. Vlahov. Psychological resources protect health: 5-year survival and
immune function among hiv-infected women from four us cities. Aids,
20(14):1851–1860, September 2006.
[132] C.F. Ratelle, R.J. Vallerand, Y. Chantal, and P. Provencher. Cogni-
tive adaptation and mental health: A motivational analysis. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 34(4):459–476, July 2004.
[133] B. Major, C. Richards, M.L. Cooper, C. Cozzarelli, and J. Zubek. Per-
sonal resilience, cognitive appraisals, and coping: An integrative model
of adjustment to abortion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
74(3):735–752, March 1998.
[134] P.L. Tomich and V.S. Helgeson. Cognitive adaptation theory and breast
cancer recurrence: Are there limits? Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 74(5):980–987, October 2006.
[135] J.D. Creswell, W.T. Welch, S.E. Taylor, D.K. Sherman, T.L. Grue-
newald, and T. Mann. Affirmation of personal values buffers neu-
roendocrine and psychological stress responses. Psychological Science,
16(11):846–851, November 2005.
[136] B. Spilker and D.A. Revicki. Taxonomy of quality of life. In P. Spinhoven,
editor, Quality of Life and Pharmacoeconomics in Clinical Trails, volume
Second Edition, pages 25–32. Lippincott-Raven Publishers, Philadelphia,
1996.
[137] A.D. Wu and B.D. Zumbo. Understanding and using mediators and
moderators. Social Indicators Research, 87(3):367–392, July 2008.
[138] E.J. Hurkmans, S. Maes, V. De Gucht, K. Knittle, A.J. Peeters, H.K.
Ronday, and T.P.M. Vliet Vlieland. Motivation as a determinant of
physical activity in patients with rheumatoid arthritis. Arthritis Care &
Research, 62(3):371–377, March 2010.
[139] A.M. Stiggelbout, E. Vogel-Voogt, E.M. Noordijk, and T.P.M.
Vliet Vlieland. Individual quality of life: adaptive conjoint analysis as an
alternative for direct weighting? Quality of Life Research, 17(4):641–649,
May 2008.
181
[140] Jr. Ware, J.E., M.K. Snyder, W.R. Wright, and A.R. Davies. Defining
and measuring patient satisfaction with medical care. Evaluation and
Program Planning, 6(3-4):247–263, 1983.
[141] M.F. Scheier and C.S. Carver. Optimism, coping, and health - assessment
and implications of generalized outcome expectancies. Health Psychology,
4(3):219–247, 1985.
[142] L.I. Pearlin and C. Schooler. The structure of coping. Journal of Health
Social Behavior, 19(1):2–21, March 1978.
[143] J.E. Ware and C.D. Sherbourne. The mos 36-item short-form health
survey (sf-36) .1. conceptual-framework and item selection. Medical Care,
30(6):473–483, June 1992.
[144] A.M. Stiggelbout, G.M. Kiebert, J. Kievit, J.W. Leer, J.D. Habbema,
and J.C. de Haes. The "utility" of the time trade-off method in can-
cer patients: feasibility and proportional trade-off. Journal of Clinical
Epidemiology, 48(10):1207–1214, October 1995.
[145] F.E. van Nooten, X. Koolman, and W.B. Brouwer. The influence of
subjective life expectancy on health state valuations using a 10 year tto.
Health Economics, 18(5):549–558, May 2009.
[146] J.M. Morea, R. Friend, and R.M. Bennett. Conceptualizing and mea-
suring illness self-concept: A comparison with self-esteem and optimism
in predicting fibromyalgia adjustment. Research in Nursing & Health,
31(6):563–575, December 2008.
[147] M.F. Scheier, C.S. Carver, and M.W. Bridges. Distinguishing optimism
from neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem) - a
reevaluation of the life orientation test. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 67(6):1063–1078, December 1994.
[148] R.M. Baron and D.A. Kenny. The moderator mediator variable dis-
tinction in social psychological-research - conceptual, strategic, and sta-
tistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
51(6):1173–1182, December 1986.
[149] M.E. Sobel. Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in struc-
tural equitions models. In S. Leinhart, editor, Sociological methodology,
pages 290–312. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1982.
[150] R. Arnold, A.V. Ranchor, R. Sanderman, G.I.J.M. Kempen, J. Ormel,
and T.P.B.M. Suurmeijer. The relative contribution of domains of quality
182
of life to overall quality of life for different chronic diseases. Quality of
Life Research, 13(5):883–896, June 2004.
[151] D.A. Revicki and R.M. Kaplan. Relationship between psychometric and
utility-based approaches to the measurement of health-related quality-
of-life. Quality of Life Research, 2(6):477–487, December 1993.
[152] A. Campbell. Subjective measures of well-being. American Psychologist,
31(2):117–124, 1976.
[153] J.C. de Haes and K. Welvaart. Quality of life after breast cancer surgery.
Journal of Surgical Oncology, 28(2):123–125, February 1985.
[154] B.G. Tabachnick and L.S. Fidell. Using multivariate statistics, volume
Fourth Edition. Allyn & Bacon, Needham Heights, MA, 2001.
[155] L.M. McCracken. Learning to live with the pain: acceptance of pain
predicts adjustment in persons with chronic pain. Pain, 74(1):21–27,
January 1998.
[156] P.A. Ubel, R.A. Hirth, M.E. Chernew, and A.M. Fendrick. What is the
price of life and why doesn’t it increase at the rate of inflation? Archives
of Internal Medicine, 163(14):1637–1641, July 2003.
[157] M.W.M. Post, A.J. van Dijk, F.W.A. van Asbeck, and A.J.P. Schri-
jvers. Life satisfaction of persons with spinal cord injury compared to
a population group. Scandinavian Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine,
30(1):23–30, March 1998.
[158] M.W.M. Post, L.P. de Witte, F.W. van Asbeck, A.J. van Dijk, and A.J.
Schrijvers. Predictors of health status and life satisfaction in spinal cord
injury. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 79(4):395–401,
April 1998.
[159] S. Folkman and J.T. Moskowitz. Positive affect and the other side of
coping. American Psychologist, 55(6):647–654, June 2000.
[160] R.G. Tedeschi and L.G. Calhoun. The posttraumatic growth inventory:
Measuring the positive legacy of trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
9(3):455–471, July 1996.
[161] S.J.T. Jansen, J. Kievit, M.A. Nooij, and A.M. Stiggelbout. Stability
of patients’ preferences for chemotherapy: The impact of experience.
Medical Decision Making, 21(4):295–306, July 2001.
183
[162] T.D. Wilson and D.T. Gilbert. Affective forecasting - knowing what to
want. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(3):131–134, June
2005.
[163] C.S. Saigal, J. Gornbein, K. Reid, and M.S. Litwin. Stability of time
trade-off utilities for health states associated with the treatment of
prostate cancer. Quality of Life Research, 11(5):405–414, August 2002.
[164] C.F. van Koppenhagen, M.W. Post, L.H. van der Woude, S. de Groot,
L.P. de Witte, F.W. van Asbeck, Heuvel W. van den, and E. Lindeman.
Recovery of life satisfaction in persons with spinal cord injury during
inpatient rehabilitation. American Journal of Physical Medicine & Re-
habilitation, 88(11):887–895, November 2009.
[165] C. Collin, S. Davis, V. Horne, and D.T. Wade. Reliability of the barthel
adl index. International Journal of Rehabilitation Research, 10(3):356–
357, 1987.
[166] N.M. Crewe and J.S. Krause. An eleven-year follow-up of adjustment to
spinal cord injury. Rehabilitation Psychology, 35(4):205–210, 2006.
[167] M.W.M. Post, F.W. van Asbeck, A.J. van Dijk, and A.J. Schrijvers.
Dutch interview version of the barthel index evaluated in patients
with spinal cord injuries. Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Geneeskunde,
139(27):1376–1380, July 1995.
[168] K.T. Lucke, H. Coccia, J.S. Goode, and J.F. Lucke. Quality of life in
spinal cord injured individuals and their caregivers during the initial 6
months following rehabilitation. Quality of Life Research, 13(1):97–110,
February 2004.
[169] W.B. Mortenson, L. Noreau, and W.C. Miller. The relationship between
and predictors of quality of life after spinal cord injury at 3 and 15
months after discharge. Spinal Cord., 48(1):73–79, January 2010.
[170] J.S. Krause. Adjustment after spinal cord injury: A 9-year longitudinal
study. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 78(6):651–657,
June 1997.
[171] A. Schwartz, G. Hazen, A. Leifer, and P. Heckerling. Life goals and
health decisions: What will people live (or die) for? Medical Decision
Making, 28(2):209–219, March 2008.
[172] J.C. de Haes, J.H. de Ruiter, R. Tempelaar, and B.J. Pennink. The
distinction between affect and cognition in the quality of life of cancer
184
patients–sensitivity and stability. Quality of Life Research, 1(5):315–322,
October 1992.
[173] A. Robinson, P. Dolan, and A. Williams. Valuing health status using
vas and tto: What lies behind the numbers? Social Science & Medicine,
45(8):1289–1297, October 1997.
[174] P.F.M. Stalmeier, L.M. Lamers, J.J.V. Busschbach, and P.F.M. Krabbe.
On the assessment of preferences for health and duration - maximal en-
durable time and better than dead preferences. Medical Care, 45(9):835–
841, September 2007.
[175] D.T. Gilbert, M.D. Lieberman, C.K. Morewedge, and T.D. Wilson. The
peculiar longevity of things not so bad. Psychological Science, 15(1):14–
19, January 2004.
[176] T.D. Wilson and D.T. Gilbert. How happy was i, anyway? a tetrospec-
tive impact bias. Social Cognition, 21(6):421–446, 2003.
[177] Ubel P. A. Jankovic A. Smith D.M. Langa K. M. and Fagerlin A. What
is perfect health to an 85-year-old?: Evidence for scale recalibration in
subjective health ratings. Medical Care, 43(10):1054–1057, 2005.
[178] G. Loewenstein and D Schkade. Wouldn’t it be nice? predicting future
feelings. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, and N. Schwarz, editors, Well-
Being The foundations of Hedonic Psychology, number 5, pages 85–105.
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1999.
[179] D.T. Gilbert, M.J. Gill, and T.D. Wilson. The future is now: Temporal
correction in affective forecasting. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 88(1):430–444, May 2002.
[180] K.J. Smith, J. Tsevat, R.B. Ness, H.C. Wiesenfeld, and M.S. Roberts.
Quality of life utilities for pelvic inflammatory disease health states. Sex-
ually Transmitted Diseases, 35(3):307–311, March 2008.
[181] D.A. Schkade and D. Kahneman. Does living in california make people
happy? a focusing illusion in judgments of life satisfaction. Psychological
Science, 9(5):340–346, September 1998.
[182] G. Loewenstein. Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(3):272–292, March
1996.
185
[183] E. Diener, R.A. Emmons, R.J. Larsen, and S. Griffin. The satisfaction
with life scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49(1):71–75, 1985.
[184] Smith D.M. Loewenstein G. Jankovich A. and Ubel P.A. The dark side
of hope: Lack of adaptation to a temporary versus permanent disability.
Health Psychology (In Press), 2010.
[185] Tversky A. and Kahneman D. Advances in prospect-theory - cumulative
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4):297–
323, October 1992.
[186] R.E. Lucas. Long-term disability is associated with lasting changes in
subjective well-being: Evidence from two nationally representative longi-
tudinal studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(4):717–
730, April 2007.
[187] D.M. Smith, G. Loewenstein, P. Rozin, R.L. Sherriff, and P.A. Ubel.
Sensitivity to disgust, stigma, and adjustment to life with a colostomy.
Journal of Research in Personality, 41(4):787–803, August 2007.
[188] C.E. Schwartz and M.A. Sprangers. Methodological approaches for as-
sessing response shift in longitudinal health-related quality-of-life re-
search. Social Science & Medicine, 48(11):1531–1548, June 1999.
[189] F. X. Gibbons. Social comparison as a mediator of response shift. social
science and medicine. Social Science and Medicine, 48(11):1517–1530,
1999.
[190] Daltroy L. Larson M. Eaton H. Phillips C. and Liang M. Discrepancies
between self-reported and observed physical function in the elderly: The
influence of response shift and other factors. Social Science and Medicine,
48:1549–1561, 1999.
[191] Schwartz C. and Sendor R. Helping others helps oneself: Response shift
effects in peer support. Social Science and Medicine, 48:1563–1575, 1999.
[192] I. B. Wilson. Clinical understanding and clinical implications of response
shift. Social Science and Medicine, 48(11):1577–1588, 1999.
[193] C.E. Schwartz, R. Bode, N. Repucci, J. Becker, M.A.G. Sprangers, and
P.M. Fayers. The clinical significance of adaptation to changing health:
A meta-analysis of response shift. Quality of Life Research, 15(9):1533–
1550, November 2006.
186
[194] G.L. Albrecht and P.J. Devlieger. The disability paradox: high quality
of life against all odds. Social Science & Medicine, 48(8):977–988, April
1999.
[195] P. Ekman. Emotions Revealed. New York: Times Books., 2003.
[196] J. C. Brunstein. Personal goals and subjective well-being: A longitudinal
study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(5):1061–1070,
1993.
[197] Lepore S. J. and Eton D. T. Response shifts in prostate cancer patients:
An evaluation of suppressor and buffer modes. Washington, D.C.: Amer-
ican Psychological Association., 2000.
[198] Kahneman D. Wakker P. P. and Sarin R. Back to bentham? explorations
of experienced utility. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2):375–
405, 1997.
[199] Loewenstein G. and Ubel P.A. Hedonic adaptation and the role of deci-
sion and experience utility in public policy. Journal of Public Economics,
92(8-9):1795–1810, 2008.
[200] Brossart D. Clay D. and Willson V. Methodological and statistical con-
siderations for threats to internal validity in pediatric outcome data:
Response shift in self-report outcomes. Journal of Pediatric Psychology,,
27(1):97–107, 2002.
[201] Schwartz C. Sprangers M. Carey A. and Reed G. Exploring response
shift in longitudinal data. Psychology & Health, 19(1):51–59, 2004.
[202] D.M. Smith, G. Loewenstein, C. Jepson, A. Jankovich, H.I. Feldman,
and P.A. Ubel. Mispredicting and misremembering: Patients with renal
failure overestimate improvements in quality of life following a kidney
transplant. Health Psychology, 27(5):653–658, 2008.
[203] D. Kahneman. Determinants of health economic decisions in actual prac-
tice: The role of behavioral economics. Value in Health, 9(2):65–67, 2006.
[204] F.J. Oort. Using structural equation modeling to detect response shifts
an true change. Quality of Life Research, 14(3):587–98, 2005.
[205] P. Menzel, P. Dolan, J. Richardson, and J.A. Olsen. The role of adap-
tation to disability and disease in health state valuation: a preliminary
normative analysis. Social Science & Medicine, 55(12):2149–2158, De-
cember 2002.
187
[206] J. Halpern and R.M. Arnold. Affective forecasting: An unrecognized
challenge in making serious health decisions. Journal of General Internal
Medicine, 23(10):1708–1712, October 2008.
188
Publications
Peeters, Y., Vliet Vlieland T.P.M, and Stiggelbout, A.M.; Focusing illusion,
adaptation and EQ-5D health state descriptions: The difference between pa-
tients and public. Health Expectations 2011 Mar 3, Epub ahead of print.
Peeters, Y., Ranchor A.V., Vliet Vlieland T.P.M, and Stiggelbout, A.M.;Effect
of adaptive abilities on utilities, direct or mediated by mental health? Health
Quality of Life Outcomes 2010, 12 (8):130
Peeters, Y., and Stiggelbout, A.M.; Health state valuations of patients and
general public analytically compared; A meta-analytical comparison of patient
and population health state utilities. Value in Health 2010, 13(2): 306-309
Peeters, Y., and Stiggelbout, A.M.; Valuing health: Does enriching a scenario
lead to higher utilities? Medical Decision Making 2009, 29 (3): 334-342
Peeters, Y., Boersma, S.N., and Koopman, H.M.; Predictors of quality of life:
A quantitative investigation of the stress-coping model in children with asthma.
Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 2008, 6: 24
Ubel P.A., Peeters Y., Smith, D.M.; Abandoning the Language of “Response
Shift”: A Plea for Conceptual Clarity in Distinguishing Scale Recalibration
from True Changes in Quality of Life. Quality of Life Research 2010, 19
(4):465-471.
Vermunt, R., Peeters, Y., Berggren, K.; How fair treatment affects saliva corti-
sol release in stressed low and high type-A behavior individuals. Scandinavian
Journal of Psychology 2007; 48: 547-555.
Peeters, Y., Putter, H., Snoek, G.J., Sluis, T.A.R., Smit, C.A.J., Post, M.W.M.,
Stiggelbout, A.M.; The influence of time and adaptation on health state valu-
ations in patients with Spinal Cord Injury. Under revision (Medical Decision
Making)
Peeters, Y., Smith, D.M., Loewenstein, G., and Ubel, P.A.; Newly disabled
patients expect to adapt to their condition. Conditionally Accepted (Journal
of Happiness Studies)
Stiggelbout A.M., Peeters Y., de Jong Z.; Health state utilities from patients,
partners and the public: in search of an explanation for the gap between the




Yvette Peeters werd op 12 augustus 1981 geboren in Venlo, als kind van
Hans Peeters en Riki Jacobs en zusje van Vivian. In 1999 behaalde ze haar
VWO diploma aan het Bouwens van der Boijecollege in Panningen en begon
zij aan haar studie psychologie aan de Universiteit Leiden. Als onderdeel van
haar studie volgde ze een onderzoeksstage aan de Högskolan i Skövde (Zweden)
en een klinische stage aan het Willem-Alexander Kinder- en Jeugdcentrum van
het Leids Universitair Medisch Centrum. Eind 2005 behaalde ze haar doctoraal
examen in zowel Methoden en Technieken als Klinische- en Gezondheidspsy-
chologie.
In 2006 begon zij haar promotieonderzoek in dienst van de Universiteit
Leiden, bij de afdeling Medische Besliskunde van het Leids Universitair Medisch
Centrum waarvan de resultaten staan beschreven in dit proefschrift. In het
kader van dit onderzoek heeft ze in 2009 een bezoek gebracht aan het Center
for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine (CBSSM) van de University of
Michigan (U.S.), waar ze heeft samengewerkt met Prof. dr. Peter A. Ubel en
dr. Dylan M. Smith. Naast haar onderzoek heeft ze in 2007 in het bestuur
gezeten van het Leids Promovendi Overleg en momenteel is ze associate edi-
tor van het Journal of European Psychology Students (JEPS) een tijdschrift
gericht op studies uitgevoerd door studenten. Samen met haar partner Jan
Edelaar kreeg ze in 2010 een zoon, Kyan.
Na haar promotie onderzoek zal ze in juni 2011 starten op het project
“Web-based time trade-off incorporating interviewer help: efficiency with va-
lidity” op de afdeling Medische Besliskunde van het Leids Universitair Medisch
Centrum. Hiervoor heeft ze samen met haar collega’s een subsidie gekregen
van ZonMW.
Je kunt niet anders zijn dan wie je bent




Prof. dr. A. M. Stiggelbout, Anne; dat je als promotor mij met je kennis en
wijsheid hebt bijgestaan hoort erbij, maar je snelle reacties, betrokkenheid, en
de vaak praktische tips horen minder vanzelfsprekend bij de functie, ik wil je
hier oprecht voor bedanken. Omdat je naast promotor ook mijn dagelijkse
begeleider bent geworden zou ik je daar ook nog graag voor willen bedanken,
maar dat zou tegen de LUMC regels voor het dankwoord zijn.
Nanny ook jou wil ik graag bedanken voor je betrokkenheid maar ook voor je
ondersteuning bij het afnemen en verwerken van de interviews, het voelde als
teamwork.
Mijn (ex) kamergenoten en mijn collega’s van de afdeling Medische Besliskunde
bedankt voor jullie steun, kritische vragen en waardevolle opmerkingen.
Next I want to thank Prof. dr. Peter A. Ubel and Dr. Dylan M. Smith you
taught me a lot in a short period of time and your enthusiasm was inspiring.
Yet, my stay in Michigan could not have been so nice without the support of
all other members of the Center for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine
(CBSSM).
Tot slot wil ik me richten op alle respondenten die vrijwillig hebben meegewerkt
en natuurlijk ook de medewerkers van de verschillende afdelingen (artsen, psy-
chologen, verpleegkundigen en de medewerkers van de planning) die betrokken
zijn geweest bij het project; de polikliniek en Sole Mio van de afdeling Reuma-
tologie van het LUMC, Het Roessingh centrum voor revalidatie, Rijndam reval-
idatiecentrum, Reade revalidatie, Revalidatiecentrum De Hoogstraat, Sophia
Revalidatie en Heliomare.
193
